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Two Montana State University faculty members and a for 
mer University student have worked together to produce the 
comprehensive report on Montana’s reapportionment problems 
which appears in this issue of the Quarterly.
Dr. Ellis Waldron, who has written all but two parts of the 
discussion, has taught political science at Montana State Uni 
versity since 1950, except for last year which he spent at the 
Harvard Law School as a Fellow in Law and Political Science. 
He was Graduate Dean at Montana State University from 1957 
to 1961. He has an A.B. degree from Ohio State University and 
M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in political science from the University 
of Wisconsin.
His particular interests are American constitutional law and 
legislative problems which he first studied at the University 
of Wisconsin under Dr. E. E. Witte, an early head of the famed 
Wisconsin Legislative Reference Service. As a United Press 
Staff Correspondent, Dr. Waldron reported on Ohio govern 
mental affairs and its legislature from 1941 to 1944. His semi 
nar in legislative problems has made field trips to the Montana 
Legislative Assembly since 1953, and a research grant from 
the Montana Historical Society enabled him to spend much 
time in Helena during the 1957 session. In that year he pre 
pared a Legislative Handbook for distribution by the Montana 
Legislative Council. His Montana Politics Since 1864—An 
Atlas oj Elections was published by the Montana State Univer 
sity Press in 1958; and in 1961 he compiled a survey of Munici 
pal Facilities and Services in Montana. He participated in 
the urban planning studies of the Upper Midwest Economic 
Study and contributed to its 1963 report, The Why and How oj 
Community Planning.
Mr. Douglas C. Chaffey received his B.A. degree in political 
science from Montana State University in 1963 and his M.A. 
degree in political science from the University of Wisconsin in 
1964. He currently is working toward his doctorate at Wiscon 
sin, and is also employed as a project assistant in that Univer-
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sources but few media could justify a study of the Montana 
situation such as that prepared by Dr. Waldron, Mr. Chaffey, 
and Dr. Reinhardt for the Quarterly.
Similarly, Maxine Johnson’s semi-annual discussion of the 
business outlook comes closer to providing operational data for 
Montana business and political executives than can the most 
learned treatise by any pundit interpreting the “big picture” 
of the whole economy.
The Spring publication will more than compensate for the 
unusual concentration of this issue. The manuscripts that we 
are currently editing deal with the special risks of small busi 
ness, the coal resources of Montana, the new Uniform Com 
mercial Code, the forest industries in Montana’s economy, the 
pros and cons of sales taxes, the development of the state’s 
tourist attractions, and the increased rate of change to which 
all enterprises must adjust more quickly and accurately than 
ever before.
We are mindful of the interests and needs of our readers and 
request your tolerance should the contents of this issue appear 
to be a departure from established editorial policy.
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The Nation
The American economy’s longest period of business expan 
sion since World War II, which began in February 1961 and 
is still underway, will continue through all or most of 1965. 
This is the consensus of the experts, although some of the less 
confident foresee a possible slowing down or falling off of 
business activity toward the end of the year. The question, 
as the economists see it, is not whether 1965 as a whole will be 
a good business year, but whether this happy situation can 
continue into 1966.
Among the reasons for the current optimism is the moder 
ation which has characterized recent economic activity. Con 
sumers responded rather cautiously to last year’s tax cut, in 
creasing their purchases in a prudent manner; businessmen 
have used discretion in accumulating inventory; and so far 
labor costs have remained relatively stable as increased pro 
duction has largely offset wage raises. As a result, our pre 
sent economic position is remarkably free of the type of dis 
tortion which frequently brings about “readjustment” in the 
form of a general business slowdown. Also, partly because of 
this moderation, very little inflation has occurred during this 
expansion period. Consumer prices last year averaged less 
than 4 percent higher than they were in 1961.
Because 1964 was a year of abundance for most Americans, 
it was easy to forget that the unemployed and the poverty- 
stricken still constitute a national problem. Unemployment 
did decline during the year; in November it was estimated 
at 5 percent of the labor force. The goal of an unemployment
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rate of 4 percent or less remains some distance away. In fact, 
the rate of unemployment may increase in 1965 as an es 
pecially large number of 18-year-olds, many lacking the skills 
necessary to land jobs, enters the labor market. Special ap 
proaches to the unemployment problem will be necessary to 
eliminate the incongruous combination of the greatest pros 
perity in history and excessive unemployment.
The total value of goods and services produced in 1964 (the 
gross national product) was in the neighborhood of $624 bil 
lion, about 7 percent above the $583.9 billion gross national 
product in 1963. Spending by consumers (whose purchases 
account for nearly two-thirds of gnp) plus business and state 
and local government spending was responsible for most of 
the increase.1 The same three segments of the economy—con 
sumers, business, and government—are expected to promote 
a gain of some $30-35 billion, or 5 to 6 percent in the gross 
national product in 1965. Most forecasters who expect a 
growth of this size assume that a further tax reduction (prob 
ably the elimination of excise taxes) around midyear will 
stimulate consumer spending.
A gross national product of $650-660 billion in 1965 will 
represent a gain of around 30 percent since 1960, a much more 
satisfactory increase for the first half of the decade than was 
anticipated only a couple of years ago. Much of the credit 
for this record should go to those responsible for last year’s 
tax cut.
In addition to the greater spending by consumers, forecasters 
predict that business expenditures for capital investment and 
purchases by state and local government will increase in 1965,
'The following breakdown may help readers recall the makeup of gross 
national product:
Personal consumption expenditures 
Durables 
Nondurables 
Gross private domestic investment 
Business fixed investment 
Nonfarm residential construction 
Inventory accumulation 
Net exports
Government purchases of goods and services 
Federal
State and local
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and that these parts of the economy will continue to be largely 
responsible for the growth of total gross national product. 
There are a number of reasons why business capital expendi 
tures are expected to rise. A good many industries need ad 
ditional productive capacity; others need to modernize, to im 
prove efficiency and cut costs; and many firms currently 
have internal funds to carry out expansion programs. The 
growing demand for state and local government services in 
sures that expenditures by those governments will continue 
their steady rise. Although federal spending probably will 
increase slightly in 1965, it is almost certain that state and 
local government spending this year will equal or exceed fed 
eral expenditures for the first time.
What may happen to the three other smaller components of 
gnp—inventory accumulation by business, foreign trade, and 
housing—is more difficult to predict. The possibility of a steel 
strike this spring is causing some stockpiling of steel. Once 
the steel issue is settled, inventory accumulation will prob 
ably decline; this is one of the reasons some economists an 
ticipate a slowdown in overall business growth toward the 
end of the year. In the foreign trade area, exports are likely 
to exceed imports by about the same amount as last year. Per 
haps the biggest question mark is housing, which this year 
probably will do no more than hold its own. The longer-run 
outlook for the industry, of course, is much better: within a 
few years the large numbers of young people born immedi 
ately after World War II will begin to marry and create an 
increased demand for housing.
To summarize, the American economy, in spite of some prob 
lems, can look forward to continued progress in 1965. This, 
of course, is good news for all U. S. citizens; but because most 
of our readers are concerned particularly with developments 
in Montana, let us consider the prospects for the state’s econ 
omy in the light of these national expectations.
The State
Like most of the United States, Montana bustled with eco 
nomic activity in 1964—although at a somewhat slower pace 
than in many other parts of the country. It is true that Mon-
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tana has been enjoying unusually good business conditions 
during the past couple of years and that these favorable cir 
cumstances will probably continue through 1965. But it is 
also true that growth in the state still lags behind that of the 
country as a whole.
Montana’s record for 1964 suffers in comparison with 1963 
and 1962 for two reasons: the heavy federal spending for 
Minutemen missile installation and the unusually high farm 
income which characterized the two earlier years. With farm 
income down from 1962 and 1963 and the missile projects 
(which had employed several thousand persons) completed, 
it was not surprising that the state economy in 1964 lacked 
the vitality which was evident at the national level. Also, 
two natural disasters of major proportions struck the state 
last year: the floods in June and the extreme blizzard con 
ditions of December. Both these events caused heavy eco 
nomic losses in the areas affected, in addition to the suffer 
ing and loss of human life which occurred.
Although not all the data for the year are available, the 
indications are that economic activity in the state in 1964 was 
very little different from 1963. Some of the optimistic esti 
mates publicized earlier in the year recently have been re 
vised downward. The latest estimates of both Business Week 
magazine and the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis show 
only modest gains in total personal income, considerably less 
than the increases at the national level. Business Week’s esti 
mate of personal income for 1964 credits Montana with a 3.0 
percent increase over 1963, compared to 5.5 percent for the 
United States.2 Recent figures from the Montana Unemploy 
ment Compensation Commission indicate that total employ 
ment for the year will average slightly below 1963, and other 
indicators of state business activity reflect the lack of any 
significant growth.
But the contrast between economic expansion in Montana 
and the United States since early 1961 (when the current up 
turn began) is more significant than year-to-year compari 
sons. Figures measuring the exact period are not available 
for Montana; however, between 1960 and 1964, total civilian
-Business Week, January 2, 1965, p. 36.
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employment grew approximately 5.4 percent in the nation 
and 3.0 percent in the state.3 Department of Commerce in 
come figures for the year 1964 are not yet compiled, but be 
tween 1960 and 1963 total personal income increased 15.7 per 
cent in the United States and 13.9 percent in Montana while 
per capita income grew 10.5 and 9.6 percent respectively.4 
According to all the available evidence (as noted above), 
when the 1964 figures are released, the income gap will have 
widened. Thus the state continues to be faced with a basic 
problem of economic growth.
As 1965 begins, the most promising source of improvement in 
Montana’s growth rate is the federal government. Increased 
defense expenditures in the state this year—as another 50 
Minutemen missiles are installed—will provide a temporary 
boost in the Great Falls area. Yellowtail Dam construction 
will continue through the year, although employment will 
decline in the fall as the project nears completion. Expendi 
tures for highway construction will continue to increase and 
will probably be the highest ever in 1965. The following year 
(1966) preliminary contracts will be let for the $350 million 
Libby Dam in northwestern Montana. Its projected construc 
tion already has begun to inspire new private development in 
that area. On the other hand, the announced closure of Glas 
gow Air Force Base by June 30, 1968, will have a depressing 
effect upon the Glasgow area. If nothing else, the Glasgow 
situation illustrates again the danger of community depen 
dence upon one industry, whether private or public. A simi 
lar moral, of course, can be applied to the larger economic 
area; in recent years Montana as a whole has been excessively 
dependent upon federal expenditures for its growth.
‘Total civilian employment includes all persons at work in nonmilitary 
occupations—wage and salary workers and the self-employed. United 
States figures are Department of Labor estimates and appear on page 
10 of Economic Indicators, prepared for the Joint Economic Committee 
by the Council of Economic Advisers, November 1964. State data are 
from the Unemployment Compensation Commission of Montana, mime 
ographed report dated November 11, 1964 and undated report dis 
tributed in June 1964. The 1964 figures used in computing the percent 
increase were estimates based on the first ten months.
4U. S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, Survey 
of Current Business, August 1964, p. 16.
14 MONTANA BUSINESS QUARTERLY
In the private economy, what may happen to agriculture, 
largest of the state’s basic industries, is always difficult to 
predict. It is unlikely, however, that agriculture will be a 
growth factor this year. Although official estimates are not 
yet available, the net income of farmers and ranchers almost 
certainly declined in 1964, mostly because of lower prices re 
ceived for cattle and for wheat. At this time, little improve 
ment in cattle prices is foreseen during the next twelve months, 
and crop prices will probably fall further. Declines in grain 
prices will be at least partially offset by increased government 
payments, but the over-all prospects in agriculture do not 
point to a significant gain in the income- of farmers and ranch 
ers. Employment in agriculture is expected to continue its 
steady decline.
The outlook for the state’s nonagricultural industries this 
year is generally good. The construction industry, of course, 
will benefit, as it did in 1964, from the large volume of public 
construction discussed above. Construction employment should 
increase this year and may again provide a boost to the whole 
state economy.
The wood products industry, so important to western Mon 
tana, continues to produce predominantly lumber, a product 
which, of course, is strongly influenced by the ups and downs 
of the housing market. Since housing is not one of the strong 
spots in today’s national economy, some uncertainty faces 
state producers this year. But any decline in housing con 
struction probably will not be large, and the continuing ex 
pansion of the area’s industry into other wood products may 
offset any loss in total employment or value of production 
which results from curtailed lumber output. In the meantime, 
lumbermen can look to the latter part of the decade when, as 
noted above, the housing market is almost sure to expand.
Last year’s completion of the new concentrator at Butte 
coincided nicely with a strong demand for copper and output 
from Montana’s metal mines increased substantially. Copper 
production in 1964 was the largest since 1956; lead and zinc 
output were about the same as in 1963. Between late 1963 and 
mid-1964 the number of men at work in the mines increased 
from 4,000 to 5,000. The chances are that production and em 
ployment will remain near this new, higher level in 1965.
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It is interesting to note that in 1956 it took almost 9,000 
miners to produce about the same amount of ore that was pro 
duced by 5,000 workers last year, and that over the same period 
smelter employment has fallen from about 5,000 to 3,200. All 
of this is in line with The Anaconda Company’s attempts to 
make its Montana properties competitive with other producing 
areas through utilization of technological advances.
Travel and recreation will undoubtedly bring increased rev 
enue to the state in 1965, partly because most Americans will 
have more money available for such purposes and partly be 
cause, for some important recreational areas of the state, 1964 
was a year of financial disappointment. Vacation travel in 
northwestern Montana was curtailed during early summer 
by floods which inundated large areas of Glacier National Park 
and Flathead County (as well as many acres east of the Con 
tinental Divide) and by fears of travelers. Later in the year, 
as vacationers were reassured about the condition of highways 
and the availability of accommodations, a more normal travel 
pattern was established in the area. Southwestern Montana, 
on the other hand, benefited as Yellowstone National Park re 
ceived a record number of visitors in 1964—3 percent more 
than in 1963, and other parts of the state reported a good year.
Expectations for the industries discussed above, plus the 
generally optimistic outlook for the national economy, point 
to a good business year in 1965 in Montana. The construction 
industry and businesses serving travelers and vacationers in 
particular should find it a better year than 1964. It is well 
to remember, however, that the state economy will chiefly 
benefit from an unusually large number of projects financially 
supported by the federal government, and that we must give 
continued attention to ways of expanding the private sector 
of our economy if we are to assure sound, long-term growth.
Bank Notes and the Federal Reserve
GENE L. ERION
Professor of Business Administration 
Montana State University, Missoula
Bank notes—the promissory notes of commercial banks, 
specifically—are not new in the United States. Recently, how 
ever, a new type of commercial bank promissory note has 
appeared on the scene. The new type are unsecured promis 
sory notes payable at a specified date in the future and issued 
for sale to the nonbank public.1 How does this new type of 
commercial bank promissory note fit into the functioning of 
the commercial banking system in the United States? Will it 
weaken Federal Reserve control over the supply of money in 
the nation?
The following discussion seeks to answer these questions and 
to provide some historical perspective in viewing the role of 
the most recent type of commercial bank note. It seeks to do 
so by first presenting a very simplified explanation of the 
commercial banking system and some of its operations as those 
operations affect the supply of money in the United States. 
Next, the new type of commercial bank promissory note is 
compared to, and contrasted with, two types of commercial 
bank promissory notes preceding it in the history of United 
States banking. Then, the purpose of the commercial banks in 
using the most recent kind of promissory note is examined. 
An analysis is presented of the probable effects of the new 
notes on the control of the commercial banking system by the 
Federal Reserve. Finally, an appraisal is made of whether the 
latest innovation in commercial bank notes is likely to prove 
socially desirable.
'This development followed a ruling by the Comptroller of the Cur 
rency “. . . that it is within the corporate powers of a national bank 
to borrow money for general banking purposes by means of issuing 
unsecured promissory notes.” Office of Comptroller, United States 
Treasury, Years of Reform: Prelude to Progress (Washington, D. C.: 
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 22.
See also, “Boon or Bugaboo?,” Forbes, October 15, 1964, p. 34.
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The Commercial Banking System
There are all sorts of banks, and various types will be re 
ferred to at various times in this article; so it may be useful 
at the start to establish some categories, and to indicate the 
relative importance of some of those categories. A commercial 
bank is defined as a bank whose liabilities include demand 
deposits—checking accounts—and whose customers are pre 
dominantly the general public. (A central bank—the Federal 
Reserve in the United States—deals predominantly with com 
mercial banks, the Treasury, and the central banks of other 
nations.) In earlier days, the liabilities of commercial banks 
also included bank notes payable on demand. The distinctive 
feature of a commercial bank—past and present—is that its 
liabilities have included promises to pay on demand which 
have been generally acceptable as money in the settling of 
obligations.
In the United States, a commercial bank may receive its 
corporate charter from the federal government or a state gov 
ernment. In the former case, it is a national bank; in the 
latter, a state bank. A national bank must be a member of the 
Federal Reserve System (established by federal law); a state 
bank may be a member of the Federal Reserve System.
Reflected in the data in Table 1, and pertinent to the follow 
ing analysis, are these facts. 1) Most of the commercial bank 
ing business in the United States is handled by banks which 
are members of the Federal Reserve System. 2) National banks 
are predominant both as to number and amount of business
TABLE 1
NUMBER AND ASSETS OF VARIOUS TYPES OF COMMERCIAL 
BANKS IN THE UNITED STATES, JUNE 30, 1964
A m ount 
P e rcen t of Assets P e rcen t 
Type of B ank N um ber of Total (^billions) of Total
Banks belonging to 
Federal Reserve System
National 4,702 34.4 175.2 54.4
State 1,478 10.8 94.2 29.3
State banks not belonging 
to Federal Reserve System 7,489 54.8 52.5 16.3
Total 13,669 100.0 321.9 10o!o
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, October, 1964, p. 1290.
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done within the Federal Reserve System. 3) State banks which 
are not members of the Federal Reserve System are the most 
numerous, but handle a very minor fraction of the total of 
commercial banking business.
As already indicated, the supply of money in the United 
States includes demand deposits at commercial banks. In fact, 
as can be seen in Table 2, demand deposits comprise the bulk 
of the money in circulation in the United States.
TABLE 2
KINDS OF MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 








Federal reserve notes 32.3 20.5
Other 2.2 1.4
Demand deposits adjusted 120.3 76.1
Total 158.0 100.0
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, August 1964, p. 1033; 
1964, p. 1439.
November
Next consider a simplified balance sheet for all of the com 
mercial banks in the United States, as shown in Table 3.
TABLE 3
ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL ACCOUNTS OF 
COMMERCAL BANKS IN THE UNITED STATES,
JUNE 30, 1964
(in billions of dollars)
Assets Liabilities
Cash and due from banks 53.2 Demand deposits 164.7
Loans and discounts 164.5 Time deposits 120.3
U. S. Government and Other liabilities 10.1
other securities 95.7 Capital accounts 26.8
Other assets 8.5
Total 321.9 321.9
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, October 1964, p. 1288.
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Some of the items on the simplified balance sheet may need 
some explanation. The item “cash and due from banks” in 
cludes the deposits at Federal Reserve Banks owned by the 
commercial banks which are members of the Federal Reserve 
System. These deposits, plus member banks’ cash in their 
vaults, comprise legal reserve for the members of the Federal 
Reserve System. The significance of this fact will be consid 
ered shortly.
“Loans and discounts” includes such assets as personal loans 
which involve a customer’s promise to repay a loan at a speci 
fied date in the future plus the interest charged on the loan. 
The loan might be for $10,000, and the customer’s note prom 
ising repayment would have a face value of $10,000. If interest 
charged were a simple six percent per year, the borrower 
would pay the bank $10,600 at the end of the year. An alter 
native approach would be for the bank to discount the cus 
tomer’s $10,000 note, to be paid in one year, at six percent. The 
customer then would receive $9,400 when the bank bought the 
note, and would pay the bank $10,000 at the end of the year.
“Time deposits” includes such items as savings accounts and 
certificates of deposit. Ownership of this type of commercial 
bank liability has both an advantage and a disadvantage for 
the customer as compared with the ownership of a demand 
deposit. The owner of a time deposit is paid interest if he 
retains ownership for a specified minimum period of time. On 
the other hand, of course, he is not able to write a check against 
a time deposit. His time deposit is not money.
How Commercial Banks Create Money
Because demand deposits are money, it is important to un 
derstand how the supply of this type of money is increased, or 
decreased. Briefly, then, if the demand deposit liabilities of 
commercial banks change, there, of course, must be a change 
in some other item of the commercial banks’ balance sheet 
shown in Table 3. If demand deposits are increased, there 
must be an increase in assets; or a decrease in other liabilities, 
or in capital accounts. Principally, commercial banks create 
demand deposits when they purchase earning assets, chiefly
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the debts of others on which the commercial banks are paid 
interest.
Thus if commercial banks increased their loans to customers 
by a billion dollars, the initial changes in Table 3 might be:
Loans and discounts +1.0 Demand deposits +1.0
Similarly, if commercial banks bought one billion dollars 
worth of United States Government, or other, securities on 
the open market, the initial changes might be:
U. S. Government and
other securities +1.0 Demand deposits +1.0
If customers of commercial banks decided to own one billion 
dollars less time deposits, one billion more of demand deposits, 
the changes in Table 3 would be:
Demand deposits +1.0
Time deposits —1.0
The reverse of the first case, if customers reduced their 
borrowings from commercial banks, the initial effect in terms 
of Table 3 might be:
Loans and discounts —1.0 Demand deposits —1.0
Or, if customers decided to own more time deposits, less 
demand deposits, Table 3 would be changed:
Demand deposits —1.0
Time deposits +1.0
If commercial banks are able to buy more debt, on which 
they are paid interest, by increasing their demand deposit lia 
bilities, what limit is there to the increase in demand deposits, 
in the supply of money? This is where legal reserves, men 
tioned earlier, enter the picture. Commercial banks are re 
quired to maintain certain ratios between their deposit lia 
bilities and their legal reserves.2 Thus, if the reserve require-
There is a great variety in the ratios required between reserves and 
deposits. For banks which are members of the Federal Reserve Sys 
tem, the ratios are determined by the Board of Governors of that 
System, within limits provided by federal law. The ratios are higher 
for demand deposits than for time deposits; and are higher for “reserve 
city” member banks than for “country” member banks. For commer-
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ment for commercial banks belonging to the Federal Reserve 
System were 15 percent for demand deposits, a member bank 
would need $15 worth of deposit with its Federal Reserve Bank 
and/or $15 cash in vault for every $100 worth of demand de 
posits. Given $1 million of demand deposits, the required re 
serve would be $150,000. If the bank’s legal reserve were 
greater than its required reserve, it would have excess reserve. 
The greater the excess reserves of commercial banks, the 
greater is their unused earning capacity, other things being 
equal. Given excess reserves, commercial banks are in a posi 
tion to create more demand deposits by the process of making 
more loans or investments, thereby increasing the supply of 
money.
If the legal reserves of commercial banks are deficient in 
comparison with required reserves, they must obtain additional 
reserves by borrowing some reserves or by liquidating some 
assets, either of which alternatives may be costly; or by re 
ducing their deposit liabilities by failing to replace loans or 
investments as they mature, thereby decreasing the supply of 
money.
Commercial banks, then, create money in buying earning 
assets. Reserve requirements plus the availability of legal 
reserves limit the commercial banks in their creating of money.
Two Older Types of Commercial Bank Notes
To repeat, commercial bank notes are not a new phenomenon 
in the United States. In fact, throughout most of the years 
since the beginning of the United States, the promissory notes 
of commercial banks have played an important, although often 
very controversial, role in the economy of the nation. In the 
earlier decades of the United States commercial bank notes 
comprised the major part of the money supply.8 These were
cial banks which do not belong to the Federal Reserve System, reserve 
requirements are established by the laws of the fifty states. It is 
because of the great variety that the ratios actually required, and the 
percentages that legal reserves currently comprise of deposit lia 
bilities, are not given in the explanation of the function of reserve 
requirements.
8Cf. Davis Rich Dewey, Financial History of the United States (12th 
edition, New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1934), pp. 224-227, 
259-262.
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commercial bank notes that were payable on sight or demand. 
Any time an owner presented such a note to the bank of issue, 
the bank was obligated to pay for the note immediately and in 
full with legal tender. It was because of the promise to redeem 
with legal tender that this type of commercial bank note cir 
culated as money, as a generally accepted means of payment.
At times prior to the Civil War the notes of some of the 
commercial banks chartered by some of the states circulated 
only at a more or less severe discount; that is, the value of a 
note in exchange was less than the value stated on the face 
of the note. Such discounting reflected the fear that the issuing 
bank would not redeem fully all notes presented to it. The 
National Banking Acts of 1863 and 1865 provided for federal 
chartering of national banks, whose notes were added to the 
money supply, and eliminated state commercial bank notes 
from circulation in the period following the Civil War.4 In 
1935 the United States Government bonds eligible as collateral 
for national bank notes were retired and the Treasury assumed 
liability for the national bank notes in circulation. By that 
time the promissory notes of the Federal Reserve System, 
established 1913-1914, had become the principal component 
of the nation’s supply of paper money. Today, then, commer 
cial banks’ promises-to-pay-on-demand are no longer a part 
of the supply of paper money in the United States.5
Another type of a promise-to-pay by a commercial bank ap 
peared during World War I and resumed importance during 
and following World War II. During World War II (as well 
as in the latter part of the 1930’s), the ownership of United 
States Government securities by banks increased greatly. And
'Cf. Harold Barger, Money, Banking, and Public Policy (Chicago: Rand 
McNally and Co., 1962), pp. 46-47.
•7bid., pp. 531-532. As a commercial bank liability, the bank note pay 
able on demand was comparable to a demand deposit. Except for 
differences in the laws pertaining to legal reserve requirements, the 
same analysis that was made of demand deposits in terms of Table 3 
may be applied to the bank notes that were payable on demand. They, 
too, were commercial bank liabilities created for the purpose of buying 
earning assets.
Whereas the bank note may have required somewhat less literacy 
than the check written on a demand deposit, it generally was less con 
venient where large amounts were involved, as is true of checks and 
“folding money” today. That a bank note is a promise to pay while 
a check is an order to pay is of no significance in the economic analysis.
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while commercial banks had large excess reserves going into 
World War II, and hence had no need to borrow additional 
reserves from the Federal Reserve,0 by the end of World War II 
their excess reserves had dropped to only a small fraction of 
their prewar maximum.* 7 During World War II, banks greatly 
increased their loans and, particularly, their investments. In 
doing so, they also greatly increased their deposit liabilities 
against which reserves are required. When demand for bank 
loans and investments continued to be strong following World 
War II, the banks had need for additional reserves. This need 
they filled chiefly in  two ways: 1) by selling United States 
Government securities, some of the sales going, directly or in 
directly, to the Federal Reserve; or 2) by borrowing from the 
Federal Reserve through promissory notes secured by United 
States Government securities pledged as collateral. In the 
latter case, the banks paid interest on the loan (promissory 
note), and the loan (promissory note) was to be repaid by the 
bank after a specified period of time. Borrowings of this type 
are known as advances, and continue in use as a means for 
member banks to obtain credit from their Federal Reserve 
Banks.
Summarizing the history of commercial bank promissory 
notes to the recent past, then, it can be said that they chiefly 
have taken two different forms. 1) There were the bank notes 
so familiar in the 19th century and the early decades of the 
20th century as a prominent part of the money supply. Re 
deemable by the issuing bank in legal tender on demand, some 
bank notes—those issued by state banks prior to the Civil War 
—were subject to discounts, but they did circulate as money. 
2) The second form, the promise of a member bank to repay 
a loan obtained from a Federal Reserve Bank, continues as a 
feature of United States banking. It is a time note, providing 
for repayment by the borrowing bank after a specified short 
period of time, not on demand; and it carries explicit interest
"At the end of June, 1940, member banks’ required reserves were $6,924 
billion, while their excess reserves were $6,857 billion. Annual Report 
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the Year 
1940, p. 52.
7At the end of September, 1945, member banks’ required reserves were 
$14,261 billion, while excess reserves were $1,153 billion. Federal 
Reserve Bulletin, January, 1947, p. 281.
charges, is not discounted. While this type of promissory note 
is used by banks to obtain additional reserves, it obviously 
does not circulate as money as the earlier type of bank note 
did.
Both these first two types of bank promissory notes have 
been required by law to be “secured,” meaning generally that 
banks must provide as collateral for their notes some type of 
asset such as securities of the United States Government.
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The New Unsecured Promissory Note
The most recent type of commercial bank promissory note 
that has appeared on the scene in the .economy of the United 
States is the unsecured promissory note payable at a specified 
date in the future—not on demand. This latest type of com 
mercial bank promise-to-pay is issued for sale to the nonbank 
public. The interest charge is implicit, not explicit; that is, it 
sells at whatever discount is necessary to induce its purchase. 
The new type is intended to obtain additional reserves for the 
issuing commercial bank by borrowing money from the non 
bank public, rather than borrowing directly from the Federal 
Reserve. On the other hand, it is not money to the nonbank 
public because it is not payable on demand.
As a means of obtaining additional reserves from the non 
bank public, the unsecured time promissory notes of commer 
cial banks are considered to be alternatives to time deposits, 
including certificates of deposit, with certain apparent advan 
tages for the banks in comparison to time deposits. 1) No re 
serve is required against the promissory notes, while time 
deposits of commercial banks are subject to reserve require 
ments. That is, banks must maintain a certain ratio between 
deposits with Federal Reserve Banks and cash in vault on the 
one hand and, on the other, their time deposits. Deposits with 
Federal Reserve Banks and vault cash are assets from which 
commercial banks receive no direct income; and the banks 
generally try to avoid nonearning assets as much as possible, 
preferring assets from which they do receive income. No re 
serve is required against the unsecured time promissory notes 
of banks because the Board of Governors of the Federal
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Reserve System has ruled that such promissory notes are not 
liabilities of the deposit type, and hence are not subject to 
reserve requirements.8
2) The discount on promissory notes is determined by the 
market, while the rate of interest paid on time deposits by 
commercial banks is subject to a ceiling imposed by the Fed 
eral Reserve’s Board of Governors. Such a ceiling might 
appear to be to the advantage of commercial banks, and origi 
nally it was intended to be so. When banks are limited in what 
they may pay as interest on time deposits, “cutthroat” compe 
tition for time deposits is restrained. If banks agreed with 
each other to so limit competition, they might well be accused 
of illegal collusion; but when the restraint is imposed by an 
agency of the United States Government, the limitation is not 
subject to such a charge. The maximum legally allowable rate 
of interest was imposed in the mid-1930’s to lower the costs of 
commercial banks by preventing price (interest) competition. 
That sort of rivalry appeared to benefit an aggressive individ 
ual bank, but was judged to raise the costs of all banks with 
little lasting benefit to any bank. In the mid-1930’s, the non 
bank public’s desire for liquidity was high, and its demand for 
loanable funds was quite weak. Under such circumstances, 
the payment of much more than a nominal rate of interest on 
time deposits could well be argued to be an unnecessary and 
undesirable cost to commercial banks.
Competition for Funds
Following World War II, and especially during and since the 
1950’s, however, the competition for funds of the type that 
might enter the time deposits of commercial banks has been 
greatly intensified by the growth and proliferation of nonbank 
financial institutions. While the ceiling on the rate of interest 
paid on time deposits by commercial banks has restrained
““Issuance of Unsecured Negotiable Notes by Member Banks,” Federal 
Reserve Bulletin, September, 1964, p. 1137. It is there ruled that 
neither the Board’s Regulation D (Reserves of Member Banks) nor 
Regulation Q (Payment of Interest on Deposits) is applicable to un 
secured negotiable notes. Earlier the Comptroller of the Currency 
had so ruled with respect to national banks. (See footnote 1.)
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competition between those banks themselves, it also has re 
stricted commercial banks in competing for funds with other 
financial institutions such as savings and loan associations, life 
insurance companies, credit unions, and mutual savings banks.
Also, in distinct contrast to the 1930’s have been the oppor 
tunities for lending and investing. There has been no serious 
depression in the postwar period. Nor has there been any 
drastic decline in the demand for loans on the downswing of 
any postwar business cycle. When the growth in the demand 
for loans has tapered off, the banks have moved into securities, 
especially those of the United States Government, rather than 
permit any substantial increase in their excess reserves (their 
unused potential earning capacity).
With the conditions prevailing in the postwar period, then, 
commercial banks have been increasingly willing to compete 
for the funds that would provide additional reserves. When 
the Federal Reserve has increased the maximum rate of in 
terest payable on time deposits, most commercial banks have 
been quick to raise the rate they offer to the new ceiling. And 
there have been expressions of dissatisfaction with the situa 
tion that requires commercial banks to meet legal reserve re 
quirements against time deposits, while there are no compar 
able legal reserve requirements (nor ceilings on interest rates) 
on savings accounts with such competitors as savings and loan 
associations.9
It is therefore quite understandable that commercial banks 
should find unsecured promissory notes payable in the future 
highly attractive, especially when viewed against the historical 
background and the present institutional setting. The use of 
promissory notes by commercial banks is nothing novel, al 
though the most recent type is a new variation on the old 
theme. Furthermore, it should not be surprising that many 
commercial banks chafe at what they consider to be discrimin 
atory restraints upon their competing for funds to finance the 
purchase of income-earning assets.
*Cf. Money and Credit: The Report of the Commission on Money and 
Credit (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), pp. 
167-169.
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Federal Reserve Control Weakened?
The question has been raised, however, whether the use by 
banks of unsecured time promissory notes might not be un 
desirable from the viewpoint of the general economic welfare. 
Does it unduly loosen the control of the Federal Reserve over 
member bank reserves, and consequently over the capacity of 
commercial banks to increase their loans and investments by 
increasing their demand deposit liabilities? Has control of 
the supply of money by the Federal Reserve been unduly 
loosened?10
Quite to the contrary, the entry of the commercial banks 
into the short-term capital market should prove to be desir 
able from the viewpoint of the Federal Reserve. As explained 
earlier, control by the Federal Reserve over the supplying 
of money by the commercial banks takes two general forms: 
1) control over the reserve ratios required of member banks; 
and 2) the availability of reserves to commercial banks. The 
reserves of commercial banks consist chiefly of Federal Re 
serve liabilities: a) deposits of member banks with Federal 
Reserve Banks; and b) the vault cash of commercial banks, 
the chief component of which is Federal Reserve notes. The 
availability of Federal Reserve liabilities to commercial banks, 
therefore, depends upon the extent to which the Federal Re 
serve Banks extend credit by buying assets with their own 
liabilities, and the extent to which those liabiliites reach the 
commercial banks to serve them as reserves.
There are competing uses for Federal Reserve Bank liabili 
ties. The chief of these competing uses is currency in circula 
tion, currency in the hands of the public. To the extent the 
public is willing to buy bank promissory notes with currency, 
banks will enlarge their share of existing potential reserve.
10Forbes, loc. cit., states that Gabriel T. Kerekes of Goodbody & Com 
pany and Professor Marcus Nadler of New York University are two 
who have suggested such a possibility. The question also has been 
raised by Walter A. Schlechte, president of the American Bankers 
Association’s National Bank Division in an address to a convention 
of that organization as reported by American Banker, October 27, 1964, 
pp. 16, 85, 90.
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However, in most transactions, especially the larger ones, pay 
ment is by check, not by currency. As the new type of promis 
sory note is issued in large denominations, the direct effect on 
currency owned by the public should be negligible. With the 
promissory notes paid for by check, individual banks may gain 
reserve at the expense of other banks. Taking all banks to 
gether, though, the effect would not be a gain in total reserves: 
one bank’s gain would be offset by the reserve lost by one or 
more other banks.
Even so, taking commercial banks as a whole, their capacity 
to lend and invest would be increased—for their deposits 
would be reduced, lowering their required reserves and in 
creasing their potential for a subsequent expansion of deposits 
in buying earning assets. In other words, the buyers of the 
notes would be exchanging one type of bank liability (deposits 
against which reserves are required) for another type (promis 
sory notes against which reserves are not required). Banks 
would gain excess reserves. The extensive use of the un 
secured, time promissory note by banks, then, might secure 
to them a slightly larger share of the potential reserve out 
standing, but chiefly would economize on the use of reserves 
owned by them. So long as the Federal Reserve maintains 
control over the total of Federal Reserve credit outstanding, 
however, it can offset the effects of the use of such notes by 
banks.
Perhaps this can best be explained by asking a couple of 
questions. How does the Federal Reserve extend credit in the 
first place? How does it happen that banks, the nonbank pub 
lic, the U. S. treasury, and others come to own any liabilities of 
the Federal Reserve? When the matter is put this way, the 
immediate, offhand reaction might well cut to the heart of the 
matter, if it is Federal Reserve credit that is involved, surely 
the Federal Reserve may control how much of that credit is 
outstanding, how much it is to increase or decrease.
By and large, such an answer to the problem is a correct 
one, but it is subject to some reservations and perhaps deserves 
some elaboration. First, the Federal Reserve Banks them 
selves, by law, are subject to reserve requirements. The re-
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serve requirements are established by Congress, and may be, 
and have been, changed by Congress. The legal reserves of 
the Federal Reserve Banks vary with the monetary gold stock 
of the United States. The required reserves of the Federal 
Reserve Banks vary according to the reserve requirements 
established by Congress on the one hand, and the size of the 
liabilities of the Federal Reserve Banks against which reserves 
are required (deposits and Federal Reserve notes) on the other 
hand. The difference between legal reserves (gold certificates) 
owned by the Federal Reserve Banks and required reserves 
is, of course, excess reserves. At times, the Federal Reserve 
has been quite concerned about the possibility of its not having 
enough legal reserves, because of a decrease in the monetary 
gold stock or an increase in its liabilities against which reserves 
were required.
In such a situation, several alternative courses of action 
would be possible. 1) The price of gold, in terms of dollars, 
might be raised. 2) Legal reserve requirements for Federal 
Reserve Banks might be lowered. 3) The Federal Reserve 
might slow down, stop, or reverse the increase in its liabilities 
against which reserves are required. That is, it might slow 
down, stop, or reverse the increase in potential legal reserves 
for commercial banks.
If the first two alternatives are ruled out, for whatever 
reasons, then the Federal Reserve may be subject to some 
restraint in its providing of potential reserves for commercial 
banks by the size, and changes in the size, of the monetary 
gold stock.
Historically, the Federal Reserve also has been subject to 
another, opposite type of restraint on its freedom of decision 
as to its providing of reserves to commercial banks. In both 
World War I and World War II, the Federal Reserve felt con 
strained—and the consensus is that it properly felt so—to ex 
tend Federal Reserve credit to support the financing of the 
war effort. To the considerable extent that it provided Federal 
Reserve credit to support war finance, the Federal Reserve 
also provided additional potential reserve to the commercial 
banks.
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Federal Reserve Controls
How does the Federal Reserve extend its credit? How does 
it increase or decrease the volume of Federal Reserve credit 
outstanding? There are several methods available to it, but 
the most important one by far is known as the Federal Re 
serve’s “open market operations” in United States Government 
securities. What this amounts to is that the Federal Reserve 
buys and sells United States Government securities in compe 
tition with other buyers and sellers. But the Federal Reserve 
is no ordinary buyer and seller of such securities. When the 
Federal Reserve buys on the open market, it pays with checks 
drawn against the Federal Reserve. Whether the checks are 
paid to commercial banks or to customers of commercial banks 
makes little difference in this context. Most checks get de 
posited with commercial banks, so either way commercial 
banks obtain ownership of orders-to-pay which the Federal 
Reserve has written against itself. The commercial banks may 
exchange the checks for Federal Reserve notes or, much more 
likely, for increases in their deposits with the Federal Reserve 
Banks. In either case, there has been an increase in the legal 
reserve of the commercial banks, increasing their potential to 
lend and invest by increasing their deposit liabilities against 
which reserves are required.
If the Federal Reserve wants to reduce the potential reserves 
of commercial banks it sells securities on the open market. 
Receiving checks in payment for the securities, it collects on 
the checks by reducing the deposits with the Federal Reserve 
Banks of the commercial banks against which the checks were 
drawn.
It might be noted here that the open market operations of 
the Federal Reserve may not only affect the potential reserves 
of commercial banks, they can also have a direct effect on 
interest rates. If the Federal Reserve buys large amounts of 
short-term securities, the prices of those securities will tend 
to rise with the increase in the demand for them, lowering the 
yield on them and tending to lower short-term interest rates 
generally. The lowering of interest rates may then, with the 
passing of time, spread to other parts of the interest-rate struc-
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ture; but the immediate impact is on the short-term interest 
rates.
During and following World War II, until 1951, the Federal 
Reserve was committed to the policy of “pegging”—holding 
up—the prices of United States Government securities, which 
largely confined it to the buying side in its open market oper 
ations.11 For most of the decade following 1951, the Federal 
Reserve’s open market operations were under a different, self- 
imposed type of restraint known as the “bills-only” (or “bills- 
preferably” or “bills-usually”) policy. The key feature of this 
policy, obviously responsible for its name, was that the Federal 
Reserve usually limited its open market operations to Treasury 
bills, which mature in ninety days, and other Treasury obliga 
tions maturing in no more than a year. Another part of its 
policy was to refrain from “swapping”: buying issues of one 
maturity while selling issues of another maturity.12
The Federal Reserve had its stated reasons for its “bills- 
only” policy of the 1950’s. They were largely technical in the 
sense that they pertained to the developing of a market for 
Government securities that would not be dominated by the 
Federal Reserve in the way that the market had been domi 
nated during and following World War II. Some critics of the 
policy, on the other hand, stated that the Federal Reserve, 
while it concentrated its open market operations at the short 
end of the market, was not doing all it might to stabilize the 
economy at a high level of employment and to increase the 
rate of economic growth. They reasoned that long-term in 
terest rates are more significant than short-term rates in affect 
ing the demand for funds to finance the construction of plants 
and other buildings, including homes, and the purchase of 
durable production equipment. They also reasoned: 1) that 
such expenditures are particularly susceptible to wide varia 
tion as compared with total expenditures, and hence their 
stimulation needs particular emphasis if employment is to be 
maintained at a high level; and 2) that such expenditures,
"For the official demise of the support policy see “Treasury and Federal
Reserve Statements,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, March, 1951, p. 267.
VJ Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys 
tem, for the Year 1953, pp. 86-105.
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especially those on plant and durable production equipment, 
contribute to a higher rate of economic growth.13
Concern Over Monetar y  Gold Stock
In 1960-1961 the Federal Reserve announced that it was 
abandoning the “bills-only” policy, partly in answer to the 
criticism noted above, but probably even more to defend the 
United States’ monetary gold stock.14 From at least as early 
as 1958 to date, concern has been expressed over the decrease 
of the monetary gold stock of the United States and the in 
crease in the volume of short-term debt of the United States 
owned outside the United States. Presumably the owners of 
such short-term debt, ii they so desired, could demand pay 
ment in gold, directly or indirectly, immediately if the debt 
was of the demand type, otherwise as soon as the debt matured.
,!The Commission on Money and Credit, op. cit., pp. 62-64; Joseph 
Ascheim, Techniques of Monetary Control (Baltimore: The Johns Hop 
kins Press, 1961), pp. 53-82.
William McC. Martin, Jr., “Federal Reserve Operations in Perspective ” 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, March, 1961, pp. 272-281; Annual Report of 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the Year 
1961, pp. 37-43, 94-99.
That the Federal Reserve chiefly moved from short-term to inter- 
mediate-term, rather than long-term, securities is indicated by the 
following table.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS’ OWNERSHIP OF UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT MARKETABLE SECURITIES,
BY MATURITY CLASS
(Amounts are  par value in millions of dollars)
June  30, 1960 Ju n e  30, 1964
A m ount P ercen t A m ount P ercen t
Maturing:
Within one year 19,385 73.1 i 8,029 51.8
1- 5 years 5,689 21.5 14,691 42.2
5-10 years 1,179 4.4 i,836 5.3
Over 10 years 271 1.0 239 0.7
Total 26,523 100.0 34,794 100.0
S01964,:pF1177.al Reserve Bulletin> September, 1960, p. 1039; September,
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Whether they so desired would depend upon many factors, 
including the rates of interest offered on short-term debt in 
the United States as compared with short-term interest rates 
in other countries.
The developments described above combined to put the Fed 
eral Reserve in a bit of a bind. If the Federal Reserve wanted 
to provide more money for an expanding, or a slumping, econ- 
omy, it would want to buy United States Government securi 
ties on the open market to provide more potential reserves for 
the commercial banks. At the same time it would want to 
avoid further outflow of gold. Yet, if it limited itself to the 
short end of the market, it would provide more potential re 
serve only by measures that might lower short-term interest 
rates and, consequently, increase the risk of a greater outflow 
of gold. At the same time, it would directly affect the interest 
rates its critics have contended to be the least significant in 
terms of employment and economic growth.
Federal Reserve Defensive Actions
How is all of this relevant to the new use of promissory 
notes by commercial banks? If the Federal Reserve believed 
the banks were obtaining too great an increase in their excess 
reserves by their borrowings in the short-term market, the 
Federal Reserve could offset that effect by reducing its credit 
outstanding. Particularly appropriate would be a reduction 
of its buying of securities on the short-term market.
Banks offering promissory notes on the short-term market 
would increase the supply of short-term paper or, alterna 
tively, increase the demand for short-term credit. The result 
of an increase in demand, there being no offsetting increase in 
supply, generally is an increase in price, price in this case 
referring to short-term interest rates. If the Federal Reserve 
reduced its buying of short-term securities it would thereby 
reduce the supply of short-term credit. The result of a decrease 
in supply, there being no offsetting decrease in demand, gen 
erally is also an increase in price, again an increase in short 
term interest rates in this case.
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Thus the greater the extent to which banks increased their 
excess reserves by the use of short-term promissory notes, the 
more might the Federal Reserve want to restrict its credit. 
Furthermore, both the increase in the demand for short-term 
credit and the decrease in the supply of it would tend to raise 
short-term interest rates. The increase in short-term interest 
rates, in turn, should reduce the outflow of gold, assuming no 
offsetting developments. It would appear, then, that the Fed 
eral Reserve should welcome the use of short-term promissory 
notes by commercial banks, so long as the Federal Reserve is 
in a position to take offsetting action. An expanding economy 
needs an expanding supply of money and credit; the Federal 
Reserve probably could simply reduce the rate at which it 
increases Federal Reserve credit to offset the excess reserves 
banks might obtain by using short-term promissory notes.15 
If necessary, however, the Federal Reserve could stop the 
expansion of its credit entirely, or even reduce the amount of 
its credit outstanding. Reducing Federal Reserve credit out 
standing would be accomplished chiefly by the Federal Re 
serve’s selling of securities of the United States Government. 
As of June 30, 1964, the Federal Reserve had $34.8 billion of 
such securities, representing its potential for selling, as com 
pared with member banks’ excess reserves of $0.4 billion and 
total reserves of $20.8 billion.10
In addition to selling securities on the open market, the
,0Cf. Robert F. Wallace, “What Everybody Wants to Know About Defi 
cit Spending,” Montana Business Quarterly, Summer, 1963, pp. 60-103. 
1,1Federal Reserve Bulletin, September, 1964, pp. 1148, 1177. Strictly 
speaking, the member bank data are averages of daily figures for the 
week ending July 1, 1964. Free reserves—excess reserves minus the 
borrowings of member banks from Federal Reserve Banks—were only 
$181 million that week.
The citing of these data is by no means meant to imply that the 
Federal Reserve might dump on the market all of its holdings of United 
States Government securities to offset the use of unsecured negotiable 
notes by commercial banks—or to offset any other commercial bank 
actions, for that matter. To do so would be comparable to the United 
States Government’s using an H-bomb on rioters in the Canal Zone 
to prevent seizure of the Panama Canal. Rather, it should be clear, 
the intention is to emphasize the tremendous potential for counter 
measures available to the Federal Reserve. The extent of that potential 
is a measure of the extent to which commercial banks may not weaken 
Federal Reserve control under existing institutional conditions, or any 
institutional conditions likely to prevail in the foreseeable future.
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Federal Reserve also could increase the interest rate it charges 
on loans to member banks. If banks were busy obtaining ex 
cess reserves on the short-term market, however, raising the 
rate on advances might have little effect. Another alternative 
available, mentioned earlier, is that of raising reserve require 
ments for member banks. This is a much more powerful in 
strument of control for the Federal Reserve. If the reserve 
requirements are doubled, the effect is much the same as re 
ducing the reserves of member banks by half.
If the banks’ use of short-term promissory notes came at a 
time when there was a large inflow of gold into the United 
States, the problems of the Federal Reserve in maintaining 
control would be greater; but even then it is likely that all 
that would be required would be that the Federal Reserve 
actions of the type described above would have to assume 
greater proportions. If such an approach were not successful, 
or if the Federal Reserve for any reason felt it needed rein 
forcing, perhaps to permit a more delicate touch, various fur 
ther defensive measures could be taken with the cooperation 
of other central banks and the Treasury. At present, however, 
an outflow of gold, rather than an inflow, is the prevailing 
situation confronting the United States, so there is little need 
to consider those further possible measures at this time.
Conclusions
To return to the question posed earlier, does the use of short 
term promissory notes by the banks threaten the control of 
the Federal Reserve over the reserves of member banks, over 
the expansion of bank credit, and over the supply of money? 
Such a threat might seem more likely under conditions quite 
different from those of today. With circumstances as they are, 
however, especially considering the problem of the gold out 
flow, the Federal Reserve should welcome the commercial 
banks’ turning to the short-term market as a means of in 
creasing their excess reserves. By so doing, commercial banks: 
1) reduce the need for a further expansion of Federal Reserve 
credit; and 2) increase the demand for short-term loans, tend 
ing thereby to raise short-term interest rates. The rise in 
short-term interest rates should tend, in turn, to induce those
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owning short-term debt of the United States abroad to continue 
owning such debt, rather than to liquidate that debt and reduce 
still further the monetary gold stock of the United States. Thus, 
the use of the newest type of commercial bank promissory note 
should prove advantageous not only to the issuing banks, but 
also to the Federal Reserve as it seeks to meet the nation’s 
monetary problems.
Background and Priorities 
For Legislative
Reapportionment in Montana
I. Introduction and Summary
ELLIS L. WALDRON 
Professor of Political Science 
Montana State University, Missoula
The current nationwide interest in legislative apportionment 
is “an episode in the urbanization of the American com 
munity.”1 Towns may have dominated colonial American po 
litical life, but revolutions in transportation and in the culti 
vation of food and fibre enabled a restless people to subject 
a continent to wheel and plow during the 19th century. The 
balance of political power shifted to a dispersed agricultural 
population.
Yet the relentless onrush of technology liberated man from 
tilling the soil and sent him to the city to produce, distribute 
and consume the products of a burgeoning industrial economy. 
In the migration to the city the newly urbanized American 
left a disproportionate share of his political representation 
back on the ranch.
Farm population declined relatively, then absolutely—by 
more than half since 1930—from 30 million to 14 million. It is *72
'Professor E. E. Schattschneider’s characterization of Baker v. Carr, 369 
U. S. 186 (1962), the Supreme Court decision which broke open the 
apportionment question for consideration in the federal courts; see his 
article, “Urbanization and Reapportionment,” Yale Law Journal, Vol.
72, p. 7 (1962).
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estimated that 70 percent of the American people now live on 
about one percent of the nation’s land. Montana’s population 
has reflected these national trends; though lacking massive 
concentrations of people, the effects have been scarcely less 
dramatic in their local impact.
Montana has had her own century of experience with mo 
bility of population, from the heartbreaks of boom-to-bust 
mining camps through the disasters of open range cattle oper 
ations and tarpaper-to-dust small farming, to modern large 
scale commercial agriculture. About three-fourths of the 
reasure State s population now lives in or immediately around 
incorporated cities and towns. Meanwhile a legislative appor 
tionment system which dates from 1889 has become as anachro 
nistic as the 160-acre homestead against which Major John 
Wesley Powell had warned in the 1870’s.
This is a good place to define some terms. The United States 
Supreme Court ruled in June 1964 that a constitutionally 
apportioned state legislature is one in which representative 
districts as nearly of equal population as is practicable” are 
given substantially” equal representation in each of its houses. 
A malapportioned legislature, then, is one in which one or
f °  j- P^S6S ePar  ̂ from the standard of equal representation 
for districts of equal population. Not one of the 50 state legis 
latures is perfectly apportioned, of course; and perhaps no 
more than four or five of them met the Supreme Court’s con 
stitutional standard in both of their houses when that standard 
was decreed in June 1964.
The technical literature on legislatures often distinguishes 
ween the establishment of the representation units, called 
districting and the assignment of one or more representatives 
t each of these districts, called apportionment. In most states 
the legislature or some other official body is required to make
a.SSignT ent 1or reapportionment of representatives at 
some stated interval, usually after the decennial federal census. 
In this study as m most current popular discussion, the term 
apportionment is used for both districting and the assignment 
of represen atives to districts, unless otherwise indicated.
Malapportionment of state legislatures is common, but it has 
come about in a variety of ways. In some states whose legis 
latures have wide discretion to reapportion, there has been a
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reluctance to respond to constitutional or statutory obligation. 
And until recently, judicial pressure was not available to com 
pel legislatures to respond to this obligation. In other states 
the pattern of representation is embedded in the constitution, 
leaving little discretion or capacity in the legislature to keep 
itself well apportioned. Sharp partisan cleavages between re 
gions have affected the willingness to reapportion in some 
states, while in others great concentration of population in one 
or two great urban centers is a primary dimension of the ap 
portionment problem.
The Montana pattern of representation has its own pecu 
liarities which are explored in Part II, How the Montana 
Legislative Assembly Became Malapportioned (page 51).
1. In Montana’s Territorial Legislative Assembly, represen 
tation in both houses rested upon enumeration of qualified 
voters in a fashion which would “fairly represent the people 
of the several districts in both houses.”
2. Counties with small populations dominated the 1889 Con 
stitutional Convention, and after a sharp power struggle be 
tween these counties and the more urban counties, population 
was abandoned as the basis of representation in the state Sen 
ate; counties would be represented as counties with one senator 
each regardless of population—a constitutional requirement.
3. Yet the 1889 Constitutional Convention evidently intended 
the House of Representatives to represent population rather 
accurately. The Constitution required a census every five 
years, and reapportionment of the House after each census. 
Apportionment of House seats was to be made according to a 
population ratio.
4. The first apportionment assigned several joint representa 
tives to pairs of counties which thus had some half-seat rep 
resentation.
5. But the 1895 Legislative Assembly decided to grant each 
county a representative regardless of its population. There 
after, the population ratio was employed only for assignment 
of representatives beyond the first one, to counties with suffi 
cient population.
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6. A reasonably even distribution of population and of 
growth kept legislative malapportionment within modest 
bounds until 1910.
7. But in the “county-busting” era between 1910 and 1925, 
the number of counties doubled from 28 to 56; and constitu 
tional requirements for the Senate and statutory policy for 
the House gave a senator and a representative to each new 
county regardless of its population.
8. Agricultural depression and the advent of automobiles 
and mechanized farming conspired to blight the growth of 
many of these newer counties, while several of the historic 
mining counties also were losing population.
9. Larger urban centers made substantial population gains, 
and the total state population grew at a moderate rate during 
the generation from 1930 to the present.
10. In combination, the factors mentioned created ever 
greater disproportion between population and legislative rep 
resentation; Montana, by 1960, had one of the most malappor- 
tioned senates among the states, and its House of Representa 
tives was less representative of population than the houses in 
many other states.
11. Underrepresentation of urban areas and overrepresenta 
tion of rural areas became greater with each decennial reap 
portionment because constitutional and statutory provisions 
gave three-fourths of the legislative seats to counties without 
regard to their population.
12. A curious effect of legal restriction and legislative policy 
was to put smaller cities at even greater disadvantage than 
the larger cities, in relation to rural counties.
Part III, Statistical Measures of Apportionment, explores the 
lack of any universally accepted yardstick for measuring the 
fairness of apportionment (page 62).
1. The Montana Senate is one of the most malapportioned 
state senates by whatever measure is employed.
The Montana House of Representatives is in about average
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or median position among the houses of the states, in its rep 
resentation of population.
3. A “maximum population-variance ratio” was employed by 
the Supreme Court in its June 1964 decisions. While no maxi 
mum allowable variance ratio has been fixed, congressional 
districts with a variance of somewhat more than two-to-one 
have been held to deny equal representation.
4. The variance ratio between largest and smallest popula 
tion districts in the Montana Senate is 88-to-l; and in the 
Montana House of Representatives, 14-to-l.
5. A “minimum-proportion-to-control” ratio also was em 
ployed by the Supreme Court. This test, in a fairly apportioned 
legislature, would require votes of representatives of approxi 
mately 50 percent of the state’s population to control 51 percent 
of the votes in a legislative chamber.
6. Senators representing 16.1 percent of Montana’s popula 
tion could muster 51 percent of the votes in the Senate. This 
is a smaller proportion than that in at least 13 of the 15 states 
whose senates were held to be invalid by the Supreme Court 
in June 1964.
7. Representatives of 36.6 percent of the state’s population 
could muster 51 percent of the votes in the Montana House of 
Representatives. This was a smaller proportion than that in 
nearly half of the 15 states whose houses were challenged by 
the Supreme Court in June 1964.
8. These tests have been criticized for lack of political and 
statistical sophistication. But two more complex and statis 
tically refined tests confirm the major findings of the simpler 
tests as to the relative position of the Montana Legislative 
Assembly, compared to the legislatures held to be unconsti 
tutional by the Supreme Court.
9. Two more complex tests, the David-Eisenberg index and 
the Schubert-Press “inverse coefficient of variation” give a 
more distributive measurement of the kind and degree of 
malapportionment.
10. All tests seem to suggest that neither house of the Mon 
party; while rurally based Democrats were more apt than their
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tana Legislative Assembly could be sustained as fairly appor 
tioned if a valid judicial challenge is brought against them.
Part IV, The Effects of Malapportionment in the Montana 
Legislative Assembly, examines the theory that disproportion 
between population and representation makes a difference in 
the response of a state legislature to the problems brought 
before it. This is usually believed to take shape as urban-rural 
conflict in which urban popular majorities lose out in conflicts 
of interest with rurally oriented legislative majorities (page 
74).
An extensive questionnaire to members of the 1963 Montana 
Legislative Assembly was paired with an examination of legis 
lative histories of a number of bills voted upon in that session. 
Findings indicated that legislators recognized the existence 
of urban-rural conflict, and that it made some difference in 
the legislative product.
1. Rural legislators in each party tended to be more conser 
vative than their urban brethren of the same party—in outlook 
towards fiscal matters and towards reform of legislative struc 
ture and procedures. Thus rural overrepresentation accentu 
ated the conservative disposition of the legislature in both 
houses regardless of party.
2. Urban representatives were more responsive to urban 
problems, and rural representatives to rural problems; neither 
understood the problems of the other kind of constituency as 
well as they understood the problems of their own constituents. 
Thus rural overrepresentation gave considerable relative ad 
vantage to the access and appeal of spokesmen for rural in 
terests, particularly in the Senate.
3. Many rural legislators did show understanding of urban 
problems, although with greater difficulty; such understanding 
seemed to be related to legislative experience, and this tended 
to offset the factor of rural overrepresentation in the Senate.
4. Rural overrepresentation diminished party discipline. 
Partisan affiliation sometimes overrode urban or rural attach 
ments, but urban Republicans were more apt than rural Re 
publicans to break from fiscally conservative positions of their
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party; while rurally based Democrats were more apt than their 
urban brethren to abandon more liberal fiscal positions of 
their party.
5. Urban-rural cleavages appeared most prominently in bills 
which would divert funds from counties or the state to cities; 
on special problems of larger cities; on recreational and con 
servation measures which involved use of rural land by urban 
folk; and on property taxation which would be borne by rural 
districts.
6. In the 1963 session, rural overrepresentation accentuated 
both the Democratic majority in the Senate and the Republi 
can majority in the House.
A malapportioned legislature poses what might be called the 
“Dilemma of the Unrepresentative Legislator.” The standard 
expectation in the legislative process is that the representative 
will further the interests of his constituency as these interests 
are made known; only occasionally will he support the larger, 
or public, interest to the felt disadvantage of local constituents. 
In another view, the representative votes as he thinks the bet 
ter informed opinion among his constituents would have him 
vote.
But in a malapportioned legislature, the representative of 
an overrepresented minority frequently is put in the position 
of having to vote against the interests of his own constituents, 
if the legislature is to respond adequately to problems of an 
underrepresented majority of the people. This appears to be 
an unreasonably heroic expectation; and the more likely re 
sult is an inadequate response, if not positive frustration, of 
the legislature toward problems which confront it.
Seen in this context, the opposition of some self-proclaimed 
“states righters” to fair legislative representation seems curi 
ously shortsighted. Defense of malapportionment may amount 
to nothing more than protection of the most local and parochial 
interests as against recognition of the larger interest in an 
adequate state government within the federal system.
Shallow declamation of states rights which adds up to frus 
tration rather than assumption of proper state responsibilities 
is the surest guarantee that disadvantaged interests will turn
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to the national government for the help denied to them at the 
state level of government.
Part V, The Political Effects of an Equitable Apportionment, 
explores by statistical probabilities what party balances would 
have occurred in the 1963 and 1965 Legislative Assemblies if 
they had been equitably apportioned (page 90).
1. In 1963, Republicans controlled the House; in a fairly ap 
portioned House their strength might have been as little as 50 
percent or as strong as 64.6 percent maximum. Democrats con 
trolled the Senate in 1963; in an equitably apportioned Senate 
their strength might have ranged from 59.5 percent minimum 
to 76.7 percent maximum. In other words party control would 
have balanced out as it actually did.
2. In 1965, Democrats controlled both houses; their mini 
mum strength in a fairly apportioned House would have been 
53.4 percent and their minimum statistical strength in a fairly 
apportioned Senate would have been 50.4 percent. The maxi 
mum Democratic strengths would have been 69.7 percent in 
the House and 69.5 percent in the Senate. In other words, 
party control would have been what it actually is.
3. The problem was computed using a ten-year average or 
index of partisan preference for each county, derived from 
votes for six offices—state and national legislators, President 
and Governor—for the years 1952-1962. Assuming that the bal- 
ance of strength would be the same in each house, Republican 
strength would have ranged from 43.2 percent minimum to 
49.6 maximum, while Democratic strength would have ranged 
from 50.4 percent minimum to 56.8 percent maximum. Since
qL  y+6ar 3Ver?ge amounted t0 a Prediction of strength in 
1964, party control would have been what it actually is.
4 In a fairly apportioned legislature actual party balances
will depend as they do now primarily upon how people vote
from election to election, rather than upon the factor of reap- 
portionment. F
Part VI, The Constitutional Obligation to Reapportion has 
been imminent since the United States Supreme Court re 
versed a tradition of noninterference in legislative apportion-
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ment, to hold that state legislative malapportionment deprives 
voters of the “equal protection of the laws” which the 14th 
Amendment guarantees to them against state encroachment 
(page 96).
On the heels of this precedent-breaking decision (Baker v. 
Carr) which held that the Tennessee General Assembly was 
illegally malapportioned, suits to challenge state legislative 
apportionments soon were prosecuted in about three-fourths 
of the states. Suits from 15 states reached the United States 
Supreme Court in the 1963 term, and decisions in these cases 
were announced in June 1964. The Court had developed its 
“one man, one vote” criterion in Georgia congressional district 
ing cases and now applied this standard to both houses of state 
legislatures in the 15 states. Briefly, the Supreme Court de 
clared:
1. “As a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protec 
tion Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a 
bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a 
population basis.”
2. While “mathematical exactness . . .  is hardly a workable 
constitutional requirement” a state must “make an 
honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in 
both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal popu 
lation as is practicable.”
3. Considerations of regional identity, geography, area, 
political subdivisions such as counties, or explicit at 
tempts to balance urban against rural political power 
will not justify any “substantial” departure from equal 
representation of population in either legislative cham 
ber.
4. The “federal plan” found in a small minority of states 
including Montana, which gives representation in one 
house to political subdivisions, was specifically repudi 
ated as “inapposite and irrelevant to state legislative 
districting schemes” amounting to “little more than 
after-the-fact rationalization” of malapportionment.
5. While the Supreme Court had invalidated congressional
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districts within a state which varied more than 2-to-l 
in population, it refused to be limited by a lower court 
decision that a population variance of more than 1.5 to 1 
between state legislative districts might violate the one 
man, one vote test. It referred detailed determination 
of fair apportionment back to trial courts and other local 
apportionment agencies in the particular states.
Comments (obiter dicta) in several of the opinions recog 
nized problems which also occur in Montana. These included 
expressions of concern about the fairness of representation in 
large multimember legislative districts; and recognition of 
the “rotten borough” potential which lurks in overrepresenta- 
tion of declining population districts. •
Implementation of the Supreme Court one man, one vote 
requirement as the “supreme law of the land” is a clear con 
stitutional obligation of state legislators, state executive offi 
cers and judges of state courts “anything in the constitution 
or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding” when 
ever the issue confronts them as a matter of official duty. 
(United States Constitution, Article VI, clause 2).
The concluding portions of this study raise questions and ex 
plore alternatives; a program of action was proposed as a real 
istic framework for inquiry, not as a prescription for legislative 
action.
Part VII, What Kind of Legislature?, analyzes the various 
reapportionment possibilities open to Montanans (page 106).
1. Imputed advantages of unicameral versus bicameral legis 
latures are examined in the Montana context; it is concluded 
that the new legislature probably will be bicameral because of 
abiding belief in the value of the delays and double exposures 
which bicameralism puts in the way of legislation.
2. Smaller chambers probably would be desirable. But sev 
eral considerations, including the great range of difference be 
tween sparsely populated and urbanized counties, suggest that 
the two houses will remain at about their present size—the 
House perhaps around 100, and the Senate from one-third to 
one-half that size.
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3. Under any circumstances the least populous counties will 
be grouped for representation in both houses while more popu 
lous counties will receive more than one senator and represen 
tative.
4. The one man, one vote standard permits substantial dif 
ferences in the constituencies for election to the two houses. 
The most important creative choice to be made will be the 
choice of kinds of districts for election of senators and repre 
sentatives from the more populous counties.
5. Multimember districts for the Senate and single member 
districts for the House would permit important differences in 
the constituencies; single member House districts would reduce 
the costs of campaigning and permit more direct communica 
tion and accountability between constituents and their repre 
sentative.
6. Some practical and legal complexities which might hinder 
establishment of single member House districts are explored.
Decisions about kind of legislature, size of legislature, and 
kinds of districts claim the highest priority of importance, both 
in logic and in strategy. Decisions on these matters will dis 
charge the most significant part of the Legislative Assembly’s 
policy responsibilities with respect to reapportionment, because 
they virtually determine the nature and character of the new 
legislature; only a second order of detailed decisions is left to 
the apportioning authority—whether the Legislative Assembly, 
an apportionment commission, or ultimately the courts.
Part VIII, Getting the Job Done, explores several priorities 
and approaches open to the 1965 legislature (page 124).
1. Political considerations may not be as unfavorable as they 
might seem, although urban-rural differences furnish the back 
bone of possible conflict; but fair reapportionment will not de 
liver legislative control to one or two great cities, as in some 
states; nor will either major party be put in serious or perma 
nent disadvantage as happens in some states. In fact, the bal 
ances betwen a Democratically-controlled Legislative Assem 
bly, a Republican Governor, and courts may turn out to be 
favorable toward reapportionment.
2. The constitutional obligation to get on with reapportion-
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ment became immediate and direct for members of the 39th 
Legislative Assembly when they convened January 4, 1965, 
under their oath to support the United States Constitution (in 
cluding its 14th Amendment equal protection of the laws clause 
as construed by the Supreme Court).
3. Provisions of the Montana Constitution and statutes which 
conflict with the one man, one vote standard of the 14th 
Amendment are deprivation by the state of equal protection 
of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment; under the 
principle of supremacy of valid and relevant national law, 
(United States Constitution, Article VI, section 2) these in 
compatible provisions of the state constitution and laws are 
simply words which no longer impose legal obligation.
4. Thus the first constitutional obligation of the 39th Legis 
lative Assembly is to reapportion itself for elections to be held 
November 1966.
5. Adoption of a general apportionment statute to fix stand 
ards for kind of legislature, size of legislature, and kinds of 
districts seems desirable for several reasons; it would set the 
framework for detailed decisions by whatever apportioning 
agency might ultimately finish the job. Such a general appor 
tionment statute would make the most significant policy de 
cisions. If itself constitutionally valid, such a statute could 
limit the field of skirmish for political and judicial maneuver.
6. Creation of an apportionment commission to complete de 
tailed definition of districts and apportionments may become 
increasingly attractive by the 55th day of the regular session. 
Extension of the reapportionment work into an interim may be 
a desirable alternative to an expensive special session of un 
known duration, or to judicial reapportionment. One possi 
bility would be to extend into the interim the special reappor 
tionment committees which served during the regular session.
7. The apportionment commission should report its program 
back to a special session of the Legislative Assembly within 
some fixed time such as 90 days or perhaps 120 days. Should 
a court have taken jurisdiction of the reapportionment, it is 
not unreasonable to suppose that it would await results of in 
terim legislative action for some reasonable term.
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8. The joint resolution establishing the commission might 
provide for implementation of the commission’s apportionment 
plan in one or another of several ways. Upon being reported 
to the special Assembly session the plan could become effec 
tive if enacted by the Assembly and approved by the Governor 
in the usual way. Or, upon its report, the plan might become ef 
fective as presented unless changed or amended by agreement 
of the Assembly and the Governor. Failing such agreement 
upon changes, the plan then would go into effect as originally 
presented.
9. Details of appointment of the interim commission, its 
terms of reference, and the Governor’s pledge to call the special 
session should be provided by joint resolution late in the regu 
lar session.
10. Whatever reapportionment is developed by the Legisla 
tive Assembly or interim apportionment commission will be 
tested in the courts well in advance of November 1966.
11. It will also be necessary, though less important, to “tidy 
up” the Montana Constitution by an amendment to remove 
language incompatible with the one man, one vote standard of 
reapportionment; in the process certain archaic provisions and 
other objectionable provisions might be removed. But the ad 
dition of new constitutional limitations is probably inadvisable; 
some terms of a general apportionment statute might ulti 
mately be made constitutional but some assessment of experi 
ence with the new legislature is suggested prior to proposal of 
such amendments.
A program confined to deletion of incompatible constitu 
tional limitations might be worked out by the regular standing 
committees on constitutional amendments while special com 
mittees develop the general statute and its implementation.
12. Hopefully, Montana voters will elect a reapportioned 
40th Legislative Assembly, and ratify constitutional amend 
ments to accord with that reapportionment in the same election, 
November 1966.
In large perspective, the reapportionment movement appears 
as an invitation from the Supreme Court to the states to re 
fashion their legislative assemblies into responsible instru-
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merits of public authority. This may be a last-best chance for 
state governments to make effective responses within the fed 
eral system, or see that system shift to one of centralized power 
through atrophy of local response to local problems.
II. How the Montana Legislative 
Assembly Became Malapportioned
ELLIS L. WALDRON
The founding fathers of 1787 may still have remembered the 
revolutionary battlecry of taxation without representation 
when they had to resolve a dispute over representation in the 
Congress before they could construct the rest of a new national 
government. The famed “Connecticut Compromise” provided 
that the Senate would represent states as states, equally—the 
peculiar price of national union among states which had al 
ready been in business for more than a decade. But the na 
tional House of Representatives would be based upon popula 
tion; and so vital was this principle that a great national census 
would be taken every tenth year so that House representation 
could be readjusted to people in a growing, expanding nation.
In this same year, the Confederation Congress established a 
pattern for government in the “Old West.” The Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787 declared that “inhabitants of the said terri 
tory shall always be entitled to the benefits of . . .  a propor 
tionate representation of the people in the legislature.” This 
pattern in turn must have influenced the Congress which cre 
ated the Montana Territory in 1864.
The Montana Territorial Legislative Assembly would be bi 
cameral with both houses to be increased from time to time 
“in proportion to the increase of qualified voters” based upon 
an apportionment “as nearly equal as practicable, among the 
several counties or districts for the election of the council and 
representatives, giving to each section of the territory repre 
sentation in the ratio of its qualified voters as nearly as may 
be.”1
’Organic Act of the Territory of Montana, Sec. 4 (May 26, 1864), re 
printed in Revised Codes of Montana 1947, Vol. 1, Part 1, pp. 57, 58.
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A  century later, in June 1964, the United States Supreme 
Court summoned all states (including Montana) which had 
strayed from this standard of equal representation of popula 
tion to return to it, as a matter of constitutional obligation. 
The Supreme Court noted that “The original constitutions of 
36 of our States provided that representation in both houses of 
the state legislatures would be based completely, or predomi 
nantly, on population.”2
When the first Montana territorial government encountered 
political difficulties, Congress, in 1867, directed the territorial 
governor to district the territory for new legislative elections. 
Members were to be apportioned to districts “upon an enumer 
ation of the qualified electors of the . . . districts” in a fashion 
“which shall fairly represent the people of the several districts 
in both houses.”3
If the Montana Constitution of 1884 (Art. IV, secs. 4, 45-49) 
had been adopted, it would have perpetuated a pattern of 
legislative representation according to population in both 
houses into the period of statehood. Voters of the Territory 
approved this Constitution, but Congress was not ready to 
grant statehood.
When the present state Constitution was drafted in 1889, 
Montana departed from the population principle to embrace 
the so-called federal analogy” for its Senate. Amidst bitter 
sectional arguments, the Convention in which less populous 
counties held disproportionate representation decided to rep 
resent counties as counties in the Senate regardless of their 
population.4 Thus Montana joined a small company of states 
(in 1964 there were fewer than ten) which rejected repre 
sentation of population in both houses of the state legislature, 
for Senate representation of counties.
VI hatevei the reasons for representation of counties as coun-
meynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 12 L. Ed 2d 506, 534, (1964), citing 
Report of Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations Ap 
portionment of State Legislatures (1962). ’
*Act of March 2, 1867, reprinted Revised Codes of Montana 1947 Vol 1 
Part 1, p. 65.
Twelve less populous counties with 35 percent of the population (1890 
census) had 36 delegates, two short of a majority in the Convention: 
three populous counties with 44 percent of the population had 33 dele 
gates; Missoula County with six delegates was in “swing” position.
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ties in a state legislature, the reason for creation of the United 
States Senate was not one of them.
Advocates of such a Senate invoked the “federal” analogy— 
erroneously—in 1889; and critics—correctly—then pointed out 
that no federal relationship existed between a state and its 
subordinate local governments. Montana counties had no re 
served powers then, or now; and their lack of independent 
legislative authority endures as a problem of effective local 
government.
Yet the 1889 Constitutional Convention paid peculiar tribute 
to the importance of accurate representation of population, 
when the House of Representatives was projected on a popu 
lation basis. It decreed that legislative reapportionment should 
occur every five years:
The legislative assembly shall provide by law for an enumera 
tion of the inhabitants of the state in the year 1895, and every 
tenth year thereafter; and at the session next following such 
enumeration, and also at the session next following an enum 
eration made by the authority of the United States, shall revise 
and adjust the apportionment for representatives on the basis 
of such enumeration according to ratios to be fixed by law.
(Montana Constitution, Article VI, section 2)
This has always been the “law of the land” in Montana; but 
the requirement of a state census midway between the national 
census has simply been ignored.
Constitutional Provision for the Montana Senate 
The 1889 Constitution bears the marks of the struggle over 
legislative representation.5 Several scattered sections appear, 
when read together, to establish that each county shall be a 
separate senatorial district to be represented by neither more 
nor less than one senator. Legislative responsibility for com 
position of the Senate was limited to establishing the staggered 
terms of senators (Article V, section 4) and to granting a sen 
ator to each new county which might be created (Article VI, 
section 4).
The Fourth Legislative Assembly in 1895 dutifully enacted 
the constitutional provisions of Article VI for the Senate. The 
statute now reads:
'Detail of the provisions is examined below, Part VIII.
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Each county of the state of Montana shall constitute a senato 
rial district and each senatorial district is entitled to one 
senator.
This provision is 43-101, Revised Codes of Montana 1947. The 
next section (43-102) enacts verbatim the constitutional lan 
guage of Article VI, section 4 respecting assignment of senators 
to newly formed counties.
These constitutional provisions are squarely incompatible 
with the United States Supreme Court decisions of June 1964.
Unless the United States Supreme Court abruptly reverses 
its own growing line of decisions on this point, any federal or 
state court in Montana which held otherwise would be re 
versed on appeal by the United States Supreme Court.
Constitutional Provision for the Montana House of 
Representatives
Constitutional provisions for the Montana House of Repre 
sentatives may be compatible with Supreme Court require 
ments. The Constitution of 1889 required the Legislative As 
sembly to reapportion the House after each census (strictly, 
every five years, if the state census were taken); but redistrict 
ing might occur “from time to time as public convenience may 
require” (Article VI, sections 2 and 3).
The Montana constitutional requirement that apportionment 
of members to districts must be “according to ratios to be fixed 
by law (Article VI, section 2) neither requires nor impedes 
establishment of districts which are equal in population.
There may be no clear constitutional impediment to estab 
lishment of House districts which would give equal representa 
tion to districts of equal population '.G
To create districts with anything closer than approximate 
equality of population may be complicated by the constitutional 
prohibition against dividing counties to make representative
®This matter is explored in greater detail below, Part VIII. An appor 
tionment scheme which allocated additional representatives on some 
rismg scale of population (a regressive scale) would not violate the 
Montana Constitution, but probably would not be compatible with 
upreme Court requirements of equality. Roughly speaking, the pres 
ent system of apportionment in the House is regressively related to 
population.
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districts (Article VI, section 3). But Article VI, section 6, 
which made the initial apportionment in 1889 met this problem 
by creating several joint districts. In addition to the repre 
sentatives assigned to individual counties, each of three pairs 
of contiguous counties was represented in addition by a joint 
representative. These joint-county districts persisted until the 
reapportionment of 1895.7
While such joint districts do raise political problems of their 
own, they have the sanction of both Constitution and precedent 
in Montana. Use of this system during the early years of state 
hood continued a practice common throughout the territorial 
period. Certainly the joint district deserves to be considered 
alongside such exotic and untried devices as weighted voting, 
in any practical approach to equalizing population of repre 
sentative districts.
Statutory Apportionment for the House of Represnta- 
tives
The Montana House of Representatives fails to represent 
population equitably enough to meet Supreme Court standards 
because of a legislative policy initiated in 1895, which gives 
each county one representative regardless of population.8 It 
might have been argued that this was an unconstitutional de 
parture from the requirement that representatives be appor 
tioned according to a population ratio. At any rate, the Legis 
lative Assembly did not construe the ratio requirement this 
strictly, and statutory allocation of one representative to each 
county regardless of population has persisted since 1895.
The ratio of population apportionment was not expressly 
stated in the earlier apportionment statutes, but it can be re 
constructed from the actual allocations of representatives to 
the counties.9 As might be expected, the ratio of representa-
7Dawson County shared its only representative with Cascade County in 
a joint district, until the Fifth Legislative Assembly in 1897. Joint dis 
tricts were abandoned in elections to that Assembly.
8Montana Political Code (1895), secs. 112, 113 (Approved Mar. 14, 1895).
'Douglas Chaffey attempted this in his article, “Legislative Apportion 
ment in Montana,” Montana Business Quarterly, Fall 1963, pp. 70-71. 
Detail of each apportionment since 1889 is set forth there.
56 M O N T A N A  BUSINESS Q U A R T E R L Y
tives to population has been changed from time to time to keep 
the size of the House within reasonable limits. The ratio was 
1/3,500 in 1901; 1/4,800 in 1911; 1/6,000 in 1921 and 1931; 1/7,000 
in 1941 and 1951; and 1/8,500 in 1961. The object seems to have 
been to keep the House smaller than 100 members. At the end 
of the “county-busting” era in the 1920’s it had reached a mem 
bership of 110.
A strict application of the ratio principle would assign a first 
representative to a county only if it had a major fraction (one 
more than one-half) of the population required by the ratio. 
Nineteen counties currently (1960 census) lack the 4,251 popu 
lation which would entitle them to a first representative under 
the 1/8,500 ratio enacted in 1961. Their combined population 
would entitle them to six representatives under the ratio.
Legislative practice has employed the ratio only to assign 
representatives beyond the first one. Thus, to secure a second 
representative, a county must have 1.5 the population ratio, 
plus one person—or, at present, 12,751 population. A third 
representative is assigned to a county with 2.5 the population 
ratio plus one person, and thus upward until the largest-popu- 
lation county has received its apportionment. Yellowstone 
County, with 79,016 population, received nine representatives 
in 1961, a tenth representative would have required 9.5 X 8,500 
plus 1 =  80,751 population.
Failure to require the half-ratio (4,251 population) for as 
signment of a first representative has the following effects in 
the present House of Representatives:
1. Nineteen smallest counties, each lacking the half 
ratio, are overrepresented 3.25 times, on the aver 
age.
2. All counties with more than the half-ratio—that is, 
the other 37—are underrepresented both in relation 
to smaller counties and in relation to a statewide 
average of fair representation.
3. The nine largest counties have only 82 percent of 
the representation to which they would be entitled 
on a strict population basis. 4
4. The greatest disadvantage is experienced by the
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seven counties which have almost enough popula 
tion for a second representative: they have only 62 
percent of the representation to which they would 
be entitled on a strict population basis.
Every time the ratio is increased, the larger and growing 
counties lose representation relative to the smallest and de 
clining-population counties, so long as each county receives one 
representative regardless of its population.
Specifically, increase of the ratio from 1/7,000 to 1/8,500 in 
1961 meant that six counties with 1960 population between 
10,501 and 12,751 failed to get, or to retain, a second representa 
tive to which they would have been entitled under the former 
ratio. Meanwhile Daniels and Fallon counties joined the list 
of smallest counties who lacked half a ratio for entitlement to 
a representative. Their population was between 3,501 and 
4,251—the new major fraction or half-ratio. And Yellowstone 
County received nine representatives where it would have 
had eleven under the former ratio.
Indeed, raising the ratio from 1/7,000 to 1/8,500 deprived 15 
counties of either one or two additional representatives to 
which they would have been entitled under the former ratio.
The number of Montana counties doubled in the fifteen years 
following 1910. Twenty-eight counties became 56, and each 
received a senator and a representative regardless of popula 
tion.
Many of these newer counties did not grow. A startling fact 
has been that many of them have lost population—in some 
instances almost from the moment of creation. From 1920 on, 
agricultural depression and the automobile combined to frus 
trate both growth and equitable legislative apportionment.
Of 19 counties which today lack the 4,251 population that 
would entitle them to a first representative under the 1961 
legislative apportionment ratio, 15 were formed after 1910, and 
two more are remnants of counties so formed. Of these 19 
smallest counties, only one, Mineral County, is larger today 
than it was in 1920. Four of the new counties (Daniels, Judith 
Basin, Golden Valley, and Petroleum, formed either in 1919 or 
1925) lost population within ten years of their formation. Sev 
eral retain only minor fractions of their 1920 population. Yet
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each of these counties, and indeed one-third of all Montana 
counties, enjoy a senator and a representative regardless of 
population.
Statutory policy and population trends have combined to 
make the Montana Legislative Assembly substantially less 
representative of population than it was in 1890, or 1910, or 
1930.
Statistical norms employed by the Supreme Court to meas 
ure apportionment in 1964 have been applied to past Montana 
legislative apportionments. The following table speaks for 
itself:
DETERIORATION IN THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE 
MONTANA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, 1870-196010 
Least P roportion  (%)
of Population Whose M axim um Population Vari- 
R epresentatives Could ance Betw een Sm allest and 
TT , .  Control 51% of Votes L argest R epresentation Dis-
X <51% would be a  tr ic t ( l- to - l  w ould m ean
i®  , ®*ate  _ Perfect score) equal representation)
Year Population Senate House Senate House
15.1 41.0 42.0 1 to 3.9 1 to 2
inoi o 39-3 493 1 to 2 1 to 8.5
Jo?n " 3  o i l  3 5  0  5 0  0  1  to 1 1 5  1  to 2 3}9JJ 35.5 37.7 49.5 1 to 19.3 1 to 2
192° 31.3 21.0 46.0 1 to 30
}93S I 3.  !  23 5 49.0 1 to 35 1 to 5.2
1962 46 3 16-1 36.6 1 to 88 1 to 14
It is clear from this table that there has been a shift of con 
trol in the Senate to the group of counties which would have 
no separate representation if population were the basis for 
apportionment; and the soaring variance-ratio for the Senate 
reflects depopulation of some counties and concentration of 
urban population in others. The population of the state is 
simply much less evenly distributed today than it was a gen- 
eration ago, or two generations ago.
Representation of counties as counties in 1889 created only 
modest disparities in representation of population by contrast 
to its effect today.
M fiQ drn!iiablh^  °f t^6Se indexes is considered in some detail at pp. 63-69 Computations of indexes of representation were based
upon nearest preceding census, applied to the reapportioned Assembly.
Urban percentages were derived from the 1960 census.
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The rising variance ratio for the House reflects growing 
disparity between small counties of absolutely declining popu 
lation, and statewide growth which has increased the ratio of 
population required to secure a second representative.
Specific indexes of representativeness were computed for 
each Montana county in each house, for the years 1910, 1930, 
1950 and 1960, in a nation-wide study of state legislative appor 
tionment. These indexes show that 31 counties which were 
overrepresented in 1930 were even more heavily overrepre 
sented in 1960. Meanwhile the eight principal urban counties, 
all underrepresented in 1930, were even more seriously under 
represented in I960.11
Montana’s deepening malapportionment is not unique, but 
part of a national trend of the present century—a trend which 
has finally precipitated the crisis over equitable representation 
in nearly every state.
This nationwide trend developed in one of two primary 
patterns:
1. In states whose constitutional or statutory scheme of ap 
portionment would maintain equitable representation, the 
representatives of declining-area districts refused to re 
apportion, sometimes for as long as 50 years, despite clear 
legal obligations to do so. This was the situation in states 
like Illinois and Tennessee, whose troubles were so sig 
nificant in breaking open judicial consideration of appor 
tionment. This is the situation in many states where one 
or two very large metropolitan centers dominate the state.
2. In states like Montana whose constitutional and statutory 
provisions for apportionment tend to produce inequitable 
representation of a growing population, the legislative 
assemblies have rather faithfully reapportioned decade 
after decade; each reapportionment has increased the en 
trenched overrepresentation of declining population dis 
tricts.
"See Paul David and Ralph Eisenberg, Devaluation of the Urban and 
Suburban Vote, Vol. 2, pp. 96-98 (1962), noted in greater detail at p. 69.
III. Statistical Measures 
of Apportionment
ELLIS L. WALDRON
It has been much easier to agree upon the existence of mal 
apportionment in American state legislatures than to accept 
a common yardstick for its measurement.
Population” usually refers to the number of human beings
counted in the legislative district in the most recent decennial
national census. Patterns of population distribution differ
markedly both in kind and in magnitude among the states.
Representation districts are created in a considerable variety
of ways; and representatives are assigned to these districts in 
diverse ways.
Statistical devices which may adequately represent the pat 
tern of apportionment in one state may give distorted images 
when applied in another state with a different pattern of popu 
lation and apportionment. Statistical approaches which are 
acceptable for measuring apportionment within states may 
give distorted images when employed to compare apportion 
ments among states.
The majority of the United States Supreme Court employed 
two statistical indexes of apportionment when it ruled upon 
state legislative apportionment in June 1964. Both of these 
indexes are relatively simple to comprehend and to apply. We 
will analyze them and apply them to the Montana Legislative 
Assembly for purposes of comparison. But these tests have 
been sharply criticized for resting upon oversimple political 
and statistical assumptions. So we will explore several of the 
more sophisticated statistical measures of apportionment which 
have been applied during recent years, and note their applica 
bility to the Montana Legislative Assembly.
AH of the statistical measuring sticks give readings of “sub-
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stantial,” “considerable” or “excessive” malapportionment for 
the Montana Senate, and at least average or median malappor 
tionment for the Montana House of Representatives.
The Montana Senate is less representative of population than 
the Senate in at least fourteen of the fifteen states whose legis 
latures have been held by the United States Supreme Court 
to deny equal protection of the laws.
The Montana House of Representatives is less well appor 
tioned to population than the House in at least four of these 
fifteen states, and not materially more representative than 
many of the other eleven whose apportionments were invali 
dated in June 1964.
Brief consideration of several methods for measuring the 
apportionment of legislatures to population follows.
The Maximum Population-Variance Ratio
The simplest and least indicative measure of apportionment 
employed by the United States Supreme Court in June 1964 
was an “extremity” ratio which divided the population of the 
largest population district (dividend) by the population of the 
smallest population district (divisor) and treated the resulting 
quotient (called the Variance Ratio) as a ratio or index of the 
amount of malapportionment between the two districts of ex 
tremely divergent size within a state.
The smaller this index number, the more equitable the ap 
portionment. A quotient of 1 would represent perfectly equita 
ble apportionment. Because the quotient is a fraction, not a 
percentage, the upper range of this index was limited only by 
the divergence in size between districts to be compared. The 
variance ratio was found to be 422.5 between two California 
districts in 1960.
This measure dramatizes the extreme cases of overrepre 
sentation and underrepresentation within a state, but tells us 
nothing about representation of the other districts within the 
state.
Thus the variance ratio of 88.4 for the Montana Senate since 
1961 tells us only that the senator from Yellowstone County 
represented a population (79,016 in 1960) nearly 90 times as
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large as the number of people (894 in 1960) represented by the 
senator from Petroleum County. This ratio tells us nothing 
about the 54 other county-districts which contained about 88 
percent of the state’s population in 1960. These other districts 
might be either well-apportioned on balance, or grossly mal- 
apportioned.
The Montana House of Representatives, as in many state 
legislatures, contains some multi-member districts. The vari 
ance ratio is made applicable to multi-member districts by 
dividing the population of such a district by the number of its 
representatives, and treating each equal portion as if it were a 
single-member district for comparison with other districts.
The maximum variance ratio in the Montana House of Rep 
resentatives was 14.0 in 1961. This expressed the divergence 
between Petroleum County’s 894 population with one repre 
sentative, and Ravalli County’s 12,537 population with one rep 
resentative. But it does not show that Lake County, with 13,104
population (only 567 more), was granted a second representa 
tive.1
While the maximum variance ratio dramatizes the extreme 
cases within a single state, comparisons of such ratios from 
one state with those of another state are not particularly 
meaningful because of great differences in the size of popula 
tion districts from state to state.2 *4
With this warning about comparability of these ratios be 
tween states, the ratios for the 15 states involved in the June
S r  ° f temrS. g.lven historical application to Montana in
ta^le aJ)ove» P- 60- This index gives no clue to the fact that several
Moi?tana countlfs had only slightly larger population than Pe-
4 09 ^ity; no1r .t.hat 19 of the 56 counties in the state had less 
than the 4,251 population which would entitle them to their first rep- 
esentative if the population principle were strictly followed. Each of
they6are counties. * 3 representative and a senator simply because
limited significance to compare variance ratios for Montana
Wlth , h(°Se °* New Jersey whose smallest Senate dis- 
T  popula,tlon/M ontana’s average Senate district would 
P^lftl0Ki and whose largest Senate district had 923,545
Gus Tv er «r "frt ly T ™  the total P^ulation of Montana). Gus Tyler, Court versus Legislature: The Socio-Politics of Malappor 
tionment, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 27, p 402 (1962)
E ? ^ o VaT  nati°+S f°r each state- H u b e r t  and Press c'ted
b ^ i a l ^ l a S * ^ 6 C° mPariSOnS ° f SUCh ratios “d ram atic
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1964 decisions and for Montana are tabulated, because they 




















The Minimum-Pro portion-Necessary-to-Control” 
Index
The second measure of apportionment employed by the Su 
preme Court majority in 1964 might be called a “minimum pro 
portion of population necessary to control the House” index. 
It has been called the “Dauer-Kelsay” index after two scholars 
who employed it a decade ago in a statistical pattern which 
the National Municipal League has since kept up to date and 
widely distributed.3
In this test legislative districts (and equal shares of multi 
member districts) of a state are arranged in rank order from 
smallest population to largest population districts (or the other 
way around). Smaller population districts are then added to 
gether to secure a number of districts whose representatives 
could muster 51 percent of the votes in the legislative chamber. 
The total population of these smaller districts (whose repre 
sentatives could control a majority of votes) is then expressed 
as a percentage of the total state population. This gives an
^Manning J. Dauer and Robert G. Kelsay, “Unrepresentative States,” 
National Municipal Review , Vol. 44, pp. 571-575 (1955). Revisions and 
refinements of this index are widely disseminated. A 1962 revision 
was employed by Arthur L. Goldberg, “The Statistics of Malapportion 
ment,” 72 Yale Law Journal 90, 100 (1962). A 1964 revision, current 
with the 1964 Supreme Court apportionment decisions, appeared in 
Congressional Quarterly W eekly Report for June 19, 1964, p. 1219. This 
test was given historical application to Montana in the table above, 
p. 60.
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index number, which might range from 1 (least representa 
tive) to 51 (perfectly representative) percent of the population 
whose representatives could control a majority of the votes 
in the legislative chamber.
This Dauer-Kelsay, or minimum-proportion-to-control, index 
has several attractive features:
1. It is simple to understand and to compute. Anyone who 
can work percentages and add sums can calculate the indexes 
with a pencil, sliderule or desk calculator.
2. It gives some distributive measure of the general preva 
lence of inequities in apportionment; it may be particularly 
appropriate for an apportionment system which produces large 
numbers of small population districts.
3. It is not distorted by peculiarities of politics, geography 
or population distribution which can produce extreme but un 
typical variance ratios.
4. Raw data of widely divergent range are reduced to a 
common statistical norm, the percentage, so that some com 
parisons are allowable between chambers of a single state, and 
among states.
A 1964 Congressional Quarterly computation of these indexes 
for the 50 states illustrates several points of interest for Mon 
tana. These indexes are set forth below for the fifteen states 
whose legislatures were held to be unconstitutionally appor 
tioned m June 1964; comparable indexes cited by the Supreme 
Court are shown; and the indexes for Montana are furnished 
for purposes of comparison.4 (See following page.)
Whether Supreme Court or Congressional Quarterly figures 
are used, by this test the Montana Senate is more malappor- 
loned than the Senate in thirteen of the fifteen states whose 
legislatures were held to be unconstitutional in June 1964. And
Ther narm ednftat h re  f  —  th e  W eek ly  Report  fo r Ju n e  19’ each of t h e PrmciPal Supreme Court decision foreacn oi tne 15 states is given. Discrepancies between Sunrem p P on rt
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MINIMUM-PROPORTION-TO-CONTROL INDEXES
SENATE HOUSE
C ongressional C ongressional
Suprem e Q uar- Suprem e Q uar-
S tate C ourt te rly C ourt te rly
A la b a m a ________________ 25.1 27.6 25.7 37.9
(Reynolds v. Sims)
Colorado _________________ 33.2 29.8 45.1 32.1
(Lucas v. Assembly)
Connecticut .... .................. .. 32.0 12.0
(Pinney v. Butterworth)
Delaware ________________ 21.0 29.9 28.0 27.6
(Roman v. Sincock) 
F lo r id a _____________ ____ 15.2 26.9
(Swann v. Adams)
Idaho ...................................... 16.6 44.0
(Hearne v. Smylie)
I l l in o is ___________________ 28.7 39.9
(Germano v. Kerner)
Iowa ........... ....................... 35.2 26.9
(Hill v. Davis)
Maryland _________________ 14.1 14.2 24.7 42.3
(Md. Committee v. Tawes) 
Michigan .............................. . 29.0 44.0
(Marshall v. Hare)
New York _______ ________ 38.1 36.9 37.5 34.7
( W M C A  v. Lomenzo)
Ohio ...................................... 46.0 28.4
(Nolan v. Rhodes) 
Oklahoma ........................... 24.5 29.5
(Williams v. Moss) 
Virginia ............. ................. . 41.1 41.1 40.5 40.5
(Davis v. Mann) 
Washington ..................... ........ 35.6 33.9 38.0 35.3
(Meyers v. Thigpen) 
Montana (1962) ..... ................ 16.1 36.6
the Montana House of Representatives is less representative 
under these tests than at least six of the fifteen legislatures 
whose apportionment was invalidated by the Supreme Court.
Comparing Montana with the other 49 states, on this mini- 
mum-proportion-to-control index, only five Senates were con 
trollable by smaller percentages of population: Arizona (12.8), 
California (10.7), Florida (15.2), Maryland (14.2), and Nevada 
(8.0). The Montana Senate, in other words, ranked 45th among 
50, in representativeness. The Montana House was less repre 
sentative than those of 27 other states among 49 (Nebraska 
excluded because it is unicameral). The Montana House, a
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body at least roughly representative of population, was near 
median position—that is, about midway in the rank order.
A variant of this Dauer-Kelsey index was employed in a 
widely recognized 1955 study by Russell Baker which focused 
attention upon the representation of principal urban areas with 
in each state.*’ Treating the five largest urban counties in Mon 
tana as indicative of its principal urban areas, Baker found 
that these counties, with 37 percent of the 1950 population, 
controlled 32 percent of the votes in the House of Representa 
tives, but only 9 percent of the votes in the Senate. This led 
Baker to place Montana among a group of states in which he 
regarded malapportionment to be “substantial ” “Principal 
urban areas controlled smaller Senate representation in only 
seven other states (Georgia, Kansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, 
Arizona, South Carolina, and Mississippi).
This minimum-proportion-to-control index has been criti 
cized for making an unrealistic political assumption that rep 
resentatives of smaller-population districts will in fact com 
bine, upon that principle alone, to block the will of representa 
tives of majorities living in urbanized districts. These critics 
point out that legislative blocs form in the real world around 
such considerations as party, region, and economic and cultural 
interests which have little relationship to formal patterns of 
representation.
One may concede the validity of this criticism for most legis 
lative behavior, most of the time, and still retain belief that 
this index suggests realities of political alignment in some im 
portant kinds of matters, some of the time. The effort to de 
velop a simple, distributive measure of malapportionment like 
this Dauer-Kelsay index for a representation pattern which 
has large numbers of small population districts does not imply 
the expectation that the representatives of such districts will 
frequently or habitually combine on the population principle. 
Nor does it suggest that when such combinations develop in 
some areas of legislative action that they will occur with sta 
tistical perfection. However, it would be difficult indeed to 
persuade many an observer of Montana legislative politics that 
combinations of smaller-district votes do not occur.
P™ er' Rand°m Studies in
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The minimum-proportion-to-control index also has been crit 
icized for lack of statistical sophistication. It does not reflect 
the frequency or degree of departures from a statistical mean 
or average of population, expressed by a statistical coefficient 
of variation. Nor does it measure the effect of untypical dis 
tributions of data or events, for which statistical measurements 
of “skew” and “kurtosis” have been developed. We will turn 
to two more elaborate statistical treatments which meet some 
of these criticisms of the simpler indexes. The major effect of 
these refined measurements is to confirm, rather than to de 
stroy, the findings of the simpler measurements already noted.
The David-Eisenberg Index
In 1961-62 Professors Paul David and Ralph Eisenberg of the 
University of Virginia published Devaluation of the Urban and 
Suburban Vote. Two volumes of statistics gave “index values 
of the right to vote” for state legislators for every county in 
the United States, stated as percentages of a statewide average 
or norm.0 These David-Eisenberg indexes meet the statistical 
requirements of a distributive representation of individual in 
stances for any chamber of any state legislature.
The index computed an average, or mean, of ideal repre 
sentation for each legislative chamber (state population di 
vided by the number of legislative districts with equal shares 
allocated to representatives from multi-member districts). This 
average or norm was expressed as 100 (100 percent of an equi 
table representation district). The extent to which each legis 
lative district or representation unit deviated from this state 
wide norm was then expressed as a percentage of the norm. 
Thus an index below 100 indicated underrepresentation as a 
percentage; an index higher than 100 indicated overrepresenta 
tion as a percentage of the norm.7
“Published by the Bureau of Public Administration, University of Vir 
ginia; Vol. I in November 1961; Vol. II in June 1962. An additional 
value of this major study was its compilation of indexes for the years 
1910, 1930, 1950, and 1960, to allow historical comparisons.
’In the David-Eisenberg Index, a statistical model with 10,000 popula 
tion divided among ten districts would have a statewide average or 
norm of 1,000 population per district. An actual district with 1,000 
population would have perfect representativeness—100 percent of the
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In 1960, Petroleum County, to consider a Montana example, 
had a David-Eisenberg index of 1348 (13.5 times the statewide 
Senate norm) in the Senate, and 803 (eight times the statewide 
House norm) in the House. Yellowstone County, with an index 
of 15 (15/100ths of statewide norm) in the Senate and 73 
(73/100ths of statewide norm) in the House was underrepre 
sented by the gap between those indexes and the norm of 100. 
Comparable indexes were computed for each Montana county.
David and Eisenberg then grouped counties into population 
ranges in order to show broader patterns of representation 
among states. In these groupings, the 49 Montana counties 
each with less than 25,000 population enjoyed a grouped Senate 
representation index of 172 (1.7 times the norm) while each 
of the seven counties with more than 25,000 population had a 
grouped Senate representation index of only 26 (26/100ths of 
the norm). In the Montana House of Representatives, the 49 
less populous counties had a grouped representation index of 
119 (overrepresentation) and the seven populous counties an 
index of 80 (underrepresentation).
David and Eisenberg finally sought to compare malappor 
tionment among states. To accomplish this, they averaged the 
indexes for each house in each state (treating the houses as of 
equal weight). Montana’s 49 smaller-population counties had 
an overall, both-house index of 146 (overrepresentation) and
t e seven populous counties an index of 53 (underrepresenta 
tion) .
In comparisons of population groups among the 50 states, 
Montana’s 49 smaller-population counties ranked 15th in de 
parture from representativeness; but the seven larger-popula- 
tion Montana counties ranked 35th in departure from repre 
sentativeness among comparable counties of other states.
ese David-Eisenberg indexes have been accepted as reas 
onably adequate measures of malapportionment within any 
particular state.8
nnrtyJ: ,dlstrict .™ith 5°0 population would have 50 percent of the
norm* Tht population would have 250 percent of thenorm The percentage figures are treated as indexes.
rSetterY ardshV k”Ŝ H g L! girslative Malapportionment: In Search of
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 7, pp. 
P ys a variant form of the David-Eisenberg indexes.
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The Schubert-Press Indexes
In 1964, Professors Glendon Schubert and Charles Press of 
Michigan State University challenged the political and statis 
tical foundations of the David-Eisenberg comparisons among 
states, and presented their own fairly elaborate statistical anal 
ysis of apportionment in the 50 state legislatures and the 
United States Congress as of 1962.9
They considered the David-Eisenberg assignment of equal 
statistical weights to upper and lower houses of American 
legislatures to be unrealistic, in view of observed factors of 
seniority, longer term, and special functions vested in the 
senates. To correct for this inequality, Schubert and Press 
assigned arbitrary weights of 60 percent to Senate data, and 
40 percent to House data, when they combined their indexes 
for over-all interstate comparisons.
The Michigan State analysts objected to use of what they 
called “ad hoc” statistical yardsticks to measure apportionment 
when quite acceptable “standard” statistical measures were at 
hand. They computed the following data for each house of 
each state legislature and for the United States Congress: 
mean, standard deviation, inverse coefficient of variation, 
skewness, and kurtosis. Of these measures, the inverse co 
efficient of variation is the single most indicative yardstick, 
and the only one to be considered here.10
Measured by the inverse coefficient of variation only the 
senates of Florida, New Mexico, Arizona, and California were
"The ensuing discussion and data are derived from their article, “Meas 
uring Malapportionment,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 58, 
pp. 302-327 (June 1964). Several points of criticism in the foregoing 
discussion of other measurements were made in this provocative article.
'"The Schubert-Press indexes for Montana were as follows:
Standard Inverse Coefficient 
Mean Deviation of Variation Skewness Kurtosis
Senate 21,049 15,652 .4349 2.8133 8.0989
House 6,183 3,112 .6651 0.1302 -0.9580
Summarizing significance of their data, they declared: “the affirmative 
ideal [equitable apportionment] is a legislative chamber for which the 
distribution of representational units is characterized by zero variance, 
zero skewness, and maximal positive kurtosis: ICV -> +  1, gi -> 0, g 2 
infinity. The negative ideal [extreme malapportionment] is charac 
terized by maximal variance, extreme positive skewness, and extreme 
positive kurtosis: ICV 0, gi +  infinity, gu -» +  infinity.” Loc. cit. 
321, 316.
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worse apportioned than the Montana Senate. The Montana 
Senate was worse apportioned than 14 of the 15 senates found 
to be invalid in the June Supreme Court decisions.
The Montana House of Representatives was somewhat better 
apportioned than those in a majority of states, but no better 
than at least four of the 15 houses involved in the June Su- 
preme Court decisions.
Montana variance coefficients are presented with those of
the 15 states involved in the June 1964 Supreme Court deci- 
sions:11
„ Schubert and Press worked their data into one summary 
apportionment score” for each state, weighting Senate data 
at 60 percent and House data at 40 percent of the total. The 
resulting apportionment scores ranged from -4 .3  for Indiana,
t V qr1? aPP°rti°ned of the 50 state legislatures and Congress, 
to +96.3 for Massachusetts, the best apportioned. On this 100-
v°1tt S l f  ^ ontana’s apportionment score was 44.7, and its 
rank (25th place) was the median position among the 51 legis-
w a s ^  5 6 1311 SCOre was and the average (mean) score
t h ^ J ) f r r  Wf  “ red t0 be “atypical” because of 
Sace and r  f  Clef  variance in its Senate; Michigan, in 27th 
yp“car- ' “  ^  Pla°e' were ac“ Pted “  being more
„ J here. 1S sr H reaSOn for complacency about Montana be- 
cause of such statistical midposition. Both the Michigan and
the score, a ® *° +  L0- The higher
“best” with a score of RfiS ™ent’ Massachusetts Senate rated
SCHUBERT-PRESS INVERSE COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION
Ala. Colo. Conn. Dela. Fla. Ida. ill. Iowa
Senate .467 .588 .630 .552 .427 .458 615 581
House .594 .605 .381 .486 .416 .616 .758 .574
Md. Mich. N.Y. Ohio Okla. Va. Wash. MONT.
Senate .472 .608 .762 .770 .452 .686 685 435
House .538 .680 .688 .624 .608 .661 .739 !665
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Colorado legislatures were held to be unconstitutionally mal- 
apportioned in June 1964; and to occupy a median or average 
position in this regard really indicates only that virtually all 
state legislatures fail in some features to meet the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional tests of fair representation.
Indeed, on the basis of their data, Schubert and Press sug 
gested in advance of the June Supreme Court decisions that 
not more than three or four state legislatures as constituted 
in 1962 might meet the constitutional tests of the Supreme 
Court.
It is further worth notice that these observers placed Mon 
tana (along with the United States Congress) in a group of 
nine states considered to be “misapportioned” because struc 
tural requirements of constitution or statute made malappor 
tionment unavoidable; malapportionment of the Senate (in 
Montana) tended to block the effectiveness of representation 
in a better apportioned House of Representatives.12
Concluding this survey of measurements of apportionment, 
it may be observed that simpler figures and more sophisticated 
statistics agree that Montana’s Senate is among the least rep 
resentative or most malapportioned; and that its House of 
Representatives is no worse but scarcely better than a national 
median or norm. Both houses stand considerably outside the 
limits of fair representation which were demanded by the 
Supreme Court.
Neither house would be sustained by a federal court or a 
state court which recognized its obligation to apply relevant 
national law as declared by the United States Supreme Court 
in June 1964.
“Other states in this group were New Jersey, South Carolina, New Mex 
ico, Arizona, Hawaii, Alaska, and California. The first four along with 
Montana account for five of the seven states whose Senates represent 
counties regardless of population, on the so-called “federal analogy.” 
The other two states in this group, Idaho and Nevada, turned up in a 
group called “malapportioned” because both their legislative houses 
were less representative than the all-state median.
IV. Effects of Malapportionment in the 
Montana Legislative Assembly
DOUGLAS C. CHAFFEY 
Project Assistant
Institute of Governmental Affairs 
University of Wisconsin
Charges that a state’s legislative apportionment has its
6 f  °u the ,bllls passed and buried by the state legislature 
need to be analyzed—proved or disproved. This writer set out 
several months ago to investigate the extent to which Mon- 
ana s legislative apportionment did or did not affect a session
la t iv e S e m b T  ” 6’ SPed“ Cally the 1963 Montana
, ■ 3'̂ le ll;eory belund much of the present writing on appor- 
tonment seems to be this: apportionment, the division of legis-
or “mnbT S â non^,)egislative districts, becomes “inequitable”
renresents>°r 1-°ne ,|W? n tlle number of people each legislator
I*1m o T s t a t T  W, y lrom county to county within a state. 
fa r T e it  JcMlftaresj sparsely inhabited districts have a
tan the r^ reP? S,entati0n in °ne or both legislative houses 
l e i  T h e ^ r pul(au ns warrant' and populous districts much 
a house a l o n e ?  f  that When an issue a™es which divides 
disWcts often m 2  °fcof  “ ‘““ cy interests, the less populous 
fate of t he hm? °ver the Populous districts, and the
ment) restrictions i  & !u° aPPortionment (or malapportion-
tha" SerVin® “ »  “ ‘-e s ts  of the state
chSctere?„d °Z l0US f StriCts are often rural and agrarian in 
ar^s th i ™  , P°PUl0US districts contain major urban
S  and % £% £?  T ta? “  T t f ^  “  ”  «*city dwellers and f -i ldea ls that rural groups distrustcity dwellers and fa.l to understand urban problems. When
EFFECTS OF MALAPPORTIONMENT 75
rural representatives control one or both legislative houses, 
urban legislation often suffers defeat at the hands of rural 
indifference, even when a majority of state citizens are city 
dwellers.
Of course, it should be considered as a necessary corollary 
that reapportionment bills should be drawn carefully so as to 
avoid the opposite peril: rural citizens need representation, 
too.
Apportionment is also said to affect possible legislation by 
providing easy access to the legislature by various state in 
terest groups. Groups wishing to block urban legislation are 
believed to have a significantly greater appeal to a rurally 
dominated legislature than do the groups favoring urban 
legislation.1 In addition, rural over-representation may give 
an inherent advantage to the political party which tends to be 
strong in rural areas, and may prevent an urban-based party 
from gaining legislative control.2 Where a legislature divides 
into two political parties (as in Montana), both parties seem 
to strive for a more rural image than their statewide member 
ship would indicate.
In this study specific points taken from this existing “appor 
tionment theory” were applied to the 1963 Montana Legislative 
Assembly to test their reliability. The theory was tested in 
two major ways. First, each 1963 legislator was sent a ques 
tionnaire designed to measure his attitudes and outlooks to 
ward urban and rural problems and interest pressures. The 
idea was to see whether measurable differences between 
urban and rural legislators do exist in Montana, and to assess 
what importance these differences have in the state legislature 
in terms of the state’s apportionment system. Secondly, the 
roll call voting in the 1963 session was analyzed to see whether 
any urban-rural splits developed during the session, and, if so, 
over what types of legislation. Again the idea was to discover 
the importance of such splits in terms of the state’s apportion 
ment system.3
’Gordon Baker argues this point strongly in Rural Versus Urban Politi 
cal Power (New York: Random House, 1955) p. 23.
2See on this point V. O. Key, Jr., American State Politics: An Introduc 
tion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), p. 65.
^ h e  methods used in this study are discussed at greater length in the 
original version of this study, a Master’s thesis recently completed at
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The responses of each legislator, and his votes on the bills 
selected for analysis, were coded and punched onto data cards. 
The legislators were classified by party and by the “urbanness” 
of their county, and their responses and votes were tabulated 
against these two factors. The fifty-six Montana counties were 
sorted into “urbanness” categories in terms of their 1960 popu 
lations. In Montana particularly, this is a reliable way of 
classifying since the most populous counties are also the most 
urban, and the least populous counties are also the most rural. 
Those counties with more than 25,000 residents are termed 
larger urban,” counties with 12,000 to 25,000 “smaller urban ” 
counties with 7,000 to 12,000 “mixed,” counties with 5,000 to 
7,000 “larger rural,” and counties with less than 5,000 residents 
were classified as “smaller rural.”
The legislative apportionment system presently in existence 
in Montana is discussed elsewhere in this issue, and was noted 
earlier m the Fall 1963 issue of this journal;4 therefore little 
need be said about it here. But it would be well to note, before 
the findings of this study are discussed, that Montana presents 
a clear example of inequitable state legislative apportionment.
hus, if malapportionment has any effect on any legislature, 
it should have this effect in Montana.
The Attitudes and Interests of 1963 Legislators
The 1963 Legislative Assembly was split in party control; 
Democrats held a 35-21 majority of Senate seats and Repub- 
icans had a 57-37 majority of House seats. The distribution 
of party strength between counties was as follows:
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p a r t y  s t r e n g t h
B oth House of R epresentatives S rm tr
C ounty Houses fS tU -----d ¥5T-------R»n,lh • = r - n -------  --------------
Larger urban 45 38 14(37<r) 24, ~  ‘ otal Dem‘ Repub.
Smaller urban 27 17 10(59%) ^  7 4(57%) 3(43%)
Mixed 24 12 “ g™  7 « %  10 7(70%) 3(30%)
Larger rural 12 6 3(50%) l l v u t l  12 6<5°%) 6(50%)pfc ™: « 21 »!«! S  A .JSKJ ?!S!
U b ra T k ^ M ln ta n a t'o r  froS 'the 'P om icaT sc” ''  aV" la“ '  in sev‘Montana State University. Political Science Department of
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Thus, in the House of Representatives, Republican strength 
appears to be greatest in the larger urban and in the smaller 
rural counties. Democratic strength is greatest in the smaller 
urban counties, especially in the “high-line” area. Democratic 
strength is weakest in the smaller rural counties.
The Senate presents a very different picture, however. Sen 
ate Democrats were elected not only from the smaller urban 
counties but also from the smaller rural counties. Since there 
are equal numbers of legislators from the smaller rural coun 
ties in both houses, the difference in party strength between 
houses in the smaller rural counties cannot be a result entirely 
of apportionment. Obviously, many of these smaller counties 
elected a Republican to the House and a Democrat to the 
Senate in 1963. Since there are 38 “apportioned” seats assigned 
to larger urban counties in the House, while these same coun 
ties have but seven seats in the Senate, the comparative weak 
ness of the Republican representation from these counties in 
the Senate might in some measure be attributable to the effects 
of malapportionment of the Senate.
In the questionnaire sent to the legislators, they were asked 
whether they considered themselves liberals, moderates, or 
conservatives.’’ Responses indicated that the great majority of 
liberal Democrats of both houses came from the larger and 
smaller urban counties, and that Democrats from the more 
rural counties considered themselves as more moderate or 
conservative. As for the Republicans, those from the larger and 
smaller urban counties tended to consider themselves as mod 
erates to a greater degree than did those from the rural coun 
ties, who were more strongly conservative in outlook.0
Legislators were asked about their own occupations as well 
as the occupations of their constituents. There were major 
differences between urban and rural members in terms of
"Of the 150 legislators in the 1963 session, 101 (68 percent) responded 
to the questionnaire. Responses were about evenly divided proportion 
ately between House and Senate members, Republicans and Democrats, 
and urban and rural constituencies. Because the distribution was so 
fortunate, we can probably generalize from these 101 members to all 
150 legislators.
"The numerical distribution of responses to each question and votes on 
the selected bills is to be found in the thesis from which this article is 
drawn.
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personal and constituency occupations. Occupations of rural 
legislators of both parties and/or their constituents centered 
on farming, ranching, and to a lesser extent on business. Demo 
cratic legislators from the larger urban counties tended to be 
labor people or professional people, while urban Republicans 
tended to be businessmen or professional people. Urban legis 
lators perceived their constituents to be engaged in urban- 
related occupations such as industry, business, government 
employment, services, and labor. There is, then, some basis 
tor saying that rural legislators of both parties tended to be 
more alike m their occupations than their urban brethren; that 
rural legislators think of their counties as rural; and that urban
egislators perceive their counties to have nonagricultural 
economies.
Legislators were asked what sorts of bills they were inter 
ested m. Here again, some significant differences were evident 
between urban and rural legislators. Urban legislators were 
more interested in legislation dealing with cities, business, 
lghways and welfare than were rural legislators. Curiously 
enough, the urban desire for easy access to fish and game made 
is egis a ion a divisive subject. Rural members seemed 
mainly in stockgrowing and farming legislation; 
gis a ors were equally interested in taxation, appropria 
tions, and education. It appears that urban and rural legis-
Share SOme interests but divide on issues 
.] , ° ,, e1̂  °^ n type of county. Legislators were asked
U e eSlslative interests of their constituents, and 
esponses were very similar to what has been said above.
c o n S l TS Wefe aSkGd whether the bills desired by their 
Whether ?hP ^  apProved by the legislature, or
that hurbM Y  S e < t 0  haVG difficulty- Responses indicated 
m Jre Z  ^  °f parties and hoth houses saw
than d id lu ra lle g ila tT s9 ^  *****  ^  ^  constituents 
19^ ses^ o ^  w ^ ^  urb^^ rura^6^ 6̂  • ^ ere were times in
showed t h a t ™  ^  ^ 1 C°nfhct was P^sent. Responses
“  i n ^ ^  tX" rS Sa-  urban-rural
aw arp  nf tbo j. ’ that more urban members were
the rural l e a i s l a t n SUĈ  conflict to a greater degree than the rural legislators, but significant percentages of all legis-
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lators felt urban-rural conflict was present at times in the 
1963 session. Legislators themselves provided numerous in 
stances of urban-rural conflict in the 1963 session in the ques 
tionnaire responses, and substantially agreed upon the follow 
ing breakdown of issues provoking urban-rural conflict:7
ISSUES PROVOKING URBAN-RURAL CONFLICT
N um ber of 
Times M entioned
House Senate
Legislative Issues M embers M embers
1. Auto license fee split between cities and counties 20 19
2. Fish and game and recreation legislation .....   7 3
3. Gas tax split between state and cities ......-....  5 8
4. Grazing fees on state la n d s ..................   13 4
5. Sunday closing law ....     1 0
6. Property reclassification ........    11 4
7. Air and water pollu tion..... ........      2 0
8. Salaries of city employees .....................................  0 1
9. Taxation of cooperatives....... .......................  ... 4 3
10. City-county planning and zoning ..........  0 2
11. Labor and welfare _____________________   8 6
12. Schools and school consolidation _ __    4 2
13. Permissive 60-mill levy to cities .......................... 0 1
14. All urban legislation .......    8 2
15. Agriculture _______________________________  5 5
16. Other issues ......      10 6
Legislators were asked a series of questions concerning cer 
tain interest groups in the state, some of which are strong in 
rural areas (Farm Bureau, Farmer’s Union, and cattlemen’s 
associations), some in urban areas (the Municipal League, The 
Anaconda Company, the Chamber of Commerce, and labor 
unions), and others in both types of counties (oil, lumber, 
schools, and The Montana Power Company). Legislators were 
asked to indicate the three groups most influential in the state 
generally, then in their county, and finally in the legislature 
itself. For the urban legislator, labor unions and the Chamber 
of Commerce were groups which were influential in their 
county and in the state generally, but not in the legislature 
itself. Rural legislators stressed the importance of the Farm 
Bureau, the Farmer’s Union, and cattlemen’s associations in
7In the second half of this study, these questionnaire findings are tallied 
against roll call votes in the 1963 session, to see the extent to which 
these mentioned urban-rural splits actually appeared in voting.
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their home counties. Both urban and rural legislators agreed 
that The Anaconda Company and The Montana Power Com 
pany were even more influential in the state and in the legis 
lature than in their own counties.
Obviously, urban legislators are more aware of urban-based 
pressure groups than are rural legislators, and rural legislators 
more perceptive of rurally-based pressure groups. From this 
one might tentatively say that it is true that the rurally-based 
interest groups would have greater access to the more rurally- 
based Senate than to the more representative House. Findings 
also point out that urban legislators feel that urban interests 
are less than successful in the legislature, and rural legislators 
seem to agree with this conclusion.
Two further questions tested urban and rural legislative 
perceptions of city and farm problems. Legislators were first 
asked to comment on the major problems facing Montana’s 
arger cities. All respondents perceived finance and taxation 
to be major problems of cities. However, urban legislators 
tended to see air and water pollution, legislative representa 
tion .planning-zoning, and industrial development as more 
13 problems than did rural legislators. Rural
mSnPv Sv,C education, law enforcement, juvenile delin-
l i t  y’ S+h°PP1u? centers’ and lack of parking facilities as greater city problems.
!‘ “ e” s that urban legislators are relatively more 
aware of snbstantaland long term urban problems than are
T  legislators tend to see city needs in terms 
of their own needs and fears.
ruralW^r/tn concerninS major farm problems,
al legislators felt high production costs, high property taxes
and low prices for products to be major t o p S S S
— red these less im ports and
fven sfatlh; tC  °f £arm surpluses <or in « few eases 
lator_ sa w fj™  the termer had no problems). Urban legls-
th “ ^ r ° blems ? Heremly from rural members or declared their ignorance of the problems. One can sav that
^ z : : t z : i t Uaid lators vrobau
Z Z r  to ar?  SUP?°Tt °f  each other ™ problems pe 
on thm  w .  w -  m
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A final question concerned legislative changes which the 
legislator would like to see made. Urban legislators generally 
seemed more favorable to legislative changes than did rural 
legislators. Urban legislators showed greater enthusiasm for 
an annual session, a longer session, different apportionment, 
and several other changes than did rural members. A substan 
tial percentage of all rural legislators desired no changes in 
present structure and procedure.
In summary, tabulations of the responses to the questionnaire 
reveal these differences between the attitudes of urban and 
rural legislators:
1. The interest and outlooks of rural legislators tend to differ 
in some respects from those of their urban counterparts. 
Legislators tend to reflect their constituency in occupation 
and interests.
2. Rural legislators of both parties tend to be more conserva 
tive than their urban brethren, both ideologically and in 
their interest in procedural and structural changes in the 
legislature itself.
3. There is a greater disparity in occupation, interests, and 
outlook between legislators from urban counties than those 
from rural counties, regardless of party affiliation.
4. Urban legislators are less aware of farm problems than are 
rural legislators; rural legislators are less well aware of city 
problems than are urban legislators.
5. There is evidence that interest groups influential in rural 
areas have more appeal to rural legislators than to urban 
legislators, and that urban interest groups have more appeal 
to urban legislators than to rural legislators. Therefore, 
rural interest groups may have more access to the Senate, 
which has a preponderance of rural members, and relatively 
less to the more representative House..
Urban-Rural Splits in Voting in the 1963 Session
Here is how rural-urban attitudes affected voting in the 
1963 session. For this study, 39 bills were selected from the
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279 Senate and 535 House bills introduced in the session; these 
were the bills producing the greatest splits in voting during 
the session. Fourteen of these bills produced deviations of an 
urban-rural nature from party lines in one or both parties and 
houses. These bills were checked against the issues mentioned 
by legislators in the questionnaires as producing urban-rural 
conflict in the session.
House Bill 66: An act to authorize, in certain instances, the 
boards of county commissioners to levy an additional tax of not 
to exceed fourteen mills for the county poor funds. . . *
In questionnaire responses, eight House members and six 
senators mentioned labor and welfare legislation as provoking 
urban-rural conflict. House Bill 66 passed the House 64-24 and 
the Senate 51-4. On this measure, an urban-rural split was 
evident between urban and rural House Democrats, with rural 
Democrats more favorable toward the Republican measure 
than were urban Democrats. Three urban Republicans broke 
from their party’s position to vote against the measure. No 
split appeared in the Senate on this issue.
House Bill 105: An act . . .  to provide that dividends paid on 
capital stock of cooperative organizations and amounts allo 
cated as patronage dividends or otherwise to patrons of co 
operative organizations shall not be deductible in the calcula 
tion of gross income for Montana corporation license tax pur 
poses. . . .*
Four representatives and three senators mentioned taxation 
of cooperatives as provoking urban-rural conflict in the session. 
House Bill 105 passed the House 63-27 and the Senate 30-24. 
A rural-urban split was evident between House Democrats; 
Democrats from the most urban counties voted in favor of the 
bill, and nearly all other House Democrats opposed the meas 
ure. House Republicans, and all senators, voted on almost 
straight party lines.
House Journal of the Thirty-Eighth Legislative Assembly of the State 
of Montana (1963), p. 186. Senate Journal of the Thirty-Eighth Legis 
lative Assembly of the State of Montana (1963), p. 429.
0House Journal, p. 388.
Senate Journal, p. 562.
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Home Bill 302: An act to clarify the advisory functions and 
jurisdiction of city planning boards and city-county planning 
boards.10
Two senators mentioned city-county planning boards as pro 
voking urban-rural conflict. House Bill 302, introduced by 
urban representatives on behalf of the Municipal League, 
passed the House 81-7 and the Senate 40-10. The bill was a 
routine correction of an error in earlier legislation. Neverthe 
less rural Senate Democrats and Republicans, and rural House 
Republicans seemed less enthusiastic about the measure than 
did urban legislators.
Home Bill 313: An act . . . relating to distribution and use of 
proceeds of gasoline license tax by providing that one percent 
age of all receipts shall be deposited and credited to the state 
park fund, and the balance shall be deposited and credited 
seventy-five per centum to state highway fund and twenty-five 
per centum to the gasoline license drawback fund, and provid 
ing that the one per centum deposited and credited to the state 
park fund shall be used for creation, improvement, and mainte 
nance of state parks which are used for motor boating.11
Seven representatives and three senators mentioned fish 
and game and recreation legislation as provoking urban-rural 
conflict. House Bill 313, introduced by urban representatives, 
passed the House 54-35 and the Senate 34-19. In this instance, 
a rural-urban split developed between urban and rural Repub 
licans of both houses. Urban Republicans departed from a 
fiscally conservative position to vote in favor of a bill drawing 
money away from state funds for parks of benefit to city 
dwellers; rural Republicans were opposed to this reallocation.
Senate Substitute for Senate Bill 45: An act to establish the 
policy of the state of Montana on protection of fishing streams; 
providing for submission of plans for construction and hy 
draulic projects affecting such streams to the Montana Fish and 
Game Commission and for review of such plans. . . .VJ
This bill passed the Senate 32-21 and the House 53-33. A clear
10Home Journal, p. 355.
Senate Journal, p. 551.
11Home Journal, p. 428.
Senate Journal, p. 552.
VJHome Journal, p. 601.
Senate Journal, p. 380.
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split developed between urban and rural House Republicans on 
the issue. As indicated earlier in the study, urban legislators 
tended to be more interested in fish and game legislation than 
were rural legislators.
Senate Bill 193: An act relating to registration fees of motor 
vehicles and the disposition thereof; providing that the funds 
in the county motor vehicle fund shall be equitably dispersed 
under a unit plan; providing the method and procedure of de 
termining “city-units” and “rural-units.”13
Twenty representatives and nineteen senators mentioned the 
auto license fee split as provoking urban-rural conflict; this 
type of legislation topped the list of conflict “mentions” in 
responses to the questionnaire. Senate Bill 193 passed the 
Senate 31-24 and was defeated in the House 46-46. An urban- 
rural split on this urban-benefit measure was clear in the 
roll-call voting in both houses and in both parties. The meas 
ure was strongly supported by urban legislators and moder 
ately to strongly opposed by rural legislators.
House Bill 92: An act relating to registration fees of motor 
^ cle/ r d the dlsposition thereof by providing for the divi-
+h f nse ?r reglstration fees between cities and towns within the county in a pro rata manner. . »
This measure was a second “auto license fee split” bill, de 
signed as a compromise measure to attract enough rural sup 
port to pass. It passed the House 65-24 and the Senate 45-8. 
Rural-urban clash was still evident in voting on the Republi 
can side in both houses. In this case, urban legislators were 
orced to settle for less than they wanted of the auto license 
tax funds for cities It should be noted that five urban Demo- 
crats (four from Silver Bow County) refused to accept the bill 
since Silver Bow already shared license tax funds with Butte. 
Had there been fewer rural legislators in the House the
OnTlf*^ +?en^ e Wf Uld probably have Passed the House.
______ otherhand, had all urban members supported SB 193,
'aSenate Journal, p. 393. 
House Journal, p. 586. 
uHouse Journal, p. 437. 
Senate Journal, p. 556.
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it would have passed the House anyway, rural overrepresenta 
tion and opposition notwithstanding.
An urban-rural split in voting developed in the Senate over 
Senate Bill 19, which would have exempted state-chartered 
banks from Montana corporation license tax laws to the same 
extent that national banks were exempt.15 *Urban Senate Dem 
ocrats opposed the measure; rural Democrats looked on it more 
favorably. Senate Bill 19, defeated in the Senate 22-31, rep 
resents the only bill voted on in the Senate only which pro 
duced fairly clear urban-rural conflict. It should be noted that 
the Senate passed and sent to the House several bills of major 
benefit to urban areas. These measures included a bill to 
permit incorporated cities and towns to allocate their own 
expenditures up to sixty mills,10 and two bills increasing un 
employment compensation.17 This legislation was rejected in 
House committees.
House Bill 165: An act known as the Montana Air Pollution 
Control Act. . . .“
Air pollution legislation was mentioned by two representa 
tives as provoking urban-rural conflict. House Bill 165 was 
defeated 36-54 on a motion to segregate the bill from the Com 
mittee of the Whole report. It was apparent from the voting 
that while urban Republicans were divided about equally on 
the need for the measure, and urban Democrats approved the 
measure, rural members of both parties stood against it sub 
stantially and contributed to its defeat.
House Joint Resolution 10: . . .  requesting that Montana land- 
owners and leasees when posting private property to prohibit 
hunting, place the name of the owner upon the notice of post 
ing. . . ."
Fish and game legislation was mentioned by seven repre 
sentatives and three senators as provoking urban-rural conflict.
15Senate Journal, p. 175.
’“Senate Bill 124, Senate Journal, p. 242.
’’Senate Bill 139, Senate Journal, p. 390.
Senate Bill 175, Senate Journal, p. 362.
'"House Journal, p. 393.
"‘Ibid., p. 222.
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This measure, introduced by two urban Republicans, was de 
feated in the House 40-52. Vote distribution showed that urban 
Democrats and Republicans supported the measure to a much 
higher degree than did rural members.
The last four bills to be mentioned here, House Bills 407,-° 
409,21 410,22 and House Substitute for House Bill 411,23 all con 
cerned property reclassification, and all were voted upon on 
the same day. They were in a group of bills introduced by the 
Special Committee on Classification and Appraisal, and were 
designed to complete property reclassification in the less popu 
lous counties of the state, as ordered by a previous legislature 
for the whole state. Four of these measures received strong 
opposition in House voting, and all received “do not pass” rec 
ommendations in the Senate Committee on Taxation. While 
all these bills passed the House (with margins of 61-30, 49-42, 
51-40, and 46-45, respectively), rural-urban conflict was evi 
dent in both parties on all votes. The measures were supported 
to a greater degree by Republicans than by Democrats. But 
urban Democrats supported the bills to a much higher degree 
than did rural Democrats. A Republican urban-rural split is 
clear on all votes. Fourteen representatives and eight senators 
mentioned this legislation as provoking urban-rural conflict. 
While these measures never came to a vote in the Senate, we 
may assume that they were defeated by rural opposition.
It is possible to make some concluding remarks about this 
analysis of roll call voting in the 1963 session:
1. Urban-rural conflict does occur in the Montana Legisla 
tive Assembly; on some issues rural legislators tend to vote 
against urban legislators.
2. These urban-rural differences are evident both in the
attitudes expressed by legislators and by their actions upon 
certain bills.
3. The most evident splits in the 1963 session occurred over 




38I b i d p. 422.
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funds from counties or from the state; on special problems 
peculiar to larger cities; on fish, game, and recreation measures 
where urban residents make use of rural lands; and finally 
over property taxation legislation aimed at rural counties.
4. Party differences very often override potential urban- 
rural differences, but not at all times. Republicans who deviate 
most often from a conservative fiscal position are from urban 
areas; Democrats who deviate most often from a liberal fiscal 
position come from rural areas.
These conclusions tend to support the points made at the 
beginning of this paper. Some modifications are necessary, 
however, in view of other findings:
1. Many rural legislators understand urban problems quite 
well, and support urban legislation; it is probably more diffi 
cult for a rural legislator to gain knowledge of city problems, 
however, than it is for an urban legislator to understand them.
2. Urban legislators do not always support urban legislation. 
In many instances in 1963, legislators of one city opposed legis 
lators of another city, especially when one area’s urban prob 
lems were not shared by another area, or when party differ 
ences were more important.
3. On balance, the rurally-dominated Senate was more favor 
able to urban legislation in 1963 than was the population-based 
House. This is probably true for several reasons. First, sena 
tors generally have a longer term of legislative service than 
do representatives; therefore, rural senators have greater op 
portunity to become familiar with urban needs than do rural 
representatives. Secondly, the Democrats controlled the Sen 
ate, and were probably more disposed to support urban welfare 
and financial legislation than was the House Republican ma 
jority. Curiously, urban underrepresentation itself probably 
contributed to the success of urban legislation; the large urban 
House bloc, divided in party control and feuding within itself 
as often as not, was not present in the Senate, and agreement 
was more readily possible.
Of what importance, finally, was the overrepresentation of
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rural areas in the 1963 Montana Legislative Assembly? Judg 
ments drawn from analysis of one session must be limited. 
Nevertheless, the following may be advanced as “cautious 
conclusions”:
1. Overrepresentation of rural counties in both houses in 
creased the difficulty of passing certain types of legislation, 
including measures dealing with urban problems and finances, 
fish and game and recreation measures, and any measures 
which might adversely affect farming and ranching areas 
(such as increased property tax assessments). In some cases, 
rural opposition and overrepresentation may have killed legis 
lation such as, for example, the more extensive auto-license
fee split and the property reclassification bills in the 1963 
session.
2. Rural overrepresentation gave to the legislative parties a 
more conservative cast than they would have in a more equi 
table apportionment, and contributed to lack of party cohesion.
3. Rural overrepresentation made it more difficult for urban 
interest groups to approach the legislature; this same imbal 
ance facilitated the ease with which interest groups could bring 
pressure, especially in the state Senate.
4 .  **ural overrepresentation in the 1963 legislature accentu 
ated both the Republican House majority and the Senate Dem- 
ocratic majority.
5. Rural overrepresentation increased the difficulty of adopt 
ing any changes in legislative structure and procedure which 
might have been proposed.
We might expect then that a reapportionment of both legis 
lative houses along lines of population equality would alleviate 
,S°m? °f the problems caused by rural overrepresentation in 
the 1963 session. However, these problems will persist if urban 
senators and representatives are not ready to assert leadership 
if and when legislative power passes to them. Increased party
r ? y 'n a reaPP°rtloned legislature could render more diffi 
cult the passage of urban legislation. Thus, there remains a 
serious question to be considered by groups desiring reappor 
tionment, with a radical reapportionment of both houses, de-
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creased rural representation will tend to leave a leadership 
void—a void which must be filled by someone—if not urban 
legislators, someone else.
The rural legislators who have held the balance of power in 
Montana for so long have obviously made significant efforts 
to think of the state and its needs as a whole—unlike the more 
cynical rural legislators of some states (Illinois, for example). 
Urban counties, under any reapportionment arrangement, will 
have a great responsibility to elect the best possible legislators 
and to make sure that these legislators learn to understand 
rural needs.
V. The Political Effects of An 
Equitable Apportionment
HOWARD E. REINHARDT 
Associate Professor of Mathematics 
Montana State University, Missoula
In this section we consider two mathematical questions 
derived from two questions about legislative reapportionment: 
“What would happen if apportionment were exactly equit 
able?” and “What would be likely to happen in reapportion 
ment consistent with recent Supreme Court decisions?”
A Note on Method
Confronted with a question about the real world, a mathe 
matician extracts from that world some apparently pertinent 
facts and adds to them some more or less plausible assump 
tions. The result he calls a model; it is a simplified picture of 
the world he wishes to consider. He translates the question 
asked about the real world into a question about the model; 
the question may then be attacked with the mathematical tools 
available to him—notably, logical thinking. The answer—an 
answer about the model—may then be retranslated to a state 
ment about the real world.
The strength of the method lies in the fact that reasonable 
men will all agree as to the correctness of the solution within 
the model. An obvious weakness is the fact that the model 
may not be an adequate representation of the real world so 
that the answer obtained may be useless or worse to the de 
cision-maker of that real world.
Exactly Equitable Apportionment
Since Supreme Court decisions do not distinguish between 
upper and lower houses, we restrict our attention to a legis-
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lative chamber which might be either house. We assume that 
in a perfectly apportioned legislative chamber, a legislative 
district with, say 5.2 percent of the state’s population would 
have 5.2 percent of the votes of the chamber. (Another pos 
sible assumption would replace “population” with “registered 
voters.”) Column 1 of Table 1 gives each county’s percentage 
of total state population which would be equitably represented 
in a perfectly apportioned legislature. Thus Beaverhead 
County would have 1.07 percent of the votes. The percentages, 
which could be obtained from census figures, were actually 
computed from the related David-Eisenberg indexes described 
in Part III.
This is simple arithmetic. The question of how this 1.07 per 
cent might be divided between Republicans and Democrats is 
a more complicated problem and the answer requires one of 
the more or less plausible assumptions mentioned in the pre 
vious section. Several possibilities are considered and the re 
sults are tabulated in the remaining columns of Table 1. 
Column 2 was computed assuming the delegation to the per 
fectly apportioned legislature would divide into political par 
ties as did the actual delegation to the House convening in 
January 1963.1 Column 3 assumes division as the 1963 Senate, 
Column 4 as the 1965 House, and Column 5 as the 1965 Senate.
These figures all reflect voting behavior in a single election; 
it seems desirable also to consider an apportionment which 
would reflect a longer term of voting behavior—the political 
expectation—in the county. Simmons and Waldron- have pro 
posed such a measure—their Index of Partisan Political Pref 
ence (PPI). We suppose (and here the simplification afforded 
by such a supposition is apparent) that a PPI of .6 Republican 
means that a Republican strength of about 60 percent may be 
expected in that county. Column 6 of Table 1 indicates the 
party division of the perfectly apportioned chamber if allo 
cated according to the 10-year PPI.
‘This would be the situation in a chamber if legislators were assigned 
fractional votes.
“Lee Simmons and Ellis Waldron, “County Indices of Partisan Political 
Preference in Montana, 1952-1962,” mimeographed.
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Extremes in Acceptable Reapportionment 
Perfect apportionment would be a sort of demographic mira 
cle. Acceptable apportionments will have legislators represent 
ing different numbers of people. According to David and 
Eisenberg,3 drafters of model plans of representation have 
suggested that the ratio of largest population per member to 
smallest population per member should not exceed 1.3. These 
authors suggest that 1.5 is politically more feasible. We will 
assume that a ratio of 1.5 or less is acceptable and that any 
thing larger is not. (It should be emphasized that this is an 
assumption made for the purposes of getting on with the math 
ematics, and does not represent an opinion about the Supreme 
Court.) For each of the methods of division used in compiling 
Table 1, we seek the largest fraction of the chamber member 
ship which each of the parties could control in an acceptable
apportionment. The answers to these questions are given in 
Table 2. 5
TABLE 2
P A R T v ^ T ^ T n STABLISHED UPPER AND LOWER LIMITS OF
rmiNTV^s 4rT?i4T w h i c h  MIGHT HAVE OCCURRED IF EACH 
COUNTYS ACTUAL VOTE HAD BEEN CAST FOR AN EQUITABLE
SHARE OF A FAIRLY APPORTIONED LEGISLATURE
(Percent)
p p i
w/vrio 01963 1965 1965 (E ither
t  _ . T, . . .  , House Senate House Senate Cham ber)
Lowest Republican share 50— 23.3 31.3 30.5 43 2
Highest Republican share 64.6 40.5 44 6 49 6 49 6
mOCratfC shuare 35.4 59.5 53!4 50.4 50A
Highest Democratic share 50+ 76.7 69.7 69.5 56.8
The computations for 1963 and 1965 are just one step re- 
moved from the actual or real world legislatures of those 
years. They adjust the party strength actually elected from 
each county in those years to what its share of the entire 
chamber would have been in an equitably apportioned cham 
ber, and then make a statistical conclusion about the total 
strength which each party would have held in such a chamber.
TfJJ1 a£ d Ralph Eisenberg, Devaluation of the Urban and
^ 1 9 6 1  ' BUreaU °f PUbliC ^ n i s t r a t i o n ,  Un/vershy of v J -
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Computations based on the Party Preference Index are one 
more step removed from the real world. They substitute an 
average of votes cast in each county for 6 different offices in 
6 elections over a 10-year period (1952-1962) for the actual 
strength in a particular legislature and then adjust this 
strength, based on the 10-year average, to an equitable chamber 
as in the paragraph above.
It is noteworthy that exactly apportioned legislatures would 
have differed little in their composition from the actual ones 
and that the extreme figures arrived at vary greatly from one 
method of division to another. It seems apparent, even to a 
casual observer, that the political composition of a reappor 
tioned chamber is going to depend heavily on patterns of voting 
behavior from election to election, rather than on the fact of 
reapportionment.
VI. The Constitutional Obligation 
To Reapportion
ELLIS L. WALDRON
In 1962 the United States Supreme Court broke its own 
tradition of judicial abstention in legislative apportionment 
matters to declare that state legislative malapportionment 
could deprive voters of the equal protection of the laws guar 
anteed to all persons against state abuse by the 14th Amend 
ment, and deprive them in a way which the courts would 
review as a “justiciable” question.
The case in point was Baker v. Carr, involving the Tennessee 
General Assembly. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan dissented 
vigorously from the majority opinion, insisting that the ques 
tions involved were not amenable to judicial treatment. The 
courts, they said, should not enter what Frankfurter had tren 
chantly described as a “political thicket” in an earlier appor 
tionment case.1
The Baker case has been called the most significant exercise 
of judicial review since the oracular statement of that doctrine 
by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison (1803). 
Few Supreme Court decisions have triggered such massive and 
instantaneous response throughout the land and few have pro- 
voked noisier argument among contending schools of “acti 
vists and abstainers within the legal profession and the law 
schools.
'Baker v. Carr 369 U S. 186 (1962). The “thicket” reference was in 
th° e®f°ve reen> 328 U. S. 549 (1946). A significant precursor of 
v  6 deci slon ma^ have been the article by Anthony Lewis, New
7*???  Supreme iCourt Correspondent, “Legislative Apportion-
THQft1 f?Q*Q ê Fu?lral CouT} s’ ’ Harvard Law Review, Vol. 71, pp. 1057-
i 2 i Y hlch fargued for judicial intervention in problems of legislative malapportionment.
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Tennessee’s problem was sent back to the federal trial court 
for further process, and within a year apportionment suits 
were in process in 36 states. A number of these suits worked 
their way to the Supreme Court docket and were heard during 
the 1963-1964 term.
On June 15, 1964 the Supreme Court announced its decisions 
that malapportioned state legislatures in six states deprived 
voters of the equal protection of the laws when such malappor 
tionment occurred in either house of a state legislature.
The Court majority recalled its formulation of the “one per 
son, one vote” principle in a 1963 case involving the Georgia 
county-unit system of voting in primary elections. There Jus 
tice Douglas had declared that “once the class of voters is 
chosen and their specifications specified, we see no constitu 
tional way by which equality of voting power may be evaded. 
• • . The conception of political equality from the Declaration 
of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fif 
teenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean 
only one thing—one person, one vote.”2 
Then, in February 1964, the Supreme Court held that “as 
nearly as practicable” Georgia congressional districts must be 
arranged so that “one man’s vote in a congressional election is 
to be worth as much as another’s.”3 
The June 15 decisions held that one or both houses of the 
legislatures in Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Maryland, New 
York, and Virginia violated the equal protection guarantee of 
the 14th Amendment. A week later memorandum decisions 
citing the June 15 series invalidated legislative apportionments 
in nine additional states—Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, 
Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Washington. All fifteen 
cases were sent back to lower courts for action appropriate to 
secure equitable representation in both houses of the state 
legislatures.
The constitutional obligation upon each state to make each 
house of its legislature represent population “as nearly as may 
be” is simply beyond argument, at least until such time as an 
amendment to the national constitution is adopted which 
would prevent application of the equal protection clause to
‘Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368, 381 (1963).
3Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1, 8 (1964).
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state legislative apportionment. Proposal and adoption of such 
an amendment seems so unlikely (January 1965) that it cannot 
stand as a pretext for failure of a state to proceed with re 
apportionment.
The 14th Amendment makes it possible for any person who 
can gain standing in a federal court to challenge a state action 
which is alleged to deny that person “the equal protection of 
the laws.” The Supreme Court has held that inequitable legis 
lative representation does, in fact, deny equal protection of the 
laws by dilution of the voting power of persons underrepre 
sented. By judicial decision this application of the equal pro 
tection clause is “the supreme law of the land . . . anything in 
the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwith 
standing.” Judges in every state, along with congressmen, 
members of the several state legislatures, and all executive 
and judicial officers, both state and national, are bound by oath 
to its support. (United States Constitution, Article VI, clauses 
2 and 3.)
Officers of the state governments are now under the same 
kind of legal obligation to effectuate equitable legislative rep 
resentation as they are to desegregate racially segregated pub 
lic facilities.
The statistical measures of malapportionment which the 
Supreme Court employed in the June 1964 cases were noted 
earlier, and it seems clear that the Montana Legislative Assem 
bly stands condemned both by these tests and by additional 
features of the Supreme Court decisions in any suit properly 
filed to raise the basic issues of malapportionment.
The opinions in the June cases warrant additional notice at 
this point for several features which seem particularly relevant 
for the Montana Legislative Assembly.
The principal opinion of the six member majority was ex 
pressed in the decision of three cases which came up from 
Alabama. Chief Justice Warren was the spokesman for this 
majority in all of the cases which were accompanied by signed 
opinions. In Reynolds v. Sims both houses of the Alabama 
legislature were held to be malapportioned. Its House of Rep 
resentatives was constructed quite similarly to the Montana 
House of Representatives; but its Senate of 35 members was 
supposed to be elected from districts comprising one or more
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counties “as nearly equal to each other in the number of in 
habitants as may be.” Thus representation in both houses was 
based upon population as a matter of state constitutional re 
quirement. But the legislature had not reapportioned itself 
since 1901 despite constitutional obligation upon it to do so 
every ten years. Suits to compel reapportionment were com 
menced in the federal district courts in Alabama in 1961; and 
the Supreme Court eventually reviewed three of these actions. 
It affirmed a judgment of a three-judge federal district court 
which, pending development of a more satisfactory reappor 
tionment, directed election of a legislature according to speci 
fied parts of two reapportionment plans which had been pro 
posed by a special legislative session in July 1962.
Rejecting an argument that one house of a state legislature 
might represent political subdivisions regardless of population, 
the Court declared that “the federal analogy £is] inapposite 
and irrelevant to state legislative districting schemes” and 
represents “little more than an after-the-fact rationalization 
. . .  of maladjusted state apportionment arrangements.” 
Chief Justice Warren, speaking for six members of the Court, 
held that “as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Pro 
tection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bi 
cameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population 
basis.”
“Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable 
constitutional requirement” the Chief Justice said, but the 
equal protection clause “requires that a State make an honest 
and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of 
its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.” 
The Court avoided rigid guide lines, preferring to leave these 
for development in the lower courts in relation to particular 
problems of individual states. Commenting upon the practice 
in Alabama to give a seat to each local subdivision, the Chief 
Justice declared that:
Carried too far, [such] a scheme . . . could easily result, in many 
States, in total subversion of the equal-population principle in 
that legislative body. This would be especially true in a State 
where the number of counties is large and many of them are 
sparsely populated, and the number of seats in the legislative 
body being apportioned does not significantly exceed the num 
ber of counties. Such a result, we conclude, would be constitu-
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tionally impermissible. . . . But if, even as a result of a clearly 
rational state policy of according some legislative representa 
tion to political subdivisions, population is submerged as the 
controlling consideration in the apportionment of seats in the 
particular legislative body, then the right of all of the State’s 
citizens to cast an effective and adequately weighted vote 
would be unconstitutionally impaired.
Justices Clark and Stewart concurred in the decision; Clark 
found “invidious discrimination in each house” and Stewart 
thought that the scheme of representation was “completely 
lacking in rationality.”4 
In Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, the same six-judge 
majority reversed a federal district court finding that the 
equal protection clause did not require-“equality of population 
within representation districts for each house.” The lower 
court had accepted a recently adopted constitutional amend 
ment which apportioned the Senate on a basis of population 
and other factors including “geography, compactness and con 
tiguity of territory, accessibility, observance of natural boun 
daries £and] conformity to historical divisions such as county 
lines and prior representation districts.”
Such considerations could not prevail against recognition of 
equality of population nor could the recent adoption of a state 
constitutional amendment deprive Colorado voters of their 
federal right to equal protection of that vote.
Of particular interest for Montana was Justice Warren’s 
notice that “divergencies from population based representation 
in the Senate are growing continually wider, since the under 
represented districts . . . are rapidly gaining in population, 
while many of the overrepresented rural districts have tended 
to decline in population continuously in recent years.” He also 
expressed concern that “each Denver voter was required to 
vote for eight senators and 17 representatives” in an appor 
tionment plan which the voters had rejected despite the fact 
that it represented population more equitably than the one 
they adopted. Such a consideration had made the choice be 
tween two proposed constitutional amendments difficult. The 
multimember districts, according to Warren, meant that:
4Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 12 L. Ed. 2d 
539, 542 and 543 (1964), emphasis added.
506, 533, 531, 536, 538,
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No identifiable constituencies within the populous counties re 
sulted, and the residents of those areas had no single member 
of the Senate or House elected specifically to represent them. 
Rather, each legislator elected from a multimember county 
represented the county as a whole.
The majority regarded such a long ballot in a multimember 
district as a “debatable feature,” but did not seem to rest the 
decision squarely on this point. They left the validity of the 
Colorado House of Representatives to be determined in rela 
tion to the clearly invalid Senate.5
Justice Stewart dissented with Justice Clark’s concurrence. 
He believed that the Colorado recognition of geography, acces 
sibility, natural boundaries, and historical divisions such as 
county lines comprised part of a “rational” apportionment 
scheme which did not “permit the systematic frustration of the 
will of a majority of the electorate of the State.” He noted 
regional diversity and uneven distribution of population “in a 
mountainous State like Colorado, where accessibility is af 
fected by configuration as well as compactness of districts.”0
In Delaware the Court majority accepted a district court 
finding that rigid constitutional provisions created “gross and 
invidious discrimination . . .  of a startling nature” which de 
based the franchise without any “rational basis.” But the 
Court withheld approval of the district court suggestion that 
“population-variance ratios smaller than lVfe-to-1 would pre 
sumably comport with minimal constitutional requisites, while 
ratios in excess thereof would necessarily involve deviations 
from population-based apportionment too extreme to be con 
stitutionally sustainable.”
In our view the problem does not lend itself to any such uni 
form formula and it is neither practicable nor desirable to 
establish rigid mathematical standards for evaluating the con 
stitutional validity of a state legislative apportionment scheme 
under the Equal Protection Clause. Rather, the proper judicial 
approach is to ascertain whether, under the particular circum 
stances existing in the individual State whose legislative appor 
tionment is at issue, there has been a faithful adherence to a 
plan of population-based representation, with such minor devi-
°Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U. S. 713, 12 L. Ed. 2d 632, 
638, 643,644 (1964).
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ations only as may occur in recognizing certain factors that are 
free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.7
The Maryland case was relevant for Montana because the 
Maryland Senate represented counties regardless of popula 
tion, assigning equal representation to each county except for 
an additional allocation to the county containing Baltimore. 
The Maryland Court of Appeals had accepted the historic rec 
ognition of counties, the bicameral differentiation between the 
houses which recognized geography along with population, and 
an analogy to the United States Senate. The Supreme Court 
rejected these considerations as insufficient to sustain “the 
gross disparities from population-based representation in the 
apportionment of seats in the Maryland Senate.” Justice Clark 
concurred and Justices Stewart and Harlan dissented.8
The New York case was interesting primarily for two points. 
The Supreme Court found that rigid constitutional require 
ments respecting apportionment deprived the New York State 
Legislature of discretion to apportion equitably. Chief Justice 
Warren also noted population trends which would mean that 
“an increasingly smaller percentage of the State’s population 
will, in all probability, reside in senatorial districts electing a 
majority of the members of that body.”9
Alignments of the justices in the fifteen state apportionment 
cases may be summarized. Chief Justice Warren led a firm 
block of six justices (Black, Brennan, Douglas, Goldberg and 
White were the other five) which furnished the majority in 
all of the cases. Justices Clark and Stewart concurred singly 
or together in some cases, so that the vote was 8-1 to affirm 
federal district court decisions requiring reapportionment in 
Alabama, Delaware, Connecticut, Iowa, Oklahoma and Vir 
ginia. The smallest majority was five in the Illinois case, in 
which Justice Goldberg took no part.
Justice Harlan dissented in all the cases, protesting that the 
Court had denied “effective consideration to any of the follow 
ing in establishing legislative districts:
■Roman v. Sincock, 377 U. S. 695, 12 L. Ed. 2d 620, 624, 625, 630 (1964).
8Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 377 U. S. 656, 12 L. Ed. 2d 595, 606 
(1964).
'‘WMCA v. Lomenzo, 377 U. S. 633, 12 L. Ed. 2d 568, 581 (1964).
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(1) history;
(2) ‘economic or other sorts of group interests’;
(3) area;
(4) geographical considerations;
(5) a desire ‘to insure effective representation for sparsely 
settled areas’;
(6) ‘availability of access of citizens to their representatives’;
(7) theories of bicameralism (except those approved by the 
Court);
(8) occupation;
(9) ‘an attempt to balance urban and rural power’;
(10) the preference of a majority of voters in the State.”10
This brief review of the June 1964 decisions suggests several 
points which are relevant to reapportionment in Montana:
(1) The “federal analogy” was expressly repudiated as a 
justification for failure of a state legislative chamber to rep 
resent population.
(2) None of the factors commonly considered to justify de 
parture from a population basis for representation could now 
prevail, as Justice Harlan properly noted in his dissent, if their 
recognition would cause substantial departure from equitable 
representation of population in either house of a state legis 
lature.
(3) No specific boundary lines between fair and unfair rep 
resentation of population were drawn by the Supreme Court. 
The majority refused to be limited by a lower court holding 
that disparity greater than 1.5 to 1 might occasion doubts about 
equal representation. On the other hand, Georgia congres 
sional districts in which one congressman represented “from 
two to three times as many . . . voters as are represented by 
each of the congressmen from the other Georgia congressional 
districts” were held to violate the equal protection clause.
Mathematical limits of allowable differences in population
10Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 12 L. Ed 2d 506 at 562 (1964).
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between representation districts undoubtedly will emerge only 
from a considerable series of decisions affirming or rejecting 
apportionments in particular states.
Despite much comment criticizing the Court for rigorous in 
sistence upon close mathematical equality, it appears to this 
observer that the Court.has emphasized the importance of 
seasonable efforts made in genuinely good faith to achieve 
equalization within “practicable” limits. These considerations 
may prove to be more important than precise mathematical 
limits.
(4) Each state was regarded as a particular complex of 
factors whose peculiarities could best be assessed by turning 
the detail of equitable representation back to legislatures or to 
courts or other apportioning authorities within the state.
The determination to implement equitable representation 
was not to be diverted by sophisticated or contrived evasions. 
Beyond the essential point of equitable representation, no 
single rationale characterized the opinions of the majority; 
varying weight was given to the effects of constitutional or 
statutory strictures, and to the availability of popular checks 
such as initiative, referendum and constitutional amendment.
(5) Indefinite postponement of equal representation will be 
regarded with some impatience, once apportionment becomes 
a judicial concern in a state.
The Court indicated some willingness to accept inequitable 
representation as a temporary condition rather than to upset 
imminent elections or legislative sessions. The season of legis 
lative activity commencing in January 1965 may bring a lull 
in the pace of adjudication, but courts in many states have 
retained jurisdiction of cases awaiting the outcome of legis 
lative action. If equitable reapportionment is not achieved in 
these legislative sessions, it seems reasonable to suppose that 
a substantial round of trial court determinations of apportion 
ment will be forthcoming in the latter months of 1965 and 1966. 
The Supreme Court has indicated in several cases that it ex 
pects equitable apportionment to prevail for the legislatures 
which will be elected in those states in November 1966; and
that if constituted agencies do not manage this, then the courts 
will do so.
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(6) Once a state’s legislative apportionment comes under 
judicial scrutiny, the Court may examine the system of repre 
sentation as a whole in both houses, and upon its own initiative 
if necessary, whether or not all relevant considerations have 
been pleaded by the litigants.
(7) Judicial enforcement of the right to equitable representa 
tion need not be deferred because political remedies are avail 
able within the state for malapportionment; or because an 
apportionment scheme is valid under a state constitution, if 
those constitutional provisions conflict with the federal right 
to equitable representation.
(8) Decennial reapportionment after federal censuses would 
appear to be frequent enough to satisfy the Supreme Court; 
but less frequent reapportionment would be constitutionally 
suspect.
VI I. What Kind of Legislature?
ELLIS L. WALDRON
Good politics make a virtue of necessity. The obligation to 
reapportion the Montana Legislative Assembly affords a 
unique opportunity to consider afresh what kind of legislature 
will best serve the Treasure State.
A new legislature lies unperceived at the end of the reappor 
tionment trek. Will it look like the present one, whatever its 
differences in organization and function? Will it be the result 
of hastily chosen expedients or will it in fair measure reflect 
deliberate and considered choices made in genuine practice 
of statecraft?
Quite properly on the eve of the legislative session which 
must seek answers to such questions, legislators and interested 
observers were drawing apportionment maps in what one 
newspaper called a “new and fascinating game sweeping Mon 
tana. Every such map implies judgments, usually unstated, 
about what kind of legislature was desired. Every districting 
proposal makes prior judgments about the kinds of districts 
which are desired. Every apportionment ratio makes an initial
assumption about the size of the legislative houses to be 
created.
Such prior judgments and assumptions need to be expressed 
and to gain acceptance as basic policy decisions about the kind 
of legislature sought, unless the matter is to be left to end-of- 
session patchwork or to the courts which will be invited into 
the act if the legislature defaults.
This and the concluding part of this study ask what the new 
legislature may look like, and consider some procedural ap-
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proaches which may be open to accomplish reapportionment. 
If nothing more, such a “program” or “model” of inquiry per 
mits hard and real questions to be asked and discussed. This 
study is neither a blueprint nor a road map; it is a report of a 
scouting trip into reapportionment territory. The Legislative 
Assembly will make the firm surveys, choose the route and 
build the road—or leave it to the courts.
Many “practical” questions have not been raised; important 
as implemental questions at a secondary level will be, they can 
be explored with profit only after the main choices have been 
marked out and agreed upon.
A Unicameral Legislature?
The most sweeping reorganization of the Montana Legisla 
tive Assembly which has been mentioned would transform it 
into a unicameral body.1 The advantages commonly imputed 
to a unicameral legislature remain mostly unproven because 
working models for comparison are lacking. Comparisons to 
the Nebraska unicameral legislature are always open to ques 
tion because that body is elected by nonpartisan ballot. More 
over, since legislative institutions are not mass produced, the 
effect of transfer of parts is never certain; no two states have 
the same pattern of political forces and power structures.
It does appear, after three decades of operation, that the 
Nebraska legislature functions effectively. It has realized nei 
ther the fondest hopes of its friends, nor the worst fears of its 
critics. It seems to have reduced certain costs of operation by 
paying fewer salaries; its members seem to serve longer, there 
by gaining in experience with public affairs; it does enact a 
larger proportion of the smaller number of bills introduced;
'This proposal is a favorite among political scientists; these and other 
advocates of the one-house legislature may take heart and renewed 
hope from the reapportionment debate and the opportunity it affords 
to restate their views. But it should be recognized that most American 
legislatures have been based at least in part on representation of popu 
lation in both houses. The two-house legislature persists for reasons 
other than the supposed analogy to the United States Congress; and 
Montana is one of a very small number of states whose Senate, like 
the United States Senate, rests upon political subdivisions unqualified 
by population factors.
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its sessions are somewhat longer; and the end-of-session log 
jam has been reduced.2
There is little firm evidence to show that the Nebraska legis 
lature has enacted more ill-advised legislation, in greater haste 
or with less deliberation; or conversely, that a bicameral legis 
lature enacts fewer such measures. A Kentucky review of the 
matter concluded recently:
The conflict that is often posed in the debate over unicam 
eralism between efficiency and full deliberation is, in a sense, 
an artificial one. Unicameralism provides one, but not the only, 
technique for making the legislature more efficient. The same 
purpose might be served, at least in part, by several devices: 
greater use of joint committees or joint hearings by committees, 
more adequate staff facilities, longer sessions, a smaller number 
of legislators in both houses. Bicameralism does not guarantee 
careful deliberation, as anyone can discover by sitting in the 
gallery during the closing hours of the legislative session in 
most states. . . .  A more realistic aspect of the debate is the 
unquestioned fact that it is more difficult to pass laws in a 
bicameral legislature than in a unicameral one.3
One point can be made for a unicameral legislature which
would have particular cogency for Montana: the elimination
of one round of committee hearings would reduce pressure
upon the archaic and miserably inadequate committee space
available in the attic quarters of the Capitol in Helena. This in
turn would improve the opportunity for orderly advanced
scheduling and announcement of public hearings of commit 
tees.
A new argument has been added to the arsenal of the uni 
cameralists. This is the certainty that a one-house legislature 
must be apportioned to population. Such a chamber would be 
unaffected in the unlikely event that an amendment to the 
United States Constitution to allow malapportionment of one 
house in a state legislature should be ratified.
"5e?. Shumate, “The Nebraska Unicameral Legislature,” Western
Political Quarterly, Vol. V, pp. 504-512 (1952) for a fairly recent 
evaluation.
E* ^°hn K Reeves> “The Kentucky Legislature:
2  P ^ ? rSei0 QTW0* R*v)ew °f Government, Vol. 5, No. 2, Department 
of Political Science, University of Kentucky (November 1964). A
+£ bllef Tevie™ of the debate over unicameralism, with refer- 
V hL m?dTiIl literature on the subject, appears in W. J. Keefe
if: °5 U1, rican Legislative Process: Congress and theStates, Prentice-Hall (1964), pp. 53-55.
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A Bicameral Legislature?
The abiding reason for bicameralism is acceptance of the 
notion that a two-house legislature furnishes important checks 
against adoption of ill-considered or undesirable statutes. Bi 
cameralism is a strongly “conservative” system. It adds delays 
and obstacles to the passage of legislation; it increases oppor 
tunities for application of leverage by special interests; lobby 
ists favor it because it increases the market for their mediation 
and services. But it also increases the amount of “pickling” or 
exposure involved in the legislative process. It would seem 
that a limited session of 60 days should be bicameral in order 
to get this additional bicameral exposure, and that an impera 
tive of unicameralism would be to extend the allowable term 
of the session. This might be desirable anyway, for a bicameral 
body.
“We’re really down here to prevent the passage of the bad 
legislation,” a veteran member of the Montana Senate observed 
wryly one morning after a particularly exacerbated and un 
productive session.
It seems likely that Montanans will continue a two-house 
Legislative Assembly, while seeking from time to time to 
reduce some of its inefficiencies and to improve its working 
conditions. Notable progress has been made in a few areas in 
recent years, and some experienced legislators in both parties 
remain committed to further improvements.
Bicameralism affords an important opportunity to establish 
different patterns of representation in the two houses, with ad 
vantages which are explored in the following discussion of 
kinds of districts. Bicameralism also allows establishment of 
terms of different lengths between the two houses. This affords 
a check against sharp partisan shifts in elections, by having 
some “carry-over” members who serve from a prior election. 
But the same feature could be achieved by staggering elections 
to longer-term service as in the present Montana Senate.
How Large Should the Houses Be?
The equitable apportionment standard seems to say nothing 
about the size of the legislative houses to be apportioned. Yet
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decisions about size must be made, even if the decisions are to 
perpetuate the present size as nearly as may be.
The original Montana Senate had 16 members, and by crea 
tion of 40 more counties within 35 years it grew to 56 members; 
the House of Representatives started with 55 members and 
now has 94, although it once reached 110 in the late 1920’s.
There is no “ideal” size for a legislative body. National rep 
resentative assemblies such as Congress and those of England, 
France, and the Soviet Union tend to be quite large, ranging 
in the hundreds and even to more than a thousand members. 
The United States House of Representatives might function 
more effectively if it had 300 members rather than 435, but 
whether it would represent the American people more effec 
tively is not so evident.
State legislative chambers vary greatly in size, but tend to 
be smaller than national legislatures. There seems to be little 
correlation between size of legislature and state population. 
New Hampshire with a house of 400 has less population than 
Montana, while New York represents its millions with a senate 
of 58 and with 150 representatives. Forty senators sit beneath 
the golden codfish in a handsome oval chamber of Bulfinch’s 
State House in Massachusetts, which may have the best appor 
tioned legislature among the states—whatever its other quali 
ties.
State houses of representatives range from 35 (Delaware) to 
400 (New Hampshire) and one-third of them cluster at mem 
berships between 100 and 124. State senates range from 17 
members (Delaware and Nevada) to 67 (Minnesota); Mon 
tana s senate is fourth largest. Most senates have between 30 
and 39 members.4 Limiting factors in Montana appear to in 
clude the fact that a very small legislative chamber, appor 
tioned to population, would require some of its members to 
represent sparsely populated districts of quite large area. If a 
small chamber established multimember districts “across the 
board, some districts would reach truly unwarranted size. 
For this reason, while multimember districts are recommended 
for Senate representation of urban areas in the next section
r t h f f  1  f  d i  (?gu1, p: 46, Clted above note 3 ,  think “it is plain . . . that 
w teS hav.e / Iven no more than casual attention to the relation 
ship between state population and the size of the legislature.”
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of this study, allowance of some single member Senate districts 
for the sparsely populated regions in the state seems impera 
tive.
It may be expected that these factors will not be ignored in 
the consideration of reapportionment by Montana’s Legislative 
Assembly. Recent population studies of Montana and its region 
by the Upper Midwest Economic Study are available in this 
connection/’ Visual comparisons of the maps at pages 58 and 
59 also will suggest aspects of this problem.
Without further exploration, it is assumed that the Montana 
House of Representatives will retain approximately its present 
size, or be a bit smaller—say, from 75 to 100 members. It is 
further assumed that the Senate will he from one-third to 
one-half the size of the House.
What Kind of Districts?
This may be the most important creative choice which the 
39th Legislative Assembly can make regarding apportionment. 
Decisions in this area will determine the nature and character 
of the new legislature more fundamentally than any other 
decisions which seem likely or even possible to make.
The Legislative Assembly might be able to decide this prob 
lem by deliberation and choice, whether or not it settles the 
details of districting and apportionment, or the establishment 
of an interim agency for such detailed work. If the kinds of 
districts to be established can be determined, the legislature 
will have had its say in its most important area of creative 
policy determination. Such a decision doubtless would inform 
and guide a court which would reapportion if the legislature 
fails to agree on the details. More is said on this problem in 
Part VIII of this study.
5See in particular its Urban Reports, No. 2, ‘‘The Urbanization of the 
Upper Midwest: 1930-1960” (February 1963); No. 3, “Trade Centers 
and Trade Areas of the Upper Midwest” (September 1963); No. 7, 
“Urban Dispersal in the Upper Midwest,” (June 1964); and No. 8, 
“Projected Urban Growth in the Upper Midwest,” (August 1964)—all 
by Dr. John R. Borchert and associates; and No. 6, “Population Mobility 
in the Upper Midwest,” (May 1964) by Russell B. Adams; also, Study 
Paper No. 4, “Migration and Population Growth in the Upper Midwest: 
1930-1960” (July 1962) by Larry A. Sjaastad; University of Minnesota, 
Minneapolis.
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Critics of the equitable apportionment standard complain 
that it robs the states of creative choice in fashioning their 
legislatures. This view overlooks the substantially different 
consequences which follow from choices among kinds of repre 
sentative districts—even when all of those districts are equita 
bly apportioned to population. The makeup of these repre 
sentative districts is a central issue in the whole reapportion 
ment movement.6
The basic choice is between “single member” districts and 
“multimember” or “multiple member” districts. Each kind of 
district has advantages and disadvantages which will operate 
in the new legislature, whether or not the implications of 
choice are recognized when the decisions are made.
A single member district really should be called a “single 
representative” district; it elects a single delegate to a legis 
lative chamber. Winner takes all by plurality or majority, 
minorities have no representative of their own choice, and such 
districts discourage the rise of dissident or third-party candi 
dates. Examples are Montana counties which serve as single 
member districts for election of state senators; and Montana’s 
two congressional districts for election of members for the 
United States House of Representatives.
A multimember district probably should be called a “mul-
“The reader who thinks in spatial terms and who “sees” maps is refer 
red to the map on the opposite page, with the warning that it seeks to 
illustrate the problem of reapportionment, not to propose a solution. 
On this map, area represents population. Each county was assigned 
an area which would represent its share of the state’s total 1960 popu 
lation.
Thus equal areas on this map indicate equal populations within such 
areas. If this map were divided into 10 equal areas, each of the ten 
areas would contain about one-tenth of the state’s population. As 
egislative districts, ten such areas would meet the one-man, one vote 
standard of fair apportionment to population.
The map suggests the limits within which counties of small population 
must be combined at one end of a districting scale, while counties of 
large population must receive multiple representation, or be divided 
into subdistricts, at the other end of the scale, if legislative chambers 
are to be kept within reasonable limits of size.
This is not an apportionment proposal. The reader may wish to imag- 
.hls 30, or B 50, or 100 equal areas on this map; this would 
district the state into that number of equitably apportioned single 
member legislative districts. This map may be compared with the one 
at page 59 which shows counties by area.
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tiple representative” district; it elects more than one delegate 
to a legislative chamber. Each of two or more representatives 
is elected “at large” from the entire district, by a plurality or 
majority of voters in the entire district, and serves alongside 
other representatives similarly elected. The terms of these 
representatives may be coterminous, as in the Montana House 
of Representatives, or terms of equal length may be staggered 
to overlap in time, as do the terms of United States Senators. 
Each state is a multimember district for election and repre 
sentation in the United States Senate.
A joint district is one which grants fractional shares of a 
representative to each of several smaller districts which are 
combined within the “joint” district; this gives representation 
which is additional to any other representation each of the 
smaller districts may have. A few instances of this kind of 
districting existed in the earliest Montana state legislative 
sessions and were discussed in Part II. Congressmen “at 
large” in states which also elect United States representatives 
from districts are elected from a statewide joint district.7
All three types of districts have existed in Montana, and 
both single member districts and multimember districts now 
exist in the 39th Legislative Assembly. It seems likely, if not 
imperative, that both single member and multimember dis 
tricts will be found in the new legislature; and joint districts 
might be a more desirable occasional expedient than such un 
tried and uncertain devices as weighted voting.
In what combinations should these types of districts be used, 
to accomplish what objectives of representation?
If all members were elected from single member districts 
in both houses of the new legislature each senator would rep 
resent two to three times as many constituents as would each 
representative. If two or more senators were to be elected 
from multimember districts (at least in the more populous
See above, page 55, for discussion of the Montana precedents. In 
Davis v. Mann, 377 U. S. 678 (1964) the Virginia state apportionment 
case, the United States Supreme Court called such joint districts “flo- 
terial, defining them thus: “a legislative district which includes within 
its boundaries several separate districts or political subdivisions which 
independently would not be entitled to additional representation but 
whose conglomerate population entitles the entire area to another seat 
in the particular legislative body being apportioned.”
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counties) while representatives were elected from smaller 
single member districts (perhaps parts of more populous coun 
ties), still greater differences could be achieved between the 
constituencies of senators and representatives. This would im 
plement the notion that bicameralism implies such differences 
to be desirable.
Under any circumstances it appears that several districts in 
each house must combine two or more of the less populous 
counties.8 It may also be assumed that within allowable limits 
of population variance—tentatively something less than two 
to one—districts comprising several counties will meet the 
constitutional requirement of contiguity and compactness 
(Montana Constitution, Article VI, section 3). Such districts 
might be represented by one senator while the most populous 
counties might have as many as five or six senators.
Populous counties will have multiple representation in both 
houses in any event; and it is for these counties that the Legis 
lative Assembly reaches the heart of creative choice in consti 
tuting the new legislature.
The relevant considerations can be illustrated by relating 
them to a particular proposal, whether that proposal proves to 
be acceptable or not.
Single Member Districts in the House of Representa 
tives?
Single member districts had an early and vigorous champion 
in Wilbur Fisk Sanders, pioneer, attorney, and Montana’s first 
United States Senator. His own words are best:
In a Democratic Government, the basic element . . . is 
equality in opinion and action of all its electors. That equality 
manifestly does not exist where one elector is permitted in one 
locality to vote for one representative and across an imaginary 
line, another is permitted to vote for thirteen. The inequality 
of power resulting from this situation is not the main or only 
mischief . . .
The esteemed pioneer cataloged a few: “unwise legislation,”
"As noted in Part II, nineteen smallest counties are entitled to but 
six representatives according to present population ratios for the House 
of Representatives.
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chicane,” “corrupt log rolling,” not to mention alienation be 
tween voters and their representatives and the emancipation 
of representatives from responsibility.
Nor, it seems, was the one man, one vote principle first
brought to Montana by the United States Supreme Court in 
1964:
One man, one vote, one Representative, that is democracy, 
that is republicanism, and none other is . . .
Sanders was convinced that single member districts would 
be legal under the existing constitution. “It is not believed 
that our Constitution forbids single Representative Districts, 
and the correction of this flagitious example continued from 
our earliest history is a crying need.”9
Appealing arguments can be made for systematic establish- 
ment of single member districts in one of the houses, and the 
advantages would be most fully realized if this were to be the 
larger House of Representatives.
1) Small population, single member districts furnish maxi 
mum representation of minorities. In a populous county which 
has multimember representation, as in the present Montana
ouse of Representatives, a countywide partisan—or economic 
—or cultural majority tends to capture the entire legislative 
delegation while strong, persistent and well-recognized minori 
ties may go unrepresented by legislators of their own choice.
Awareness of urban-rural cleavages is heightened in the 
reapportionment process and this may diminish the chances,
3 1'one 0̂0 S°°d, that rural parts of populous counties
will be able to elect any representative of their interests in a 
countywide multimember district.
Moreover it is reasonable to suppose that party discipline 
will be heightened within the new legislature, and that party 
oyalties will be more important in legislative elections. This 
would tend to freeze out local party minorities within multi 
member districts even more than at present.
Single member districts within populous counties would im-
Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana, vol. 4, pages 144-
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prove the chance for either rural minorities or party minorities 
to receive some representatives “of their own.”
2) Since single member districts would be smaller than 
multimember districts, a candidate for election within a single 
member district would have the advantage of substantial econ 
omies in financial cost and other burdens of campaigning. To 
this extent the single member district would tend to enlarge 
the pool of possible recruits for service in the legislature.
3) Since single member districts would have smaller con 
stituencies of voters, they should facilitate communication 
between voters and their representatives. By the same token 
single member districts might make accountability of the legis 
lator to his constituents more clear and direct and personal. 
Such a trend would fit modern notions that effective repre 
sentative government depends upon sharpening the focus of 
responsibility upon elected officials.
4) In a few instances it might be desirable to attach rural 
portions of populous counties to adjoining counties of smaller 
population. This would improve the chance for representation 
of rural parts of urbanized counties; and it would also give 
the apportioning authority maximum flexibility in putting to 
gether districts of equitable population.
But single member districts are not a panacea for the prob 
lems of representation, nor is their establishment lacking in 
practical complexities. Opponents of the single member dis 
trict will argue with some plausibility that it tends to accentu 
ate peculiarly local interests at the expense of a larger view 
of public policy. This same criticism can, of course, be directed 
against any subdividing of an electorate. It is the purpose of 
districting and apportionment to divide up the electorate so 
that local and partial interests can be expressed, shifting alli 
ances contrived, and minority views protected. Perhaps the 
tendency of the single member district to accentuate the local 
can be balanced in the pattern of Senate representation.
The suggestion that more persons might be attracted to legis 
lative service by the economies of campaigning in small single 
member districts may be countered by an argument that voter 
choices will be unduly restricted if their representative must
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live within a district smaller than a county. The Montana 
Constitution requires (Article V, section 3) that the represent 
ative must live within the “district in which he shall be 
elected.”
There is also a constitutional problem to be faced in estab 
lishing single member districts within populous counties. The 
Montana Constitution (Article VI, section 3) declares that “No 
county shall be divided in the formation of representative dis 
tricts.” It seems likely that an apportionment plan using whole 
counties and combinations of whole counties could be contrived 
which would be equitable as to the populations of such dis 
tricts.
But in such a legislature voters of Yellowstone and Cascade 
counties would immediately face ballots with as many as 
twenty candidates for House seats, assuming the House to have 
around 100 members. In five more years, after the 1970 census, 
the ballots for at-large, multimember elections in the most 
populous counties will be still longer; and there is no reason 
to expect that this trend will stop in the foreseeable future, as 
ever-increasing proportions of the state’s population live in 
its cities.
Yet to reduce the size of the House very sharply to prevent 
such long ballots would develop what might be considered as 
irrationality at the other end of the scale, in districts of un 
desirably large territorial spread for the least populous regions 
of the state.
Thus division of the more populous counties into single 
member districts for elections to the larger of the two houses 
again seems persuasive; it meets the Supreme Court’s warning 
that long ballot multimember district elections from Denver 
were a debatable feature” of the Colorado apportionment 
invalidated last June.10
The Supreme Court has not ruled out of consideration mat 
ters of size, homogeneity of region, or convenience of internal 
access, in making legislative districts; it has said, rather, that 
such matters may not prevail to the prejudice of equitable 
representation of people.
This study takes the considered position that the first and
See discussion of this case above, pages 100-101.
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overriding task of the 39th Legislative Assembly is its obliga 
tion under the 14th Amendment equal protection clause to 
make an equitable apportionment of the state for the Novem 
ber 1966 legislative elections. This apportionment can and 
should he “rational” as well as equitable.11
It may be that Article VI, section 3 prohibits only the attach 
ment of parts of counties to other counties; it may not prohibit 
the establishment of sub-districts within counties. But if it 
does cover the latter case and is still valid law, it would stand 
in the way of a legislative decision to create House districts 
within counties. Amid possible doubts whether this particular 
provision of Article VI, section 3 is applicable, it might be said 
that the Montana Legislative Assembly is entitled to exercise 
its judgment that the provision must be swept out along with 
other state constitutional provisions whose incompatibility 
with the one man, one vote standard is beyond doubt—and 
that such presumption should be entitled to weight in a judicial 
interpretation of the matter.
But should the Legislative Assembly, while choosing to 
establish single member House districts, consider that this 
provision of Article VI, section 3 persists as an operative con 
stitutional restriction, the legislature could proceed initially 
to district on the basis of whole counties and combinations of 
whole counties, expressing the ultimate intention to sub 
district the more populous counties when all legal barriers had 
been removed.1- This intention could be stated in the proposed 
general apportionment statute as a guideline for the appor 
tioning agency, whatever immediate decisions might be made 
to district using whole counties. Should the Legislative As 
sembly desire to establish single member House districts 
within the more populous counties, a practical problem of 
secondary importance will be how best to partition the coun-
"The weight of this factor of “rationality” in the Supreme Court’s de 
cisions deserves separate study. Justices Clark and Stewart seemed to 
vote with the six-member majority in the June 1964 cases when the 
state apportionment lacked not only equitability but rationality as well; 
in some cases they dissented from the majority position when they 
thought the apportionment to be rational by their standards although 
not equitable by the majority’s standards.
“See further discussion of the approach to amendments below, pages 
131-135.
ties. No final answer is attempted here; it would seem that 
precincts or combinations of precincts would be the most 
obvious subdivisions for election purposes. But population data 
are not available by precincts, so that apportionment would 
be based upon numbers of registered voters, in partitioning 
the county equitably. Given divergencies between voter regis 
tration and population from precinct to precinct, would appor 
tionment based on the voter registrations meet the one man, 
one vote standard?
A kind of answer and a possible approach may lie in the 
recent suggestion of a New York State Citizens’ Committee 
on Reapportionment. It said that “an evaluation of the Su 
preme Court opinions in the apportionment cases warrants the 
conclusion that use of voters is the proper interpretation of 
what the Court requires as the basis of apportionment.”13
Stopping short of the full rigors of that position, it might 
be said that districting based upon voter registrations seems 
to be fully consistent with the logic of the one man, one vote 
standard. In the absence of evidence showing systematic dis 
crimination in the voter registration system, or a showing that 
more appropriate data were at hand for the job, such district- 
ing would seem reasonable, non-discriminatory, and a “good- 
faith” approach.
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Multimember Districts in the Senate?
Since single member districts in the House would tend to 
accentuate the expression of local interests, balance could best 
be achieved by using multimember districts quite systematic 
ally to represent the more populous counties in the Senate.
Here an analogy to the United States Congress is both apt 
and suggestive. Election of United States Senators from entire 
states as multimember districts is balanced by election of Rep 
resentatives from single member parts of states. Differences 
between size and nature of constituencies is maximized. In 
similar fashion, multimember districts for most Montana Sen-
Report to Governor Nelson A . Rockefeller by the Citizens’ Committee 
?? ^^ P P °rt1(>nment, State of New York, December 1, 1964, Appendix 
Use of Voters as a Base for Apportionment,” page 103; at 105: 
e right to Equal Protection is the right of the individual voter and 
not of a non-voting population or body of citizens.”
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ate seats would be appropriate to balance single member House 
districts.
Yet to keep the Senate within modest size limits it will be 
necessary for counties of smaller population to be grouped for 
representation by a single senator, while the more populous 
counties will be represented by as many as five or six senators. 
The pattern would be rather like that in the present Montana 
House of Representatives except that the smaller population 
counties would be grouped into districts.
In such a legislature voters in the major cities would not 
face an unduly long ballot of candidates for the Senate prob 
ably not so long as the voters of Yellowstone and Cascade 
counties now have for the House of Representatives.
But to reverse the proposed arrangement and elect senators 
from single member districts and representatives in populous 
multimember districts would create long ballots for election 
of House members in urban counties, as we have just noted.
The fact that one-third of Montana’s counties have popula 
tions too small to earn a representative under present popula 
tion ratios establishes the probability that there will be some 
single member districts for groups of such counties in both 
houses of the new legislature, even if multimember districts 
are the pattern for more populous counties in one house.
One federal district court has challenged a system in which 
single member districts and multimember districts appeared 
side by side for the same chamber but the facts of the case 
appear to distinguish it from the situation proposed here for 
Montana.14
It just happens that the 1960 populations of most of the 
urban counties in Montana fall pretty close to multiples of 
15,000. An apportionment ratio of one senator for each 15,500 
population would give a Senate of about 45 members give or
“Drew v. Scranton, 229 Fed. Supp. 310 (U. S. Dist. Ct., Pennsylvania, 
1964); at 326 the court declared: “The defendants have offered no 
explanation. . . .  In the absence of any legislative history or other 
explanation justifying it, and we have found none, we can only con 
clude that this districting is either the result of gerrymandering for 
partisan advantage, as was suggested at the hearing, or that it is 
wholly arbitrary and capricious.” Multimember districts for populous 
areas and single-member districts for the least populous areas in Mon 
tana would be neither arbitrary nor capricious.
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take one or two as particular apportionments might be decided.
But such an apportionment ratio might “fit” the 1970 popu 
lations of these urban centers quite awkwardly; by the same 
token, a small change in size of the chamber after a 1970 appor 
tionment might facilitate application of a ratio with a more 
appropriate “fit” to the districts which have been created.
To the extent that the Legislative Assembly can explore 
these matters of size deliberately and thoughtfully, it might 
be desirable to fix allowable ranges of size for each house in 
a general apportionment statute. Such a statute could guide 
the apportionment whether it is accomplished by legislature, 
commission, or court. But to the extent that size limits are 
chosen on a traditional or negotiated basis only, it would seem 
advisable to leave the limits open to amendment by statute; 
probably they should not be embedded in a new constitutional 
provision.
A further consideration is that the functioning of a fairly 
apportioned legislature cannot be predicted with any certainty. 
Even if both of its houses are about the present size, the only 
certainty is that they will behave somewhat differently from 
the present chambers. Discretion suggests that size limits 
should not be constitutionally fixed until judgment on such 
matters can be founded on some experience with the new 
legislature.
American state legislatures are a bountiful source of inter 
esting devices for voting within multimember districts, and 
the literature of political science abounds with further inter 
esting possibilities of varying complexity. For example, a 
minority party can be protected within a multimember district 
by limiting nominations of each party to some fraction of the 
entire list. Illinois in effect did this in legislative elections of 
November 1964 when the two major parties limited themselves 
to 118 nominations for the 177 seats to be filled.15 Such a 
system gives no assurance of representation for minorities 
other than party minorities.
Some proposals that have been made in Montana would 
employ identical districts for Senate and House, merely appor 
tioning different numbers of representatives to these districts.
Query. How would the proportions be determined, from county to 
county?
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This, of course, is a valid way to meet the one man, one vote 
standard; but it would seem to surrender whatever advantage 
bicameralism might offer, in the form of different constituent 
bases for the two houses. Such a legislature might as well be
unicameral, in this respect.
The crux of the policy problem in districting—assuming 
desire to capitalize on bicameral differences between houses 
is to strike the particular balance which is desired between 
representation units which will express local, partial and 
minority views on the one hand, and units which will be large 
enough to focus upon larger or “public” interests on the other 
hand. The fixing of district sizes and the manipulation of 
apportionment ratios to achieve this balance within a bicam 
eral legislature is the essence of the political function which 
has reposed traditionally in the legislatures.
If the 39th Legislative Assembly can resolve the main prob 
lems of kind of legislature for itself, or for an apportionment 
commission, or for the courts, it will have discharged its prin 
cipal responsibility.
VIII. Getting the Job Done
ELLIS L. WALDRON
Some Political Considerations
It may not be optimistic beyond warrant to propose that 
Montana can solve its reapportionment problems expeditiously 
when other states have found the matter to be so vexatious. 
It does not underrate the complexity of the problem in Mon 
tana to point out that two major stumbling blocks encountered 
in other states either do not exist or can be minimized:
1) In some states equitable apportionment delivers the bal 
ance of legislative power irrevocably to a single great met 
ropolis. This is not likely to happen in Montana where the 
five most populous counties together have less than half of the 
state’s population. And these centers are scattered about the 
state, divided not so much by great mountain spines as by dif 
ferences of economy and market orientations. They will com 
prise no political steamroller in the new legislature.
2) In some states the balance between political parties occurs 
sharply on an urban-rural, or upstate-downstate axis so that 
equitable apportionment delivers a preponderance of legis 
lative power to the party which prevails in the rural areas, or 
in the metropolis. This is not the case in Montana, where each 
major political party enjoys a broad and distributed base of 
support in both city and country, and across several regions of 
the state.
The statistical explorations of Professor Howard Reinhardt 
of the Montana State University Mathematics Department 
which comprise Part V of this study sustain the estimates of 
this observer that neither political party will suffer major or 
enduring displacement of legislative power in a fair apportion 
ment of seats. Either party in a future election will be able to 
capture control in one or both houses of a fairly apportioned 
Legislative Assembly as the voters might desire.1
}s indicate matter to assess; it is important to distinguish the 
effects of apportionment as such from trends of party affiliation which
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Democratic Party members hold a majority of the votes in 
both houses of the 39th Legislative Assembly as it convened in 
Helena on January 4, 1965. It is not suggested that they can 
not or will not find partisan advantage in one set of detailed 
apportionment decisions as compared to another set. As be 
tween acceptable choices they might be expected to choose the 
ones which seem most congenial to their interest, as would 
Republican legislative majorities in the same position.
But the grossest political gerrymandering would not entrench 
either party beyond a point that the disadvantaged party could 
unseat it in the next election. Moreover, the Republican mi 
nority in each house will be vigilant against abuse of the ma 
jority’s power in this whole matter.
So the Democratic majorities, perhaps making some virtue of 
this particular balance of affairs, may be expected to seek 
maximum gain by appealing to popular support for a fair and 
responsible apportionment program. They will be not un 
mindful that the Republican Governor would veto an unfair or 
obviously gerrymandered reapportionment which would come 
to his desk, thereby shifting responsibility to the Democratic 
legislators for failure to reapportion. A veto on such a basis 
would also shift the blame onto Democratic legislative leaders 
for the judicial intervention which would certainly develop at 
that juncture.
Yet the Governor will accept the burden of delay, and of 
judicial intervention, if he vetoes any reasonable reapportion 
ment plan offered by the Democratically controlled Legislative 
Assembly.
Thus possibly and somewhat ironically, partisan political 
balances of 1965 may favor development and acceptance of a 
fair and reasonable apportionment plan.
Constitutional Obligations Further Explored
The constitutional obligation to reapportion both houses of 
the Montana Legislative Assembly in time for the legislative 
elections of November 1966 was stated in general terms in
may be developing in the electorate on grounds quite independent 
from legislative apportionment.
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Part VI. This obligation now must be assigned more precisely 
to the responsible agencies of Montana state government.
The obligation to reapportion was perfected as of June 1964, 
for whatever agency was charged by state law with responsi 
bility to initiate reapportionment. In Montana this initiative 
lies with the Legislative .Assembly; and in a limited sense it 
might be said to arise for other agencies only when they be 
come a part of the process.
Thus in a sense the Governor has no obligation until an ap 
portionment program comes to his desk from the Legislative 
Assembly. And courts, as “passive” agencies, have to be in 
vited into the act by a law suit. As of January 4, 1965, when 
the Legislative Assembly convened, Montana was one of just 
seven states in which no legal action had been initiated to com 
pel reapportionment.2
But whatever the situation between June 1964 and January 
4, 1965, constitutional obligation to reapportion awaited the 
Montana Legislative Assembly when it convened and organ 
ized for business. In express and precise terms its members 
as “Members of £one of] the several State Legislatures” were 
“bound by Oath or Affirmation to support this [^United States] 
Constitution” including the 14th Amendment whose equal pro 
tection clause now requires state legislatures in both their 
houses to be apportioned equitably to population (United 
States Constitution, Article VI, section 3 and 14th Amendment, 
and June 1964 Supreme Court decisions discussed in Part VI 
of this study).
Provisions of the Montana Constitution which conflict with 
this obligation must be regarded as having ceased to “be” law 
imposing any obligation, as of June 1964 when the United 
States Supreme Court decided the state apportionment cases. 
The Legislative Assembly is relieved of obligation to these 
state constitutional provisions by the overriding supremacy 
of the national constitution and its assurance of equal protec 
tion of the laws against state deprivation. Nor can these state 
constitutional provisions bind the Governor as against his own 
oathbound obligation to sustain the relevant national law,
A convenient 50 state survey of developments appeared in The Christian 
Science Monitor for Monday, January 4, 1965, under the heading “Re 
apportionment Pace Speeded.”
GETTING THE JOB DONE 127
when he is confronted with legal obligations to sign or to veto 
a reapportionment bill which comes to him from the legis 
lature.
The Governor might veto a legislative reapportionment pro 
gram on grounds of policy, or unreasonableness, or failure to 
conform (in his judgment) to the one man, one vote standards 
set by the Supreme Court; but veto on grounds of prior obli 
gation to the Montana constitution in its conflict with the 14th 
Amendment standard of equitable apportionment would be a 
misconstruction of his responsibility to the United States Con 
stitution.
When a provision of a state constitution is in conflict with 
the United States Constitution on a point where the national 
constitution prevails, as in the 14th Amendment, correction of 
the state constitutional provisions becomes a kind of house 
keeping chore to “tidy up” the state charter for future guidance 
of state officials and citizens, and to remove any doubts about 
the supremacy of the national law. This obligation exists in 
relevant situations whether declared by a court or not; a court 
action might clarify the obligation, but it would not create it.
Thus, on January 4, 1964, the 39th Legislative Assembly of 
Montana faced a constitutional obligation to do two things: 12
1) To reapportion the state by a statute which will permit 
election of a fairly apportioned legislature in both of its houses 
as soon as practicable—that is, not later than the election of 
November 1966.
2) To bring the Montana Constitution into line with national 
law, at least to the point that there is no barrier to conformity 
with that law, in equitable apportionment of the Legislative 
Assembly.
Of these two obligations, reapportionment has priority over 
constitutional amendment in several respects. Reapportion 
ment became a continuing legal obligation of the Legislative 
Assembly until accomplished, no later than January 4, 1965; 
and the obligation will continue until discharged by an ac 
ceptable reapportionment, regardless of what the Montana 
Constitution happens to say on the subject. Indeed, ratifica 
tion or defeat by Montana voters in November 1966, of any
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state constitutional amendment the legislature might propose 
would not alter this primary obligation to reapportion.
Developing the Reapportionment Plan
Several circumstances attach peculiar urgency to adoption 
of a general apportionment statute which will answer ques 
tions about kind of legislature, size of legislature and kinds of 
districts—the inescapable questions explored in Part VII of this 
study. The 39th Legislative Assembly will have discharged 
the most important part of its reapportionment responsibility 
if it enacts such a statute, whatever else may be accomplished 
with respect to reapportionment during its regular session. 
The reasons for such a statute include the following:
1) These general structural questions must be answered any 
way. Logical imperatives and practical priorities run pretty 
close together in this matter.
2) By answering the questions about kind of legislature, size 
of legislature and kinds of districts, the Legislative Assembly 
will have occupied the larger part of the field open to it in the 
reapportionment process. Decisions on these matters pretty 
well determine the nature and character of the new legislature, 
whatever agency may ultimately work out the details.
3) Should it appear late in the regular session—say the 55th 
day that agreement may not be reached on details of district 
ing and apportionment, designation of an interim apportion 
ment commission will increasingly appear to be inevitable. A 
general apportionment statute would furnish such a commis 
sion with the guidelines it would need; there would be little 
room for questions about separation or improper delegation of 
powers if the general framework for reapportionment had been 
set by the Legislative Assembly.
4) At some point, judicial involvement seems inevitable. If 
the courts have not been invited into the reapportionment act 
long before, there can be no question that a three-judge fed-
GETTING THE JOB DONE 129
eral district court will review whatever reapportionment is 
proposed, by whatever agency.
If general legislative standards for reapportionment have 
been stated (and do not themselves conflict with the one man, 
one vote standard), the task of a special legislative session, or 
of an interim apportionment commission, or of a court to re 
apportion, or to rework details of an apportionment found to 
be invalid by a court, would be within proper and manageable 
limits.
The only truly objectionable feature of judicial interven 
tion in reapportionment develops when a court must establish 
the standards and guidelines which should have been stated 
by the legislature in a general apportionment statute. No grave 
interruption of normal governmental relations is involved if 
a court is asked to remind a legislature of its obligations; if in 
vited into the matter a court may be expected to give the legis 
lature reasonable time to perform its functions.
Should a court ultimately have to work out the detailed ap 
plication of a general apportionment statute through failure of 
other agencies to agree upon detail, no gross impropriety is in 
volved. Some state courts long have had jurisdiction to re 
view apportionments for conformity to general legislative or 
constitutional standards. The problem of working out details 
of district boundaries and apportionments of seats to these 
boundaries need not be more political nor less justiciable than 
some other matters administered by the courts—if the policy 
guidelines have been established by the legislature in a general 
apportionment statute.
5) Several reasons for proceeding under a general appor 
tionment statute rather than by restrictive new constitutional 
language at this juncture are considered below in the discus 
sion of constitutional amendments.
One of these reasons is that experience could be gained with 
the main outlines and workings of the new legislature before 
“locking it up” in the Constitution. Some of the language of 
the general apportionment statute might ultimately belong in 
the basic charter of the state; but proposal of new constitu 
tional language is best founded upon careful study of the sort 
the 39th Legislative Assembly will not have time to make.
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An Apportionment Commission
The Legislative Assembly may wish to explore use of an ap 
portionment commission to complete detailed application of a 
general apportionment statute. By the 60th day of the ses 
sion, such a commission to carry on the work ad interim may 
be the only alternative to an expensive special session or to 
reapportionment by a three-judge federal district court.
Such a commission might comprise legislators, in which case 
it would be a special interim committee; its members might be 
the members of the special apportionment committees which 
served during the regular session; or its legislative membership 
might be augmented with some elected executive officers or 
some lay or citizen members. It would be able to employ staff 
assistance, assemble and analyze data, and implement the gen 
eral apportionment statute in an environment less harrassed 
than a session of the entire Legislative Assembly. The com 
mission probably should not include any state judges who 
might later be called upon to review its handiwork in a legal 
suit.
Fourteen states have made the considered decision to put the 
lesser order of implemental or nonpolicy decisions about ap 
portionment in the hands of commissions or boards, either in 
itially or in default of legislative accomplishment of the task.3
It seems doubtful that the Montana Legislative Assembly 
would establish a permanent reapportionment commission un 
til it had experience with such an arrangement on a tempo 
rary and experimental basis. But the special (ad hoc) interim 
commission might be invited to make proposals for its own re 
placement; or that problem might be referred to the Legisla 
tive Council for study and recommendation.
Of course, the Legislative Council might be asked to func 
tion as the apportioning commission, but this suggestion is 
not made as a recommendation. Perhaps the Council is too 
useful in its normal functions to be jeopardized by the “heat in 
the kitchen” when reapportionment is in the broiler.
’Half of these states (Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Michigan, 
Missouri and Ohio) put the initiative to reapportion in apportioning 
agencies, the others vest reapportionment in some commission or 
board California, Illinois, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota and 
Texas) or in a state court (Maine) if the legislature fails to reapportion.
GETTING THE JOB DONE 131
The Legislative Assembly would expect to review the work 
of the interim special apportionment commission before allow 
ing application of its plan in the November 1966 election.
The joint resolution establishing the commission could spec 
ify that its work must be reported back to the Legislative As 
sembly after 90 days or six months, or on a certain date; this 
report could be made to a special session whose call would be 
pledged by the Governor through his approval of the joint reso 
lution.
Several alternatives exist for implementation of reapportion 
ment at this postulated juncture: acceptance of the commission 
recommendation could depend upon specific legislative adop 
tion as an apportionment statute; or it could be decided to al 
low its application unless the Legislative Assembly and the 
Governor could agree upon revisions. The latter alternative 
might hold the greatest assurance that the Legislative Assem 
bly would be reapportioned for November 1966.
If the 39th Legislative Assembly can enact a general appor 
tionment statute and establish an interim apportionment com 
mission to work out the detailed application of that statute for 
November 1966, Montana will be farther along the road to ex 
peditious reapportionment than most observers thought pos 
sible on January 4,1965.
Amending the Montana Constitution
A secondary priority has been assigned to the task of revis 
ing the Montana Constitution to make it accord with appor 
tionment plans and decisions. Perhaps the regular standing 
committees which deal with constitutional amendments and 
federal relations in the 39th Legislative Assembly might pro 
pose an amendment to delete invalid apportionment provisions, 
while the special committees on apportionment develop a gen 
eral apportionment statute, and later, create an interim appor 
tionment commission to complete details of districting and ap 
portionment.
The essence of the proposal made in this study is simply to 
delete from the Montana Constitution those few words and 
phrases which conflict with development of a fairly appor-
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tioned Legislative Assembly according to one man, one vote 
standards.
It seems advisable at this juncture not to read new positive 
provisions into the Constitution which would again freeze the 
constitutional pattern of apportionment. Several consider 
ations suggest a course of simple deletion and of minor modern 
ization:
1) It is conceivable that the Supreme Court may modify the 
imputed rigors of its one man, one vote interpretation of the 
14th Amendment. Although the rule will not be abandoned, 
it is entirely predictable that its limits will be worked out in 
litigation to continue for a decade or more.4
2) However improbable, the possibility exists that an amend 
ment to the United States Constitution might be adopted to 
limit application of the 14th Amendment to state legislative ap 
portionment. As of January 4, 1965, legislatures in at least 
ten states appeared to conform to the one man, one vote 
standard; and at least five other states seemed likely to meet 
the standard during 1965. This list does not include a number 
of other states where effective action seemed possible in con 
sequence of legislative sessions now meeting. Thirteen states 
can block adoption of any constitutional amendment by with 
holding ratification, and states which have gotten their legis 
latures fairly apportioned are not likely to move backwards 
in this regard; thus adoption of such an amendment seems re 
mote indeed.r*
4The New York Citizens’ Committee on Reapportionment advised Gov 
ernor Rockefeller on December 1, 1964: “The Committee does not 
recommend that any constitutional amendment be proposed at the next 
legislative session or, indeed, until such time as the Supreme Court 
delineates with greater clarity and precision the scope of the June 15, 
1964 decisions. After the Court has passed upon some of the proposed 
plans of apportionment of other state legislatures and has generally 
filled some of the interstices of the apportionment formyla, the limits 
of state action will be more discernible. It would be both premature 
and ill-advised to submit proposals for amending the Constitution which, 
during or shortly after the process of adoption, might well be nullified 
or modified by Supreme Court decision.” Reference was made to ex 
perience of Colorado, Connecticut, and Michigan in this matter. Re 
port, p. 10, cited above, page 120, note 13.
See the survey of developments in Christian Science Monitor, January 
4, 1965. Ohio is one of the states whose legislature is now fairly ap-
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3) The people of Montana may wish to modernize the struc 
ture of their Legislative Assembly in other ways, once the 
workings of a fairly apportioned legislature are experienced.
The suggestions for constitutional changes made here go 
slightly beyond the bare required minimum to eliminate the 
provision against division of counties, and to modernize certain 
archaic details. (Language to be deleted is enclosed in paren 
theses); new language is italicized. The affected provisions 
might read as follows:
Article V, Legislative Department:
(1) Section 4, second paragraph:
It shall be the duty of the (first) legislative assembly to 
divide the state into senatorial and representative districts 
(, but there shall be no more than one senator from each 
county). The senators shall be divided into two classes. 
Those elected from odd-numbered districts shall constitute 
one class, and those elected from even-numbered districts 
shall constitute the other class (; and when any additional 
senator shall be provided for by law, his class shall be de 
termined by lot).
(2) Section 4, third paragraph:
One half of the senators elected to the (first) fortieth 
legislative assembly shall hold office for one year, and the 
other half for three years; and it shall be determined by 
lot immediately after the organization of the senate, 
whether the senators from the odd- or even-numbered dis 
tricts shall hold for one or three years.
(3) Section 45:
When vacancies occur in either house they shall he filled 
as provided by statute; in the absence oj a statute, writs of 
election to fill vacancies shall be issued by the Governor 
£or Secretary of State?]
portioned. In the fading hours of a special legislative session on re 
apportionment problems December 29, 1964, its House Rules Com 
mittee “held a brief pre-session hearing” on a resolution to call for 
such an amendment but only one witness appeared and “no action was 
taken.” The Columbus Citizen-Journal for December 30, reported that 
“a similar resolution was also introduced in the Senate, but was killed 
through the combined opposition of Democrats and Governor Rhodes’ 
(Republican) Administration.”
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Article VI, Apportionment and Representation:
(4) Section 2:
The legislative assembly (shall provide by law for an 
enumeration of the inhabitants of the state in the year 
1895, and every tenth year thereafter; and at the session 
next following such enumeration, and also) at the session 
next following an enumeration of the inhabitants of the 
state made by the authority of the United States, shall re 
vise and adjust the apportionment for senators and repre 
sentatives on the basis of such enumeration (according to 
ratios to be fixed by law) or upon the number of qualified 
voters.
The phrase about ratios at the end of the present section 
seems superfluous when apportionment must represent popula 
tion equitably; but a decision in the general apportionment 
statute to create single member districts within populous coun 
ties, based upon precinct lines, might make addition of a phrase 
about qualified or registered voters desirable.
(5) Section 3:
Senate and representative districts may be altered from 
time to time as public convenience may require. When a 
(representative) district shall be composed of two or more 
counties or parts of counties they shall be contiguous, and 
the districts as compact as may be. (No county shall be 
divided in the formation of representative districts.)
Deletion of the last sentence from the present provision will 
accommodate the establishment of single member districts for 
the more populous counties in either house; disappearance of 
this language along with addition of or parts of counties earlier 
in the section would conform to a plan for attachment of por 
tions of certain counties to adjoining counties if this should 
prove to be desirable.8
In full caution, the committees on constitutional amendments should 
explore the possible application of the words “or at all” which appear 
in Article XVI, section 8, prohibiting combinations of counties without 
a popular referendum.
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(6) Delete section 4:
(Whenever new counties are created, each of said coun 
ties shall be entitled to one senator, but in no case shall a 
senatorial district consist of more than one county.)
The first provision seems superfluous under any construction 
of the one man, one vote standard since all parts of the state 
must be equitably represented. The latter part of the section 
is incompatible with a fairly apportioned senate of moderate 
size.
These six changes accomplish a minimum program of con 
stitutional revision while allowing considerable flexibility to 
reapportion the state. They do not divest the legislature of its 
apportionment function.
(7) Sections 5 and 6 of Article VI are archaic and should be 
deleted while the rest of that Article is being amended.
A further amendment, possibly desirable but not imperative, 
would modernize section 1 of Article VI relating to congres 
sional districts. It might be made to read:
(One) Representatives in the Congress of the United 
States shall be elected from districts or the state at large 
(, the first Tuesday in October, 1889, and thereafter) at 
such times and places, and in such manner as may be pre 
scribed by law. When a new apportionment shall be made 
by Congress the legislative assembly shall divide the state 
into congressional districts accordingly.
It appears that Montana’s congressional districts probably 
are within allowable limits of variation in population, and are 
again moving towards equality since the 1960 census; this prob 
lem can be assigned a low priority, well behind reapportion 
ment of the state Legislative Assembly.
These proposals for constitutional amendment are minimal 
and tentative, even as the entire latter portion of this study 
Parts VII and VIII—are nothing more than a reconnaissance 
into the problem of reapportionment.
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Reapportionment, States’  Rights and the Federal 
System
Equitable reapportionment of American state legislatures 
will terminate two generations of increasing alienation be 
tween voters and their legislators, bringing the assemblies of 
the states once again to represent people equitably.
However the Supreme Court may be criticized for its wis 
dom in accepting importunate invitations to enter the appor 
tionment thicket, it must be realized that the response came 
after a generation of public frustration with other approaches 
to their supposedly representative institutions; talk about po 
litical recourse at the polls begged more questions than it 
solved.
Three coincident movements of the present century have 
more than casual relevance to each other—urbanization of so 
ciety, decay in the representativeness of state legislatures, and 
assumption of increasing governmental responsibilities by the 
national government.
A most distinguished observer of American state politics has 
noted that political movements tend to follow channels of 
easiest access among alternative paths to satisfaction.
Institutional gadgets that wear down, discourage, or defeat 
ocal majorities can only drive them to the alternative route to 
action through federal power. . . When the dominant mood of 
an era encounters institutional blockages at the state level, the
0 effective political power is apt to result in accretions 
to federal functions.
All too often, appeals to states’ rights are nothing more than 
a calculation that “a decision against federal action coupled 
with the politico-constitutional system of the states amounts 
to a decision against action.”7 Or it may be a canny recogni 
tion that the choice is between responsible public government
and unresponsible private decision, not between action and 
no action.
In longer perspective, the Supreme Court’s reapportionment 
decisions probably will appear as a kind of last-best offer to
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the states to assume the responsibilities which are theirs in 
the federal system, or make way for a national government 
which has proven that it can and will respond to public needs 
and desires.
Those persons concerned in good faith about federal centrali 
zation might well give their attention to the effectiveness of 
state political systems as instruments of popular government.8

Postscript
HERWEG v. 39TH MONTANA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY
On January 13, 1965, a three-judge United States District 
Court took jurisdiction in the complaint of Phoebe Herweg, 
of Butte, Montana, against the 39th Legislative Assembly, Gov 
ernor Tim Babcock and Secretary of State Frank Murray, filed 
the previous week. The Court took judicial notice that un 
constitutional discrimination [^existed] in both houses of the 
Montana legislature, but stayed further process “until the pre 
sent session of the legislature has had a fair and reasonable 
opportunity to initiate and take steps in the direction of con 
stitutional reapportionment.”
While it would leave the “particular method of apportion 
ment” to the legislature, the Court could “perceive no impedi 
ment which will prevent the current session . . .  from ac 
complishing” the task in time for legislative elections to be held 
in November 1966. A “reasonable procedure” would submit 
proposed amendments to the state constitution for ratification
at this same election.
Meanwhile Article VI, sections 4 and 5 of the Montana Con 
stitution were specifically declared to be “void and of no ef 
fect” and further:
[A]t least for the purpose of temporary apportionment and 
until such time as a more permanent provision has been made, 
the Legislature has the inherent power, unrestricted by an 
valid constitutional limitation, to provide for its own apportion 
ment.
The Court hoped the Legislative Assembly “will exercise the 
function which properly belongs to it,” but parties were in 
vited to submit reports “from time to time” as to developments 
in the legislative session. Upon a showing of “reasonable prob 
ability that the present Legislative Assembly either will fail to 
act or will enact an unconstitutional method of apportionment 
the Court would set a hearing and “make an order effectively
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operating upon the defendants and upon the present session 
of the Legislature.”
Clearly the Court hoped to forestall the need for drastic ju 
dicial intervention of the sort required in several other states 
when legislatures failed either by inaction or by evasive action 
to reapportion equitably.
Should this happen in Montana, the Court saw several al 
ternatives to be open to it:
1) order a call of a special legislative session for reapportion 
ment
2) develop its own temporary apportionment to operate until 
the Legislative Assembly enacts a valid reapportionment
3) order legislative elections at large from the entire state 
in November 1966.1
1Herweg v. Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly of the State of Montana, 
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